Abstract—The recent Spectre attacks have revealed how the performance gains from branch prediction come at the cost of weakened security. Spectre Variant 1 (v1) shows how an attacker-controlled variable passed to speculatively executed lines of code can leak secret information to an attacker. Numerous defenses have since been proposed to prevent Spectre attacks, each attempting to block all or some of the Spectre variants. In particular, defenses using taint-tracking are claimed to be the only way to protect against all forms of Spectre v1. However, we show that the defenses proposed thus far can be bypassed by combining Spectre with the well-known Rowhammer vulnerability. By using Rowhammer to modify victim values, we relax the requirement that the attacker needs to share a variable with the victim. Thus, defenses that rely on this requirement, such as taint-tracking, are no longer effective. Furthermore, without this crucial requirement, the number of gadgets that can potentially be used to launch a Spectre attack increases dramatically; those present in Linux kernel version 5.6 increases from about 100 to about 20,000 via Rowhammer bit-flips. Attackers can use these gadgets to steal sensitive information such as stack cookies or ordinary Spectre gadgets (which will henceforth be called double gadgets), and the second uses new gadgets to steal sensitive information such as stack cookies or canaries, or use new triple gadgets to read any address in memory. We demonstrate two versions of the combined attack on example victims in both user and kernel spaces, showing the attack's ability to leak sensitive data.

I. INTRODUCTION

Computer architecture development has long put emphasis on optimizing for performance in the common case, often at the cost of security. Speculative execution is one feature following this trend, as it provides significant performance gains at a detrimental security cost. This feature attempts to predict a program’s execution flow before determining the correct path to take, saving time on a correct prediction, and simply rolls back any code executed in the case of a misprediction. However, such predictions may mistakenly speculate that malicious code or values are safe, allowing for attackers to temporarily bypass safeguards and run malicious code within misspeculation windows.

The potential of such speculative and out-of-order exploits was first demonstrated by Spectre [23] and Meltdown [31], which revealed a new class of vulnerabilities rooted in transient execution. These attacks have shaken the world of computer architecture and security, leading to a large body of work in transient execution attacks [4], [5], [24], [33], [42] and defenses [8], [38], [39], [40], [51].

Moving away from information leakage, Rowhammer [23] is a complimentary vulnerability that breaks the integrity of data and code stored in a machine’s main memory. More specifically, the tight packing of transistors in DRAM DIMMs allows attackers to induce bit-flips in inaccessible memory addresses, by rapidly accessing physically-adjacent memory rows. Similarly to Spectre, Rowhammer has spawned numerous exploits [3], [11], [13], [17], [18], [27], [32], [34], [37], [40], [43], [45], [47], including the recent bypass of dedicated defenses, such as Targeted Row Refresh (TRR) [50] and Error Correcting Codes (ECC-RAM) [9].

While both Spectre and Rowhammer have been extensively studied individually, much less is known, however, about the combination of both vulnerabilities. Indeed, only one prior work, GhostKnight [55], has considered the new exploit potential resulting from combining both techniques. At a high level, GhostKnight demonstrates that despite their transient nature, speculative memory accesses can cause bit-flips in addresses that Rowhammer could not reach alone, resulting in bit-flips at those memory locations. However, GhostKnight only shows how Spectre can be used to enhance Rowhammer, and neglects to consider the complimentary question of how Rowhammer may be used to enhance Spectre. Noting that most modern machines are vulnerable to both Spectre and Rowhammer, in this paper we ask the following questions:

Can the Rowhammer vulnerability be used to strengthen Spectre attacks? In particular, can an attacker somehow leverage Rowhammer to alleviate Spectre’s main limitation of having a gadget inside the victim’s code with attacker controlled inputs? Finally, what implications do combined attacks have on existing Spectre mitigations?

A. Our Contributions

We demonstrate that Rowhammer and Spectre can, in fact, be combined to evade the proposed defenses and increase the number of exploitable gadgets in widely-used code. In what follows, we provide a high-level overview of this combined attack, called SpecHammer, and discuss our discovery of newly exploitable gadgets in the kernel.

Attack Methods. The core idea of SpecHammer is to trigger a Spectre v1 attack by using Rowhammer bit-flips to insert malicious values into victim gadgets. We present two forms of SpecHammer: the first relaxes the restrictions on ordinary Spectre gadgets (which will henceforth be called double gadgets), and the second uses new triple gadgets to provide arbitrary reads with just a single bit-flip.
Double Gadget Exploit. Ordinarily, Spectre v1 allows an attacker to send any malicious value to a Spectre gadget and read memory arbitrarily within the victim’s address space. The main weakness of Spectre v1 is that it requires a gadget within the victim’s code that uses an attacker controlled offset variable, limiting Spectre v1’s attack surface. The target for the first version of SpecHammer, however, is a portion of code that meets all the requirements of a Spectre gadget, but does not provide the attacker any direct way to control the victim offset. By using Rowhammer, it is possible to modify the offset and trigger a Spectre attack on such victims to leak sensitive data. This attack eliminates Spectre v1’s main weakness, allowing for exploits on a wider range of code.

Unfortunately, Rowhammer can be used to flip, at best, only a few bits for a given word of memory, limiting control the attacker has over the victim offset. Nonetheless, we demonstrate how the attacker, even with limited control, is still able to leak sensitive data. For example, it is feasible to flip bits in the offset such that it points to just past the bounds of an array. This allows for leaking secret stack data, such as stack canaries designed to protect against buffer-overflow attacks [10]. That is, we show how the double gadget exploit can be used to leak such secrets, bypassing stack protection mechanisms.

Triple Gadget Exploit. While the first exploit poses a threat to a common defense against buffer-overflow attacks, its scope is more limited than the original Spectre attack which leaked arbitrary memory in the victim’s address space. The second type of SpecHammer attack, however, can be used to dump the data of any address in memory. This method relies on a triple gadget, which has similar behavior to the Spectre v1 gadget, except that it features a triple nested access. Using this, the attacker can modify an offset to point to attacker-controlled data. This data can be set to point to secret data, which leads to the use of secret data in a nested array access, just as is done in Spectre v1. The attacker-controlled data can be modified to point to any secret within the attacker’s address space, including kernel memory when exploiting a triple gadget residing in the kernel. Thus, a single bit-flip allows for arbitrary memory reads, as opposed to the double gadget which is more restricted in what addresses it can leak.

Challenges. Implementing these SpecHammer attacks presents several key challenges:

1) We must find addresses containing useful bit-flips that can force a victim to access secret data under misspeculation.
2) We need to massage memory to force victims to allocate their array offset variables at addresses that contain these useful flips. For targets residing in the kernel, this means massaging kernel stack memory.
3) We must demonstrate that flipping an array offset value in a Spectre v1 gadget can leak data under misspeculation.
4) Finally, we need to find gadgets in sensitive real-world code to understand the impact of relaxing gadget requirements.

Challenge 1: Producing Sufficient Rowhammer Flips. SpecHammer requires bit-flips at specific page offsets in order to leak secret data. To that aim, we used the code repositories attached to prior work [16], [44], [48], [50] in order to test the susceptibility of DRAM DIMMs to Rowhammer attacks. Unfortunately, the amount of flips produced by these repositories suggests it is hard to find a DIMM with enough bit-flips to practically execute SpecHammer.

However, as we show in Section [V] we observe that all of these repositories make a key oversight regarding cached data: they first initialize victim rows, and then induce bit-flips in DRAM (not caches), but neglect to flush the victim cache line before checking for flips. This leads them to observe cached data when checking for flips, leaving many flips in the DRAM arrays unobserved. By correcting these oversights, we are able to increase the number of bit flips by 248x in the worst case and 525x in the best case on DDR3, and 16x in the best case on DDR4, demonstrating bit-flips are much more common than previous work would suggest. Not only does this allow us to run SpecHammer, but it also makes Rowhammer attacks more practical than previously thought.

Challenge 2: Stack Massaging. For the SpecHammer attack, the target for Rowhammer bit-flips is a variable used as an index into an array. Such offsets are most often allocated as local variables, meaning they are located on the stack. Rowhammer attacks rely on massaging targets onto physical addresses that are vulnerable to bit-flips. However, to the best of our knowledge, only one prior work [40] has demonstrated hammering stack variables, relying on memory deduplication to massage stack data as needed. With deduplication now disabled by default, SpecHammer thus requires a new way of massaging a victim stack into place. Furthermore, the most attractive targets for this attack are gadgets residing in the kernel, as they can be used to leak kernel data, and hence a kernel stack massaging primitive is highly desirable.

Yet, the prior examples of kernel massaging focused on PTEs, rather than the stack [43], or were performed on mobile devices, taking advantage of features exclusive to Android [47]. Thus, we develop new primitives for massaging both user and kernel stacks, in order to allow for stack hammering without the use of deduplication (Section [V]).

Challenge 3: Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Demonstration. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate (in Section [VI]) the variations of the attack on example artificial victims in both user and kernel spaces. We demonstrate the double gadget attack in user space and the triple gadget attack in kernel space due to each attack’s applicability in its respective space. These PoC attacks act as the basis for eventual attacks on the gadgets already found in widely-used code. We demonstrate a leakage rate of up to 24 bits/s on DDR3 and 19 bits/min on DDR4.

Challenge 4: Kernel Gadgets. In order to better understand the effects of relaxing gadget requirements, we found the number of gadgets present in the Linux kernel, with the original Spectre v1 restrictions compared to the amount of SpecHammer gadgets. As shown in Section [VII] we find that with the original requirements, there are about 100 ordinary, double gadgets, and only 2 triple gadgets. Modifying the function to search for gadgets vulnerable to our SpecHammer attack leads it to report about 20,000 double gadgets, and about
170 triple gadgets. Thus, we show the number of potential gadgets in the kernel is greater than previously understood.

**Summary of Contributions.** This paper makes the following contributions:

- Combining Rowhammer and Spectre to relax the crucial requirement of an attacker-controlled offset for Spectre gadgets, discovering more than 20,000 additional gadgets in the Linux kernel (Section III & Section VII).
- Development of new methods for massaging a victim stack in user and kernel space, allowing an attacker to exploit the numerous gadgets present in the Linux kernel (Section V).
- Correcting oversights made by prior Rowhammer techniques to improve bit-flip rate by 525x in the best case (Section IV).
- Demonstrating how SpecHammer gadgets can be used to obtain stack canaries for buffer-overflow attacks and how triple gadgets can be used to provide arbitrary reads from any memory address on example user and kernel space victims, respectively (Section VI).

## II. BACKGROUND

We present the necessary background information on Spectre and Rowhammer needed to understand the new combined attack, SpecHammer. Since Spectre relies on previous cache side-channels, relevant cache attacks are explained as well.

### A. Cache Side-Channel Attacks

The cache was initially designed to bridge the gap between processor speeds and memory latency, but inadvertently led to a powerful side-channel exploited for numerous attacks [25], [26], [52]. By timing memory accesses, an attacker can tell whether data is being pulled from the cache (a fast access) or DRAM (a slow access), and can therefore observe a victim’s memory access patterns.

Most relevant to SpecHammer is the Flush+Reload technique [53]. The goal is to use the cache to observe a victim’s access patterns on memory shared by the victim and attacker. For example, if a victim accesses particular addresses dependent on a secret value, understanding which addresses the victim accesses can leak valuable secret information.

The technique first prepares the cache by flushing any cache lines the victim may potentially access using the clflush instruction. Then the victim is allowed to run, and will only access particular addresses dependent on secret data, loading only the corresponding blocks into the cache. Next, the attacker accesses all blocks of memory the victim may have accessed, while timing each access. If the access is slow, it implies data needs to be moved from DRAM to the cache, meaning the victim did not access any addresses within the block. However, if the access is fast, data is being pulled from the cache, meaning the victim must have accessed an address corresponding to the same cache line. Thus, by taking advantage of the drastic timing difference in latency between a cache hit versus a cache miss, attackers can accurately discern which addresses a victim interacts with and, consequently, any secret data used to control which addresses were accessed.

### B. Spectre

**Speculative and Out-of-Order Execution.** In order to improve performance, modern processors utilize out of order execution to avoid necessarily waiting for instructions to complete when subsequent instructions are ready to be run. In the case of linear execution flow, processors utilize out of order (OoO) execution, running instructions out of program order, and only committing instructions once all preceding instructions have been committed as well. When a program has branching execution paths that depend on the result of certain instructions, the processor uses speculative execution, predicting which path the branch will take. If the prediction is incorrect, any code run in the speculation window is simply undone, causing negligible performance overhead.

**Transient Execution Attacks.** Running instructions before prior instructions have committed, due to OoO or speculative execution, creates a period of transient execution. Such transient execution windows have long been considered benign, as any code that should not have run is rolled back, and only proper code is committed. However, through the meltdown [31] and Spectre [25] attacks, researches have recently demonstrated how OoO and speculative execution, can be used by attackers to force programs to run using malicious values, uninhibited by safe guards that only take effect after the transient execution is complete. By the time the code is rolled back, the malicious values have left architectural side effects (e.g. placed data in the cache) that can be used to leak data even through transient execution. SpecHammer focuses on Spectre and the domain of speculative execution.

#### Listing 1: Spectre v1 Gadget

```plaintext
if(x < array1_size){
    y = array1[x];
    z = array2[y + 4096];
}
```

**Spectre Attacks.** Spectre [25] presents multiple ways in which an attacker can exploit speculative execution. We focus on Spectre v1, which is illustrated with the following example. Assume the victim contains the lines of code shown in Listing 1 and $x$ is an attacker-controlled variable. The attack requires first training the branch predictor to predict that the `if` statement will be entered. The attacker can then change $x$ such that reading $array1[x]$ accesses a secret value beyond the end of $array1$. Even though $x$ may be out of bounds, the secret value will still be accessed thanks to speculative execution, as the branch predictor has been trained accordingly. While the data read from $array2$ is never committed to $z$, speculative execution still causes $array2$ to use the secret value $y$ as an index and load data at ("secret" + 4096) + $array2$ base address into the cache.

The attacker then uses Flush+Reload [53] to check what cache line was pulled, to reveal the $array2$ index, exposing the secret value. One key assumption this attack makes is that the attacker controls $x$, as she needs to change $x$ to the malicious value used to access secret data via $array1$. 

Prevalence of Gadgets. Since Spectre attacks rely on the presence of a gadget in the victim code, the prevalence of gadgets in sensitive code becomes a crucial question. Researchers have developed tools [19], [29], [51] to automate the process of finding gadgets within target code. For example, smatch [29], a kernel debugging tool, was extended with the capability to report Spectre v1 gadgets within the Linux kernel. On kernel version 5.6, smatch reports about 100 gadgets.

Followup Attacks. Upon Spectre’s discovery, numerous papers emerged detailing how alternate variants could be used for new attack vectors [4], [7], [20], [24], [26], [33], [41], [42]. These included performing speculative writes [24], running a Spectre attack over a network [42], and combining Spectre with other side-channels to exploit “half gadgets” that require a single array access within a conditional statement [41].

C. Rowhammer

The Rowhammer bug [23] presents a way of modifying values an attacker does not have direct access to. The exploit takes advantage of the fact that DRAM arrays use capacitors to store bits of data, where a fully-charged capacitor indicates a 1 and a discharged capacitor indicates a 0. As transistors became smaller, DRAM became more dense, packing the capacitors closer together. [23] found that by rapidly accessing values in DRAM, causing them to be quickly discharged and restored to their original values, disturbance effects can increase the leakage rate of capacitors in neighboring rows. Thus, by rapidly accessing (or “hammering”) an aggressor row, an attacker can discharge neighboring capacitors flipping 1s to 0s (or 0s to 1s) in neighboring memory locations.

DRAM Organization & Double-Sided Rowhammer. A DRAM array consists of multiple channels, each of which corresponds to a set of ranks, where each rank holds numerous banks. Each bank consists of an array of rows made of capacitors containing the individual bits of data. While it is possible to cause flips by rapidly accessing single DRAM rows [17], it is much more efficient to use double-sided Rowhammer (i.e. alternating between hammering two aggressor rows surrounding a single victim row). By increasing the number of adjacent accesses, the capacitor’s leakage rate increases, drastically improving the efficiency of inducing flips. Double-sided Rowhammer requires hammering adjacent DRAM rows within the same bank. However, attackers cannot directly see the DRAM addresses of values they interact with. Instead, they can only see the virtual addresses. These are mapped to physical address, which are mapped to DRAM addresses.

Exploits. As with Spectre, Rowhammer inspired numerous exploits taking advantage of the ability to modify inaccessible memory. This began with Seaborn and Dullien [43] demonstrating how a flip can be used both to perform a sandbox escape, as well overwrite page table entries. Many exploits followed [1], [3], [17], [27], [32], [44], [47], demonstrating how Rowhammer can be used for privilege escalation on mobile devices [47], flipping bits through a web browser using JavaScript [16], as well as remotely attacking a victim over a network [32], [45]. Gruss et al. [17] additionally showed how many Rowhammer defenses can be defeated.

GhostKnight. To the best of our knowledge, only one prior work, GhostKnight [55], has demonstrated how Spectre and Rowhammer can be combined for a more powerful attack. Since Spectre allows for accessing arbitrary memory within a given address space, GhostKnight made the observation that rapidly accessing a pair of aggressor addresses can cause flips in the speculative domain. This effectively increases Rowhammer’s attack surface by allowing for bit-flips at addresses only reachable under speculative execution.

III. SpecHammer

Our combined SpecHammer attack shows how Rowhammer can be used to enhance Spectre, bypassing proposed defenses and relaxing the requirements for a Spectre v1 gadget. We present two versions: a double gadget attack and triple gadget attack, each striking a different trade-off between the attack’s capabilities and the assumptions made regarding the availability of gadgets in the victim’s code.

A. Double Gadget Attack: Removing Attacker Control

As discussed in Section II, a key limitation of Spectre v1 is that the attacker must control a variable used as a victim array index. We relax this restriction by using Rowhammer to modify the index variable without direct access.

Listing 2: Pseudocode double gadget

Attack Overview. At a high level, the goal of the double gadget exploit is to mount Spectre v1 attacks even if the attacker does not have direct control over the array offset. We use Rowhammer to modify this offset value, causing an array to access secret data and leak it via a cache side-channel. Listing 2 presents a gadget exploited by the first version of our attack, which uses the same gadgets as Spectre v1. In addition to assuming the presence of such code gadgets in the victim’s code, we also assume that the victim’s address space contains some secret data. Finally, unlike the Spectre v1 attack, we do not assume any adversarial control over the values of x. Rather than controlling x directly, the attacker instead exploits Rowhammer to trigger a bit-flip in the value of x, such that array1[x] accesses the secret data.

Step 1: Memory Templating. The first step in any Rowhammer-based attack is to template memory in order to find victim physical addresses that contain useful bit-flips, i.e., a flip that will cause x to point to the desired data. As described in Section II templating essentially consists of hammering many physical addresses until finding a pair of aggressors that correspond to a victim row with a useful flip. After finding a physical address with a suitable flip, our memory massaging technique (see Section V) is used to ensure that the value of x resides in this physical address, making it susceptible to Rowhammer-induced bit-flips.
Step 2: Branch Predictor Training. After placing the victim’s code in a Rowhammer-susceptible location, the attacker trains the victim’s branch predictor by executing the victim code normally. As we are executing the victim’s code with legal values of $x$, it is the case where $x < array1_size$, which results in the CPU’s branch predictor being trained to predict that the `if` in the first line of Listing 2 is taken. See Figure 1(left) for an illustration.

Step 3: Hammering and Misspeculation. Next, the attacker hammers $x$, leading to the state in Figure 1(right), where a bit-flip (marked in red) increases the value of $x$ such that it points to the secret data past the end of $array1$. It is also necessary for the attacker to evict the value of $x$ from the cache beforehand, ensuring the next time it is read, the flipped value in DRAM is used, as opposed to the previously cached value. After evicting $array1_size$, the attacker triggers the victim’s code. As $array1_size$ is not cached, the CPU uses the branch predictor, and speculates forward assuming that the `if` in Line 1 of Listing 2 is taken. Next, due to the bit-flip affecting $x$, the access to $array1$ uses a malicious offset, resulting in `secret` being used as $array2$’s index, thereby causing a secret-dependent memory block to be loaded into the cache. Finally, the CPU eventually detects and attempts to undo the results of the incorrect speculation, returning the victim to the correct execution according to program order. However, as discovered by Spectre [25], the state of the CPU’s cache is not reverted, resulting in a `secret-dependent` element of $array2$ being cached. See Figure 1(right).

Step 4: Flush+Reload. To recover the leaked data from the speculative domain, the attacker uses a `FLUSH+RELOAD` side channel [53] in order to retrieve the secret. More specifically, the attacker accesses each value of $array2$ while timing the duration of each memory accesses. Since all values of $array2$ were previously flushed from the cache, the attacker’s timed access should be slow if no accesses happened between the eviction and this stage of the attack. However, if a timed access is fast, that memory block must have been recently accessed. In this case, due to the access to $array2[secret\times512]$ during speculation, the attacker should observe a fast access when measuring the offset $secret\times512$, thereby learning the value of `secret`.

B. Triple Gadget Attack: Enabling Arbitrary Memory Reads

The attack presented in Section III-B assumes that the attacker can use Rowhammer to flip arbitrary bits in the victim’s physical memory. In practice, however, Rowhammer-induced bit-flips are not sufficiently common to flip the number of bits required for leaking arbitrary addresses. An attacker can flip, at most, a few bits of the array offset, limiting the addresses she can reach. In order to provide for arbitrary reads even with the limited control provided by Rowhammer, we develop another variation that utilizes “triple gadgets”. With just a single bit-flip, an attacker can use a triple gadget to point an array offset to attacker controlled data. This data can then be set to point to any value in memory, allowing an attacker to leak arbitrary data with a single flip, as detailed below.

Listing 3: Pseudocode triple gadget

Attack Overview. For the triple gadget attack, we utilize a new type of code gadget; see Listing 3 for an example. At a high level, while the original Spectre v1 assumed that an attacker controlled variable $x$ is used by the victim for a nested access into two arrays (e.g., $array2[array1[x]]$), here we assume that the victim performs a triple nested access using $x$, namely, $array2[array1[array0[x]]]$.

By using such gadgets, the attacker can modify the innermost array offset ($x$) such that $array0[x]$ points to attacker controlled data. This, in turn, allows her to send arbitrary offsets to $array2[array1[\ldots]]$, resulting in the ability to recover arbitrary information from the victim’s address space. More specifically, our attacks proceeds as follows.

Steps 1+2: Memory Profiling and Branch Predictor Training. As in Section III-A, the attacker starts by profiling the machine’s physical memory, aiming to find physical addresses that contain useful bit-flips. The attacker then executes the victim’s code normally, thus training the branch predictor to observe that the `if` in Line 1 of Listing 3 is typically taken.

Step 3: Hammering and Misspeculation. Next the attacker hammers $x$, leading to the state in Figure 2 in which a bit-flip (marked in red) increases the value of $x$ such that it points past the end of $array0$, into attacker controlled data. As in the case of Section III-A, the attacker triggers the victim’s code after evicting $array1_size$, which causes the CPU to fall back onto the branch predictor, speculatively executing the branch in Line 1 of Listing 3 as if it was taken. The attacker...
controls the value in address $\text{array0+x}$, which results in an attacker-controlled value being loaded as the output of $\text{array0}[x]$ in Line 2. Proceeding with incorrect speculation, the CPU executes $\text{array1[array0[x]]}$ (Lines 2 and 3), resulting in the attacker controlling (through $\text{array0[x]}$) which address the victim loads from memory. The value of $\text{array1[array0[x]]}$ is then leaked through the cache side channel, following the access to $\text{array2}$ in Line 4.

![Fig. 2: Triple gadget example](image)

**Step 4: Flush+Reload.** Finally, as in the case of Section III-A, the attacker uses a FLUSH+RELOAD side channel in order to leak the value accessed during speculation.

**Comparison to Double Gadgets.** While the triple gadgets require a triple-nested array access inside the victim’s code, they also offer the advantage that multiple precise bit-flips are no longer needed for reading the victim’s data. In particular, as only one bit-flip is used to point $\text{array0[x]}$ into attacker-controlled data, multiple values can be read using the same bit-flip value. By varying the value of $\text{array0[x]}$ and launching the attack repeatedly, the attacker can dump the entire victim address space using a single carefully controlled bit-flip.

**Kernel Attacks.** This attack is particularly dangerous when performed on a gadget residing in the kernel, as a single bit-flip can be used to read the entire kernel space. At first blush, it may seem that Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP), which prevents kernel-to-user accesses, will prevent the attack by disallowing the kernel from accessing the user-controlled data on line 2 of Listing 3. However, in Section VII-B we show how to bypass this mitigation, demonstrating how an attacker can use syscalls to inject data into the kernel, and afterwards use a single bit-flip to point from the gadget to this controlled kernel data. Since SMAP does not block kernel-to-kernel reads, this technique allows for performing the triple gadget attack even with SMAP enabled.

### IV. MEMORY TEMPLATING

The high level description provided in Section III assumes two key prerequisites. First, the **memory templating** step is used to find useful flip-vulnerable address. Next, the **memory massaging** step is used to force the target victim variable to use this address. In this section, we describe the memory templating process, deferring stack massaging to Section V.

The goal of templating is to obtain "useful" bit-flips, meaning they can be used to flip an array offset variable and trigger a SpecHammer attack. Vulnerability to bit-flips depends on the nature of an individual DIMM, requiring hammering many addresses to learn which ones contain useful flips. The techniques used for templating borrow largely from existing work, and we therefore keep the descriptions high-level, referring readers to the appropriate prior work [27], [37] and giving a more detailed description in Appendix A.

#### A. Obtaining DRAM row indices from virtual addresses

As explained in Section II, Rowhammer is drastically more effective when two aggressor rows that pinch a victim row are hammered in succession, a technique called double sided hammering [23]. Finding flips via double sided Rowhammer requires controlling three consecutive DRAM rows. However, as unprivileged attackers, we have no direct way of determining how our virtual pages map to DRAM rows, preventing us from performing double sided hammering. We must therefore reverse engineer this mapping before we can begin hammering. Since virtual address map to physical addresses, which in turn map to DRAM rows, we must obtain both the virtual to physical and physical to DRAM mappings.

For the latter, we use Pessl’s DRAMA technique [37]. For the former, we only need the physical address bits used to determine the corresponding rank, bank, and channel. For a Haswell processor using DDR3, these are the lowest 21 bits. Thus, we can use the techniques presented in RAM-Bleed [27], to obtain a contiguous 2MiB page, giving us the lower 21 physical address bits. Since this technique relies on the recently restricted pagetypeinfo file, we use a new technique that relies on the world-readable buddyinfo file instead (see Appendix A). The time required for this step is unaffected by using the new buddyinfo technique.

For newer architectures that use DDR4 memory, we follow the methodology of TRRespass [14], using transparent hugepages which are enabled by default in Linux kernel version 5.14, the latest version at the time of writing. Note that for a one-DIMM configuration, only up to bit 21 is needed. For two-DIMM configurations, it is possible to use memory massaging techniques to obtain 4MB of contiguous memory.

#### B. Hammering Memory

With all the obtained memory sorted into rows, we initialize the aggressors and victims with values reflective of our desired flips. In our case, we seek to increase an array offset value to point to secret data, meaning we want to flip a particular victim bit from 0 to 1. We therefore initialize potential victim rows to all 0s. Since double sided hammering is most effective when the victim bit is pinched between two bits of the opposite value [23], [27], we set aggressor rows to all 1s, giving a 1-0-1 aggressor-victim-aggressor stripe configuration.

**Inducing Flips.** As done in prior work and existing Rowhammer templating code [16], [44], [50], [54], we repeatedly read...
and flush aggressor rows from the cache to ensure each read directly accesses DRAM and causes disturbance effects on neighboring rows. After doing a fixed number of reads, we read the victim row to check for any bit-flips, which in this case would mean a bit set to 1 anywhere in the victim row’s value. We save addresses containing useful flips (i.e., a bit-flip that would cause an array offset to point to a secret), and move onto the memory massaging phase. Note that the above steps neglect to flush the victim address cache lines. Consequently, when we try to read the victim to check if we induced a flip, we will likely be reading cached initial data.

**The Need for Useful Flips.** Upon running existing Rowhammer code on numerous DDR3 DIMMs, we experienced a somewhat low flip-rate of approximately 2 to 5 flips per hour. However, for our SpecHammer attack, we require specific bit-flips (a single bit position out of a 4KiB page), to point from an array to a secret, meaning it would take an infeasibly long amount of time to find the required bit in the average case. One option to overcome this would be to test many DIMMs until finding one particularly susceptible to Rowhammer, limiting the attack only to such susceptible DIMMs. However, we observed an oversight in existing Rowhammer repositories pertaining to the issue of cached victim data, which causes a susceptible DIMM to appear sturdy against flips, when, in fact, a vast majority of flips are simply being masked by cached data. By modifying these existing repositories, we found that the same DIMMs are vulnerable to thousands of flips per hour, allowing us to perform our attack on DIMMs that were previously thought to be safe.

**Under-reported Flip-rate in Prior Work.** Upon inspection of numerous public Rowhammer repositories designed to test a DIMM’s vulnerability to Rowhammer, we observed that they all made the victim row cache oversight mentioned in the previous paragraph. By performing the above steps, reading a victim row to check for a bit-flip will likely result in reading the cached initialization data, leading to severe under-reporting of the actual number of flips obtainable on any tested DIMMs. Any flips that are reported are likely due to victim data being unintentionally evicted from the cache due to other memory accesses replacing those cache lines. In Appendix C we describe experiments we conducted to prove that cache effects are indeed responsible for masking bit flips.

**Comparison of Rowhammer Techniques.** In order to fully understand the effect this oversight had on finding bit-flips, we compared prior work with our victim cache flush modification. The results are presented in Table I. We ran each program using double sided hammering over a two hour period with a 1-0-1 stripe configuration, then for 2 hours testing for using 0-1-0. The total flips over both runs are shown in the table.

Note that the repository for Rowhammer.js contains an error that uses virtual addresses rather than physical addresses when determining which addresses reside on the same bank, and is thus split into 2 entries: one for the unmodified Rowhammer.js and the other for the same code with the error removed excluding the cache flush oversight. Finally, we used TRResspass, the latest Rowhammer templating repository, exclusively for DDR4, since it uses techniques designed to bypass DDR4 exclusive defenses. The changes we made to these repositories are detailed in Appendix B.

We perform our DDR3 experiments on a Haswell i7-4770 CPU with Ubuntu 18.04 and Linux kernel version 4.17.3. For the DDR4 experiments, we use a Coffee Lake i7-8700K CPU with Ubuntu 20.04 and Linux kernel version 5.8.0. The DDR4 DIMMs all have model number M378A1K43BB2-CRC.

**Results.** For DDR3, when compared to Rowhammer.js with the addressing error removed, our code improved the flip rate by 248x in the worst case, and by a factor of x525 in the best case. As for TRResspass, we found that modifying the the code to include victim cache flushes resulted in 6x to 8x flips on DDR4 DIMMs. While prior Rowhammer surveys have found larger numbers of flips, they did so using techniques unavailable on general purpose machines. In the case of compiler optimization. Similarly, sought to achieve flips on servers, and their techniques can only work on multi-socket systems. In contrast, we use code that is designed for testing one’s own machines for Rowhammer bugs, and show how flushing the victim row can drastically increase the number of flips.

In order to verify these additional flips were a result of cache flushing, we performed additional experiments to verify that data was in fact being pulled from memory and not the cache for each flip. These experiments are detailed in Appendix C.

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**Fig. 3: Linux memory organization**

V. MEMORY (STACK) MASSAGING

With possession of a useful, flip-vulnerable address, the next step is to force the victim variable into this address. The target victim is a variable used as an offset into an array. Such variables are most often allocated as local variables, and hence reside on the victim’s stack. Therefore, in order to flip such variables and trigger the attack, we need to place the victim’s stack on the flip-vulnerable page obtained from the templating step. Only one prior work has demonstrated stack massaging, and used (the now-disabled) page deduplication to do so.

Note that bit-flips correspond to particular DRAM addresses, which are fixed to specific physical address. Physical addresses, however, can be mapped to various different virtual addresses through a page table mapping. Thus, the goal is to force the victim to use a particular physical page.
Furthermore, if the victim resides in kernel code, the attacker needs to massage kernel stacks which adds an additional layer of complexity compared to massaging user space stacks, since an unprivileged attacker cannot directly manipulate kernel pages. While prior work has demonstrated kernel massaging by forcing PTEs to use certain pages, they use methods too imprecise for kernel stack massaging. This existing technique simply unmaps the flip-vulnerable page and fills physical memory with PTEs until one uses the recently unmapped page. For kernel stack massaging, since spawning new threads is resource-intensive, we cannot spray a majority of memory with stack threads and must manipulate memory into a state that maximizes the odds of a limited spray using the target page. Other prior work has demonstrated more deterministic techniques, but are Android specific.

In this section we develop a novel technique for massaging kernel memory by taking advantage of Linux’s physical page allocator, the "buddy allocator" (see Appendix A), and its per-CPU (PCP) list system. Before describing our technique, we provide background on the memory structures we manipulated to achieve our result. An overview is shown in Figure 3.

Memory Zones. Within the buddy allocator, pages of memory are organized. Within the buddy allocator, in addition to being sorted by order, free pages are also sorted by their zone. Zones represent ranges of physical addresses. Each zone has a particular watermark level of free pages. If the zone’s total free memory ever drops below the watermark level, requests are handled by the next most preferred zone. For example, a process may request pages from ZONE_NORMAL, but, if the free memory ever drops below the watermark level, requests from the smallest order possible, but if no small order blocks are available, a larger block will be broken in half, and one half is used to fulfill the request [15].

Page Order. Within each zone, pages are sorted into blocks by size, also called their order, where an order-x block contains $2^x$ contiguous pages. The allocator always attempts to fulfill requests from the smallest order possible, but if no small order blocks are available, a larger block will be broken in half, and one half is used to fulfill the request [15].

Migrate-types. Pages are further organized by migrate-type. Migrate-types determine whether the virtual-to-physical address mapping can be changed while the page is in use. For example, if a process controls virtual pages that map to physical pages with the migrate-type MOVABLE, it is possible to replace the physical page, by mapping the same virtual address to a different physical address [28].

PCP Lists. Finally, the PCP list (also referred to as the Page Frame Cache) is essentially a cache to store recently freed order-0 pages. Each CPU corresponds to a set of first-in-last-out lists organized by zone and migrate-type. Whenever an order-0 request is made, the allocator will first attempt to pull a page from the appropriate PCP list. If the list is empty, pages are pulled from the order-0 freelist of the buddy allocator. When pages are freed, they are always placed in the appropriate PCP list. Even if a contiguous higher-order block is freed, each individual page is placed on a PCP list, and they are merged only when they are returned from the PCP list to the buddy allocator freelist. Thus, the system serves to quickly fetch pages that were recently freed on the same CPU, rather than needing direct access to the buddy allocator.

A. User Space Stack Massaging

Building on existing user space massaging techniques [9], [27], the main goal is to free the flip-vulnerable page currently in the attacker’s possession, and then force a victim allocation that will use the recently freed page. If the number of free NORMAL pages is too low, the allocator will attempt to service the request from ZONE_DMA32 [15].

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A. User Space Stack Massaging

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Stack allocation. User space stacks are allocated upon spawning a new process or thread, and use ZONE_NORMAL, migratetype MOVABLE memory. Additionally, even though they typically use more than one page, the request is handled as multiple order-0 requests, meaning pages are pulled from a PCP List. Pages obtained from mmap calls in user space also use NORMAL, MOVABLE memory, meaning stack pages and the controlled flip-vulnerable page are of the same type. Therefore, freeing the flip-vulnerable page via unmap will place the page in the same PCP list used for stack allocation.

Massaging Steps. Now understanding Linux stack allocation, stack massaging is performed using the following steps:

Step 1: Fodder Allocations. First, we make “fodder” allocations to account for any allocations made by the victim before allocating the stack. It is possible the target variable does not reside on the first page of the victim’s stack. Therefore, we must first calculate how many pages will be used by the victim before the victim allocates the stack page containing the target, and allocate such number of fodder pages.

Step 2: Unmapping Pages. We then free the flip-vulnerable page, placing it in the PCP List, and then free the fodder pages, placing them in the same list above the flip-vulnerable page.

Step 3: Victim Allocation. Finally, we spawn the victim process, forcing it to perform the predicted allocations, and target stack allocation. Any allocations that occur prior to the
target allocation will remove the fodder pages from the PCP List, forcing the stack to use the target page.

Results. This technique works with about 63% accuracy, which is acceptable since it only needs to be done once to mount the attack. If this step fails, we can attempt massaging again, and expect it to succeed within two tries. We can check for a massage failure by running the subsequent steps of the attack (i.e. calling the victim containing the gadget and hammering our aggressors) and checking for data on the cache side-channel. If no data is observed, we re-attempt massaging.

B. Kernel-Space Stack Massaging

Targeting gadgets in the kernel similarly requires forcing stack variables to use specific, flip-vulnerable pages. Like with user-space stack allocation, a kernel stack is allocated upon creation of a new thread or process, and that stack is used for all syscalls made by that thread or process. However, unlike user-space stacks, kernel stacks use UNMOVABLE memory, meaning they pull pages from PCP list different from that used by user space mmap and munmap calls. Therefore, the attacker needs a method to force the kernel to use “user pages” (MOVABLE pages) instead of “kernel pages” (UNMOVABLE pages). We observe from Seaborn [42] that the kernel does use user pages when memory is under pressure, and build on Seaborn’s techniques to allow for a more precise memory massaging technique that allows for massaging kernel stacks.

Fig. 4: Physical Page Stealing

Allocator Under Pressure. As mentioned above, when the zone’s total number of free pages falls below the watermark, the next most preferred zone is used. However, as zones include multiple migrate-types, it is possible for the freelist of the requested migrate-type to be empty, yet have enough total zone memory to be above the watermark. In this case, the allocator calls a stealing function that steals pages from given “fallback” migrate-types and converts them to the type originally requested. As shown in Fig. 4, this function attempts to steal the largest available block from the fallback type. For UNMOVABLE memory, the first fallback is RECLAIMABLE memory, and the second is MOVABLE memory.

Kernel Massaging Steps. The steps required for kernel stack massaging are similar to those of user space stack massaging. The key difference is that the attacker must first apply memory pressure to force the kernel into using user pages.

Step 1: Draining Kernel Pages. As non-privileged attackers, we cannot directly allocate UNMOVABLE pages. However, each time an allocation is made via mmap a page table entry (PTE) is needed to map the virtual and physical pages. Since PTEs use kernel memory, each mmap call uses both user and kernel memory. However, multiple PTEs can fit within a single page, and the address of a PTE depends on its corresponding virtual address. We need to efficiently make allocations large enough such that each PTE needs a new page, but small enough such that the process is not killed for allocating too much memory. Mapping pages at 2MB aligned addresses provides the smallest allocation size such that each PTE allocates a new page. Such allocations are made until no MOVABLE pages remain, using the pagetypeinfo file to monitor the amount of remaining pages. Subsequent mappings will use RECLAIMABLE pages for PTEs. Once the necessary pages have been depleted, the next kernel allocation will use the largest available MOVABLE block.

On machines without access to pagetypeinfo, we instead use buddyinfo (which is world readable for all kernel versions) and monitor the draining of MOVABLE and UNMOVABLE blocks together (performing Step 1 and Step 2 at the same time), only draining order 4 or higher UNMOVABLE blocks. (See Appendix A for a more detailed explanation of buddyinfo compared to pagetypeinfo.)

Step 2: Draining User Pages. Memory is now in a state that will force the kernel to use the largest available MOVABLE block. However, we need the kernel to use a specific single page (the page containing a bit-flip). We, therefore, need to ensure the target page resides in this block. It is advantageous to make the largest available block as small as possible to improve the chance that the kernel uses the target page for its stack allocation. Thus, the next step is to drain as many high-order free blocks as possible, without dropping the total number of free-pages below the watermark. In our machine, we were able to drain all blocks of order 4 or higher.

Step 3: Freeing Target Page. The goal is to free the target page such that it resides in the largest available block. However, freeing this page will send it to the PCP rather than the buddy allocator freelist. Even when it is free from the PCP, if it does not have any free buddies, it will remain in the order-0 freelist. The freed target page needs to coalesce into an order-4 block, such that the single largest remaining free block contains the flip-vulnerable target page. Fortunately, as explained in Section IV, we have already guaranteed the target page is part of an order-4 (or larger) block. Therefore, we can free the target page and all of its buddies to ensure it will coalesce into the largest available block.

The last obstacle is the PCP list, since even when unmapping a contiguous high-order block, all pages are placed on the appropriate PCP list. However, the zoneinfo file shows how many pages reside in each PCP list, and the maximum length of each list, at any given time. Thus, additional pages can be unmapped until the number of pages in the PCP list reaches the maximum length (186 pages on our machines according to zoneinfo). This forces pages to be evicted from the PCP list and sent to the buddy allocator freelist, placing the target page in the largest free block of MOVABLE memory.
Step 4: Allocating Kernel Stack. Having freed the target page, and knowing the next kernel stack allocation will use user memory, we can now force a kernel stack allocation. However, freeing pages to force the target page out of the PCP will have slightly alleviated memory pressure, meaning some UNMOVABLE pages will be free. Kernel stack allocations will consume these pages, and subsequent allocations will convert the block containing the target page into an UNMOVABLE block. Additionally, because of the kernel’s buddy system, the block will be split in half, with one half being used for the kernel stack, and the other half moved to the lower order UNMOVABLE freelist. The target page may be in either half, and allocations must continue to be made to ensure the target page is used for a kernel stack.

Therefore, we use a kernel stack spray, allocating many kernel stacks until the UNMOVABLE pages are all depleted again. We perform the kernel stack spray by spawning many threads. Each thread can spin in an empty loop until the spraying is done, and then be tested one-by-one by having the thread make the victim syscall and hammering the target variable until we observe a leak. Once the thread with the target page is found, the other threads are released. We can now flip a stack variable residing in the kernel.

Results. This technique has approximately 66% accuracy with the pagetypeinfo technique (60% accuracy with buddyinfo). We expect it to succeed within two attempts.

VI. GADGET EXPLOITATION

At this point, we have forced victim stacks in both user space and kernel space to use flip-vulnerable addresses. We can now flip array offset values, force a misspeculation, and leak target values. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate end-to-end double and triple gadget attacks on example victims in user and kernel spaces, respectively. These examples serve to verify the attack’s ability to leak data.

Setup. For the double gadget attack, we use a Haswell i7-4770 CPU with Ubuntu 18.04 and Linux kernel version 4.17.3, the default version shipped on our machine. The DRAM used consists of a pair of Samsung DDR3 4GiB DIMMs. For the triple gadget attacks, we use the same machine in addition to machines with Kaby Lake i7-7700, Coffee Lake Refresh i9-9900K, and Comet Lake i7-10700K processors. The latter three machines each use a DDR4 8GiB DIMM and run Linux Kernel version 5.4.1, 5.4.1, and 5.4.0, respectively. These configurations are shown in Table II. Note that the other two newer processors have additional defenses not supported by Haswell. We demonstrate our attack even in the presence of such defenses. KASLR is enabled on all machines. Additionally, transparent hugepages (THPs) are set to their default setting of being user-allocatable via an madvise syscall.

A. Double Gadget – Stack Canary Leak

In this section we demonstrate how stack canaries can be stolen using a double gadget residing in user space code.

Stack Canaries. A stack canary is a value placed on the stack, adjacent to the return pointer, as a defense mechanism against buffer overflow attacks. An attacker attempting to overflow a buffer and write to a return pointer will overwrite the canary, which causes the program to halt. Due to their low-cost and effectiveness at preventing buffer overflow attacks, canaries have long been widely deployed as effective, light-weight stack overflow defense mechanisms [10].

Even though they are randomly generated, stack canaries of a child process belonging to a parent process will always have the same stack canary. Thus, if a child process’s canary is leaked, it is possible to perform a buffer overflow attack on any child belonging to the same parent, assuming that the code suffers from the memory corruption vulnerability. For example, OpenSSH handles encryption through child processes spawned by a single daemon. Leaking the canary of any one of these child processes allows for circumventing this defense on any other child to leak secret keys.

Listing 4: Double gadget

Example Victim. The victim for this example attack lives within a thread spawned by the attacker, and the victim consists of a double gadget like the one shown in Listing 4, where each array is of type uint16_t (Line 1). The arrays live in memory shared by the victim and attacker, but attacks without this requirement are possible by using a PRIME+PROBE side channel [35]. The code is compiled such that stacks include secret canaries and cease execution if a canary is modified. Having the victim reside in an attacker-spawned thread allows for user space stack massaging, but extends to any process that can be forcibly spawned, such as OpenSSH [27].

Stealing Canaries. Due to their location at the end of the victim stack, just past the end of target arrays, stack canaries act as a prime target for the double gadget attack. Reading the canary requires flipping lower-order bits of the array offset, such that the corresponding array access points just past the end of the array to the stack canary.

A stack canary is typically 32 to 64-bits long and stored at the address just below the return pointer. Spectre v1 attacks steal a single “word” of data per malicious offset value, where a word corresponds to the innermost array’s data type. In our victim, array1 is a uint16_t array. Each malicious value of x points to and steals an 16 bit value, meaning the gadget must be used four times, each with a different malicious value.
Target Flip. The Rowhammer bit-flip needs to push the offset past the end of the victim array and point to the stack canary. Since the stack canary is separated into multiple words, we may either find a victim row with multiple bit-flips, or allow the victim to naturally cycle through values and hammer with the necessary timing to push the offset to different words of the canary. We use the latter approach, since we observe few rows that contain multiple flips on our machine.

Memory Templating and Massaging. We perform memory templating as described in Section 4 to find useful bit-flips. The victim offset resides at a particular page offset within the stack, meaning the required flip must occur at the same offset. Memory was templated for approximately 2.5 hours to find this specific flip. The page containing this flip is unmapped and the victim thread is spawned, forcing the variable within the victim thread to use the flip-vulnerable page.

Trigerring Spectre. The victim is left to run with legal values used for its offset, which trains the branch predictor. We wait for the victim to set the offset to the appropriate value corresponding to the given target word of the canary. For this example, the victim and attack code run synchronously, but FLUSH+RELOAD can be used to accurately monitor the execution of victim code to provide attacker synchronization [24]. We then evict the offset from the cache, forcing the gadget to use the flipped value in a state of mispeculation. One word of the canary is accessed and used as an offset to load data into the cache, allowing us to use FLUSH+RELOAD to retrieve the target. The victim value is left to change, and the hammering is repeated to retrieve the rest of the canary.

Leakage Rate. As mentioned before, the array accesses 16 bits at a time, meaning 16 bits are leaked per flip and instance of FLUSH+RELOAD. We observed a leakage rate of approximately 8b/s, meaning the entire canary is leaked in about 8 seconds with 100% accuracy.

B. Triple Gadget - Arbitrary Kernel Reads

This second example demonstrates how the triple gadget within a kernel syscall can be used to achieve arbitrary reads of kernel memory. This is particularly dangerous since kernel memory is shared across all processes, meaning an attacker with access to kernel memory can observe values handled by the kernel for any process running on the same machine.

```c
if(x < array1_size){
  attacker_offset = array0[x]
  victim_data = array1[attacker_offset]
  y = array2[victim_data+512];
}
```

Listing 5: Triple Gadget

Example Victim. The example victim for this attack is a syscall in which we inserted a triple gadget, as shown in Listing 5. Since syscalls execute with kernel privilege, any data within the kernel can be leaked. For this example, we target a 10-character string within the syscall’s code that is out of bounds from the target arrays. Additionally, the attacker and victim share the arrays used in the triple gadget.

Memory Templating. As done in the double gadget attack, we begin by finding a useful bit-flip. The purpose of the flip here is to force the victim array (in the kernel) to point to the attacker-controlled data. Thus, a specific high order bit-flip is needed to point from the victim to region of data we control. To reduce the time required to find the bit-flip, we configure the victim such that it can use an array offset at any position in the stack, by including victim variables at every offset position. Therefore, there is no need to find a flip at a specific offset; we only need to change a specific bit at any aligned 64-bit word within the page.

Attacker Controlled Data. One method of controlling data in the victim’s address space would be to simply allocate a large memory chunk on the user space heap and fill this chunk with the desired value. The bit-flip would then cause the victim to point from kernel memory to our data in user memory. However, this requires breaking Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) in order to precisely know the difference between the target kernel address and the controlled user space address. Furthermore, Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) blocks the kernel form reading user memory, and is enabled by default on the last several generations of Intel processors [2]. Therefore, we instead inject our data into the kernel at sets of addresses that differ from the target-flip-address by a single bit.

SMAP Bypass. We borrow from kernel heap-spray attacks [12, 21], which demonstrate methods of filling the kernel heap with attacker controlled data. These techniques take advantage of syscalls such as sendmsg or msgsnd, which allocate kernel heap memory using kmalloc and then move user data into these kernel addresses. To prevent these syscalls from freeing the data before returning, attackers use the userfaultfd syscall to stall the kernel. This syscall allows users to define their own thread that will handle any page faults on specified pages. When the attackers call a data-inserting syscall (such as sendmsg) they pass arguments with N pages worth of data, but only allocate N − 1 physical pages. When sendmsg attempts to copy the data from user to kernel space, it will encounter a page fault on the final page. The thread fault handler, assigned by userfaultfd, is configured to spin in an endless loop, leaving sendmsg stuck, after having copied N − 1 pages of user data into kernel memory.

Stack Data Insertion. While the above method is useful for inserting attacker-controlled data into the kernel’s heap, heap-insertion is not useful for SpecHammer since kernel heap addresses will never have only one bit of difference from kernel stack addresses. However, numerous syscalls, including sendmsg, take a user defined message header which is placed on the kernel stack. To ensure that this inserted value will land on an address that is one bit-flip away from the flip-target, we spawn many threads that all use sendmsg to insert kernel stack data, giving high probability (87%) of an address match.

Controlling Page Offsets. The only remaining issue is the offset within the page. Stack offsets for kernel syscalls are always fixed and we need to insert data into an address with a page offset that matches that of our flip-target. Fortunately for
the attacker, there are numerous syscalls (e.g. sendmsg, recvmsg, setxattr, getxattr, msgrsnd) that allow for writing up to 256 bytes of the kernel stack, giving a range of offset options. Additionally, these syscalls are called from other syscalls as well, (e.g. socket, send, sendto, recv, sendmsg, recvmsg) and each of these use a varying amount of stack space before calling the previously listed syscalls, essentially allowing the attacker to “slide” the position of the inserted data up and down the stack.

As an example, we find that the target-variable of the example gadget presented in Section VI-B has a page offset of \(0xd20\) (when it is called during the spawning of a new thread) and sendmsg can be used to control data on the kernel stack from \(0xcf0\) to \(0xd70\). Thus, the triple gadget attack can work by pointing from a victim kernel address to an attacker controlled kernel address, allowing the attack to work in the presence of SMAP. Since KASLR only randomizes the kernel’s base address, the difference between these addresses remains constant, thereby neutralizing KASLR.

Kernel Stack Massaging. Next, we run the kernel stack massaging technique from Section V-B forcing the syscall to use the flip-vulnerable page for its array offset. We allocate numerous threads as part of the stack spray, and there is a possibility none of the kernel stacks contain the flip-vulnerable page. Therefore, we check each thread for the target page, and if the page is not found, we repeat the templating and massaging steps until a target page lands within a kernel stack.

Triggering Spectre. Finally, the thread containing the target page makes the syscall containing the victim gadget, which runs repeatedly with a loop of of legal offset values in order to train the branch predictor. The offset value is occasionally hammered and evicted from the cache, causing the inner most array to point to user data in a state of misspeculation. The FLUSH+RELOAD side channel is used to confirm the target secret (in this case, the value of the victim’s string) has been correctly leaked. We then modify the attacker-controlled data to point to any secret value within the attacker’s address space, and the hammering is repeated to leak the next target value.

Offline Phase Performance When running on the Haswell machine, in which SMAP is disabled and pagetypeinfo is unrestricted, the time taken to find pages with useful flips and land a such a page in the kernel is 34 minutes. While our new buddyinfo and SMAP bypass techniques present slightly reduced accuracies, they conversely reduce the time needed to find flips and land a useful page. The buddyinfo technique relaxes the requirements on draining user pages (to only draining order 4 or larger blocks, rather than draining all blocks), meaning each massaging attempt takes less time.

Furthermore, the SMAP technique allows a range of bits to be useful, since we need any flip that points from (victim) kernel stack to (our controlled) kernel stack. These two regions of memory are much closer together the case of a kernel stack victim and controlled user space region, meaning we can make a selection among many lower order bits (bits 5 through 28) rather than being forced to flip the only high-order bit that points from kernel space to user space (bit 45). Thus, while this technique introduces another probabilistic element (with 87% accuracy) the time needed to find a single useful flip to perform the attack is reduced. Consequently, the attack requires an average 9 minutes on average to find a useful flip and land it in the kernel across all machines.

Leakage Rate. array1 is of type uint8_t, meaning each misspeculation leaks 8 bits of data. After performing the prerequisite templating and massaging steps, the leakage occurs at a rate of 16 to 24b/s on DDR3. We leaked the target string with 100% accuracy. When running on DDR4, multi-sided hammering is required, which requires more time per hammering round, consequently reducing the leakage rate to about 4 to 19b/min (6b/min on average), also with 100% accuracy on the three DDR4 machines listed in Table II.

VII. Gadgets in the Linux Kernel

A. Gadget Search

Smatch. Smatch [29] was initially designed for finding bugs in the Linux kernel. However, after Spectre was discovered, a check-spectre function was added, which searches for gadgets. It searches for segments of code in which a nested array access occurs after a conditional statement, and the offset into the array is controlled by an unprivileged user. It additionally checks if the nested accesses occur within the maximum possible speculation window, and if the accesses use an array_index _nospec macro, which sanitizes array offsets by bounding them to a specified size.

Tool Modification. We modified the tool to remove the condition of an attacker controlled offset, and searched only for gadgets in which the attacker does not control the offset. In addition, we added a function to search for triple gadgets as well, which checks if the value of a nested array access is used as an offset for a third array access.

Results. When running the unmodified check-spectre function on the Linux kernel 5.6, we find about 100 double gadgets, and only 2 triple gadgets. Modifying the function to search for SpecHammer gadgets leads it to report about 20,000 double gadgets, and about 170 triple gadgets.

Bypassing Taint Tracking. Such a large number of potential gadgets exposes more holes for Spectre attacks on sensitive, real-world code. Furthermore, oo7 [51], which is the only defense that can efficiently mitigate all forms of Spectre [4], does not work against SpecHammer gadgets. This defense identifies nested array access that use an untrusted array offset value (i.e. a value coming from an unprivileged user). Any gadgets using such an offset are considered “tainted,” and are prevented from performing out of bounds memory accesses. However, since the newly discovered gadgets use variables that cannot be directly modified by attackers, they are considered trustworthy, and would go unmitigated by oo7.

Additional Gadgets. Even after making the modification to smatch to include gadgets without attacker-controlled offsets, we observed that smatch was still unable to detect all potential SpecHammer gadgets, demonstrating that existing gadget detection tools are not sufficient for finding all exploitable code.
B. Kernel Gadget Exploit

To understand the nature of gadgets that remained undetected by smatch, we chose to explore the kernel source code by hand to identify potential gadgets that may be newly exploitable with the flexibility granted by Rowhammer. For example, in addition to manipulating array offsets, Rowhammer bit-flips allow for the indirect modification of pointers as well. Modifying a single struct pointer can lead to a chain of pointer dereferences ending with secret-dependent cache accesses. This points to a new type of gadget compared to those presented in Spectre [25], as it relies on pointer dereferences rather than nested array accesses. One particular example of this lies in the kernel’s page_alloc.c file.

[Diagram of page_alloc.c]

Fig. 5: alloc_context struct pointer

page_alloc.c This file contains the code used for all physical page allocation. The get_page_from_freelist function in particular contains the SpecHammer gadget; a simplified version with only the relevant code lines is presented in Listing 6. Note that the gadget does not contain consecutive array accesses, but rather dereferences consecutive struct pointers, and uses the result for an array access. The allocation_context (ac) struct pointer, shown in Fig. 5, is particularly important, as many variables used in the function are obtained from this pointer.

```c
void get_page_from_freelist(struct alloc_context *ac) {
    struct zoneref *z = ac->preferred_zoneref;
    for (zone = z->zone; zone; z = find_next_zone(z, ac->zone_highidx);)
        zone = z->zone;{
        preferred_zone = ac->preferred_zoneref;
        idx = preferred_zone->classzone_idx;
        z->lowmem_reserve[idx];
    }
}
```

Listing 6: Code Gadget for the double gadget attack

Forcing Misspeculation By manipulating the value of ac to point to a region of attacker-controlled code, it is possible to control all variables obtained from an ac dereference, and control the victim’s execution flow. More specifically, an attacker run the function normally, teaching the predictor that the for loop at Listing 6 Line 6 will be entered. Then, ac can be modified by hammering such that the dereferences at Lines 3 (z = ac->preferred_zoneref) and 6 (zone = z->zone) set zone equal to NULL. This triggers a misspeculation, since the for loop should terminate immediately, but will actually begin its first iteration due to the prior training. Furthermore, ac has been set such that during this misspeculation, the chain of dereferences at Listing 6 Lines 9 and 10 causes idx to equal secret data, causing a secret-dependent access at Line 12 (lowmem_reserve[idx]), recoverable by cache side channel.

Results. To empirically verify this behavior, we instrumented page_alloc.c file to flip bits as needed, and found it is possible to manipulate the function’s control flow and cause a misspeculation that leaks kernel data. We recovered an 8-bit character inserted in the kernel code that is normally out of range of the manipulated array, by inserting code that uses a FLUSH+RELOAD channel. This can be replaced with PRIME+PROBE to retrieve secrets without modifying page_alloc.

VIII. Mitigations

Spectre. Developing a defense focused on the Spectre aspects is likely the more difficult option. While other variants of Spectre received effective and efficient mitigations [4], [30], [46], Spectre v1 was seen as more as an inherent security flaw caused by branch prediction with no simple solution.

Taint tracking, the only defense previously known to protect against all forms of Spectre v1 [4], [51], is thwarted by the new combined attack, as it relies on a Spectre limitation not present in the combined attack. Other defenses [5], [38], [39] designed to protect against Spectre v1 provide incomplete protection, working only in specific cases, and often come at a prohibitively high performance cost [4].

Rowhammer. For Rowhammer, on the other hand, numerous hardware and software defenses have been developed to prevent or detect bit-flips, beginning with PARA [23]. PARA randomly refreshes rows, giving more weight to rows with repeated accesses. However, this does not guarantee protecting rows that are about to flip, but only grants a high probability of refresh. For our triple-gadget attack that requires a single bit-flip, PARA does not guarantee protection.

A defense similar to PARA, target row refresh (TRR) does guarantee a refresh whenever two aggressor rows pass a certain activation threshold. However, TRResspass [14] has recently shown how bit-flips can be obtained despite TRR by performing scattered aggressor row accesses. Furthermore, by applying this technique, DDR4 was found to be even more susceptible than DDR3 to bit-flips [22].

Another common hardware defense against bit-flips is error correcting codes (ECC). Initially designed to catch bit-flips induced by natural errors, these functions are able to correct single flips, and detect up to two flips, within a given row. However, ECCploit [9] demonstrated a timing side-channel produced by single-flip corrections, that allows attackers to find rows containing multiple flips. By simulatenously flipping multiple bits, Rowhammer attacks can go undetected by ECC, making ECC an ineffective defense.

IX. Acknowledgments

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Fig. 6: Physical to DRAM map for Ivy Bridge/Haswell (taken from [37]).

**APPENDIX**

### Reverse Engineering Virtual to DRAM Address Mapping

The following section explains the techniques used to obtain the virtual to DRAM address mapping needed for double-sided Rowhammer. These techniques manipulate the Linux buddy allocator to first obtain a virtual to physical address mapping [27]. A timing side-channel is then used to determine which physical addresses correspond to rows in the same bank [37], reverse engineering the physical to DRAM address mapping. However, these techniques relied on the pagetypeinfo file for memory manipulation, which has since been restricted to high privileged users. We therefore develop a new technique using the world-readable buddyinfo file.

**Buddy Allocator.** The buddy allocator is Linux’s system for handling physical page allocation. It consists of lists of free pages organized by order and migratetype. The order is essentially the size of a free block of memory. Typically, requests for pages from user space (for example, via `mmap`) are served from order-0 pages. Even if the user requests many pages, she will likely be served with a non-contiguous block of fragmented pages. If there are no free blocks of the requested size, the smallest available free block is split into two halves, called *buddies*, and one buddy is used to serve the request, while the other is placed n the next-largest freelist. When pages return to the freelist, if their corresponding buddy is also in the freelist, the two pages are merged and moved to a higher-order freelist. Migratetypes essentially determine whether a page is meant to be used in user space (MOVABLE pages) or kernel space (UNMOVEABLE pages) [15].

**pagetypeinfo & buddyinfo files.** The pagetypeinfo file shows how many free blocks are available for each order and migratetype. While previous techniques [27], [47] used this file to track the state of free memory, pagetypeinfo has since been made unreadable for low-privilege users. However, a similar file, called buddyinfo shows how many total free blocks are available for each order, combining the number of kernel and user pages. Since pagetypeinfo has been restricted from attacker access, we present a new technique that uses buddyinfo to obtain contiguous blocks of memory.

### Obtaining Contiguous Memory Blocks

In order to control sets of contiguous DRAM rows, we must first obtain a large chunk of contiguous physical memory. For the eventual memory massaging step, described in Section V the bit-flip needs to reside in a contiguous block of memory at least 16 pages long. Additionally, as we will see in the following paragraph, a 2MiB block will be helpful in obtaining physical addresses. However, if we request a 2MiB block via `mmap`, the allocator will service this request via fragmented, rather than contiguous, memory. Therefore, to obtain a 2MiB contiguous block, we first allocate enough memory to drain all smaller sized (1MiB or smaller) user blocks, forcing the allocator to supply us with a contiguous 2MiB block.

**Using the buddyinfo file.** However, with buddyinfo we can only see the combined total of user and kernel blocks remaining, but need to know when the number of 1MiB (and lower) user blocks is worth less than 2MiB of memory. To bypass this issue, we allocate blocks while monitoring the remaining total amount via buddyinfo. By placing our allocations at consecutive virtual addresses, we ensure our allocations will mostly use user blocks, since kernel blocks for new page table allocations will rarely be needed. Therefore we can continue to drain blocks and watch the total 1MiB block count decrease until it hits a minimum value and increases again. This behavior signifies there were no remaining user blocks to fulfill the request, requiring the 1MiB user block free list to be refilled. The observed minimum value is therefore the number of free 1MiB kernel pages, allowing us to subtract this value from the total value at any given moment to obtain the number of free 1MiB user pages.

We run the drain process again, subtracting the number of kernel pages, until the remaining 1MiB user pages equals 0. We can use the same process to drain the smaller blocks until they consist of less than 2MiB worth of memory. Finally, we request two 2MiB chunks of memory via `mmap`. Since the allocator does not have enough smaller order blocks to fulfill this request with fragmented pages, it is forced...
to supply a contiguous 2MiB chunk. Our approach is able to produce 2MiB pages with the same 100% accuracy of Pagetypeinfo. Since the additional step of calculating the number of kernel blocks needs to be performed only once during the entire attack (not once per massaging attack), using the buddyinfo technique incurs a negligible time cost.

**Physical Addresses.** To obtain the virtual to physical memory mapping, we use technique presented in [27]. Having already obtained a 2MiB block, we can learn the lowest 21 bits of a physical address by finding the block’s offset from an aligned address. We obtain this offset by timing accesses of multiple addresses to learn the distances between addresses on the same bank. By identifying the distance for each page within the block, we can retrieve the offset. With the mapping from virtual to physical to DRAM addresses, we can sort virtual addresses into aggressor and victim addresses corresponding to three consecutive DRAM rows.

**DRAM Addresses.** Next, we require the physical to DRAM address mapping. We can obtain it using Pessl’s timing side-channel [57]. This technique takes advantage of DRAM banks’ rowbuffer. Upon accessing memory, charges are pulled from the accessed row into a rowbuffer. Subsequent accesses read from this buffer, reducing access latency. All rows that are part of the same bank share a single rowbuffer. Therefore, consecutive accesses to different rows within the same bank will have increased latency, since each access needs to overwrite the rowbuffer. By accessing pairs of physical addresses and categorizing them into fast and slow accesses, an attacker can learn whether pairs lie in the same bank. Attackers can compare the bits of enough addresses that lie in the same bank to retrieve the mapping from physical addresses to DRAM.

Pessl et al. [27] present the mapping function for numerous processors, such as the Haswell mapping (shown in Figure 6). Therefore, for attacks on Haswell, we can use this mapping as is. For newer processors, we run Pessl’s attack (as provided in [50]) on several machines, and obtain the mapping for Kaby Lake, Coffee Lake, and Comet Lake processors.

**Contiguous Blocks on DDR4.** We previously explained the need for 2MiB blocks when hammering on a Haswell machine, since the physical to DRAM mapping uses the lower 21 bits. Newer processors use up to bit 24 for their mapping when a machine uses two channels with two DIMMs on each channel (4-DIMM configurations). Up to bit 22 is used for two-DIMM configurations and up to bit 21 for one-DIMM configurations [11]. These newer processors are designed to use DDR4. DDR4 Rowhammer techniques such as TRRespass [14], use hugepages to obtain 2MB blocks which are sufficient for one-DIMM configurations. For two-DIMM configurations, memory massaging techniques can be used to obtain 4MB contiguous blocks [11]. For 24-bit configurations, accuracy is reduced by the number of unknown bits, meaning 1/4 reduction of flips in the worst case of 24 bits.

**B. Modifications Made to Rowhammer Code**

**Rowhammer.js Modifications** The code listings in this section show the changes we made to existing Rowhammer repositories to prevent the cache from masking bit-flips. Listing 7 shows the changes made to Rowhammer.js’s native code. The first change starting at line 530 fixes a simple error regarding virtual and physical addresses. The original code passes virtual addresses into the get_dram_mapping function, while this function is designed to use physical addresses. The second modification occurs in lines 561 to 576. In these additional lines of code, we flush any victim rows immediately after they are initialized with test values. This ensures that when we later read these rows to check for flips, we will read directly from DRAM and not the cache. **TRRespass Modifications** Listing 8 shows the modifications made to TRRespass. We found that cache flushes needed to be added to multiple regions of code to minimize the number of hits that occur when checking for flips. Data is first initialized in the init_stripe function starting at line 387. This function is called once during a TRRespass session to initialize the entire region of victim data. While many rows are naturally evicted from the cache due to initialization over a region too large to fit in the cache all at once, many initialized values do still remain in the cache in the original code. We therefore added flushes after every write to memory. Due to how TRRespass organized addresses into columns (col in the for loop) subsequent column values do not lead to subsequent address accesses. If an address being initialized in a given loop iteration happens to come before an address that has already been initialized, the cache’s buddy fetcher may pull an address (that has already been initialized and flushed) into the cache. Thus, we add an additional flush (line 400) to remove buddy lines from the cache as well.

TRRespass then checks for flips using the scan_stripe function starting in line 571. When finding a flip (if res is non-zero), the flipped data is reinitialized to its initial value. However, there may still be some data within the same cache line that has not yet been checked. We therefore flush the cache to ensure checked data is pulled from DRAM and not the cache. After completing a hammering session, TRRespass calls fill_stripe (line 284) which refills victim rows with initial data. Similar to the init_stripe function, we must flush this initial data from the cache. Finally, while the hPatt_2_str function (starting at line 134) does not directly interact with victim data, we found that its memset call does pull victim data into the cache. This is likely due to the processor’s buddy cache system. We therefore flush this memset data as well.

**C. Verifying the Effects of Caching.**

In order to confirm that the reads were in fact reading cached data, we modified the existing code to measure the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page 3</th>
<th>Without cache flushes</th>
<th>With cache flushes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hits</td>
<td>105,530,250</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>misses</td>
<td>377,915</td>
<td>107,347,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%flips on misses</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flips</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III: The effect of flushing victim addresses on Rowhammer.js
Listing 7: Rowhammer.js Modifications

```
if (OFFSET2 >= 0)
second_row_page = pages_per_row[row_index + 2].at(OFFSET2);
if (  
    //******fixed bug***********
    get_dram_mapping((void*) (GetPageFrameNumber(pagemap, first_row_page) * 0x1000))
  !=
    get_dram_mapping((void*) (GetPageFrameNumber(pagemap, second_row_page) * 0x1000))
)  
    //************************
{
    
    #ifdef FIND_EXPLOITABLE_BIFLIPS
    for (size_t tries = 0; tries < 2; ++tries)
    #endif
    {
        //******cache flush victim***********
        int32_t offset = 1;
        for (; offset < 2; offset += 1)
        for (const uint8_t* target_page8 :
            pages_per_row[row_index + offset])
        {
            const uint64_t* target_page = (const uint64_t*)
                target_page8;
            for (uint32_t index = 0; index < (512);
                 ++index) {
                uint64_t* victim_va = (uint64_t*)
                    &target_page[index];
                asm volatile("clflush(%0)":"r*(victim va):"memory");
            }
        }
        //**********************************
        hammer(first_page_range, second_page_range, number_of_reads);
    }
    
    TRRespass Without cache flushes With cache flushes
    hits 23,914,118 14,078
    misses 2,081,626,490 2,105,526,350
    %flips on misses 100% 100%
    flips 431 4,795
```

TABLE IV: The effect of flushing victim addresses on TR-Respass

The number of cache hits and misses that occur per victim address check. We do so using by timing each access and marking fast accesses as cache hits and all slower accesses as cache misses. Since accesses pull entire cache lines into the cache, and each line is 64B, we only measure the first access per cache line, and all other accesses within the same set are labeled according to the timing of their first address. Additionally, we measured the number of hits and misses observed when extra cache flushes were added to ensure we read victim data from DRAM rather than the cache. Finally, we disabled the cache prefetcher [49], since otherwise, accessing a single set would pull additional sets into the cache and make subsequent accesses appear to be cache hits even if they had been flushed prior to hammering. We additionally verified that memset does not use non-temporal (i.e. non-caching) stores on our machines. For the DDR3 tests, we used a Haswell i7-4770 processor running Linux kernel 4.17.3, and Samsung DDR3 4GB DIMM. For DDR4 we used a Coffee Lake i7-8700K processor running Linux kernel 5.4.0 and Samsung DDR4 8GB DIMM. The experiments were run for 2 hours each. The data was initialized with a 0-1-0 stripe pattern.

The results are shown in Table III (DDR3) and Table IV (DDR4). The DDR3 test was based on Rowhammer.js [16] and DDR4 on TRRespass [50] as they are the latest Rowhammer repositories for their respective type of DIMM. For both tests 100% of the flips were observed on cache miss accesses, supporting our observation that the cache masks bit-flips. With the DDR3 tests, neglecting to use victim cache flushes results in a large majority (99.64%) of the flip-checks reading cached data. A non-negligible 377,915 accesses do occur on cache misses, which is likely why the original code was able to observe any flips at all. However, once the cache flushes are added, nearly all the accesses directly read from DRAM, revealing a drastic number of flips that had been previously masked by cache, resulting in a 233x increase in flips.

As for the DDR4 results, the unmodified code already had a large number of misses. The reason is that a larger region of data is initialized all at once before being hammered, which results in much of the data being evicted from the cache due to the cache’s limited size. However, the additional flushes were able to reduce the number of hits by 99.94%, drastically reducing the amount of bit flips masked by the cache.
char *hPatt_2_str(HammerPattern * h_patt, int fields)
{
    static char patt_str[256];
    char *dAddr_str;

    memset(patt_str, 0x00, 256);
    //******new cache flushes******
    clflush(patt_str);
    clflush(patt_str + 64);
    clflush(patt_str + 128);
    clflush(patt_str + 192);
    clflush(patt_str + 256);
    //****************************

    void fill_stripe(DRAMAddr dAddr, uint8_t val, ADDRMapper * mapper)
    {
        for (size_t col=0; col<ROW_SIZE; col+=(1<<6)) {
            d_addr.col = col;
            DRAM_pte d_pte = get_dram_pte(mapper, &d_addr);
            memset(d_pte.v_addr, val, CL_SIZE);
            //******new cache flushes******
            clflush(d_pte.v_addr);
            clflush((d_pte.v_addr) + CL_SIZE);
            //****************************
        }
    }

    void init_stripe(HammerSuite * suite, uint8_t val)
    {
        for (size_t col=0; col<ROW_SIZE; col+=(1<<6)) {
            d_tmp.col = col;
            DRAM_pte d_pte = get_dram_pte(mapper, &d_tmp);
            memset(d_pte.vaddr, val, CL_SIZE);
            //******new cache flushes******
            clflush(d_pte.v_addr);
            clflush((d_pte.vaddr) + CL_SIZE);
            //****************************
        }
    }

    void scan_stripe(HammerSuite * suite, HammerPattern * h_patt, size_t adj_rows, uint8_t val)
    {
        if(res){
            for (int off = 0; off < CL_SIZE; off++){
                memset(pte.v_addr + off, t_vall, 1);
                //******new cache flushes******
                clflush(pte.v_addr + off);
                //*****************************************************************************
            }
            memset((char *)(pte.v_addr), t_val, CL_SIZE);
            //******new cache flushes******
            clflush(pte.v_addr);
            clflush((pte.v_addr) + CL_SIZE);
            //*****************************************************************************
        }
    }
}

Listing 8: TRRespass Modifications