Propagation, Detection and Containment of Mobile Malware

by

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ABSTRACT

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Today's enterprise systems and networks are frequent targets of malicious attacks, such as worms, viruses, spyware and intrusions that can disrupt, or even disable critical services. Recent trends suggest that by combining spyware as a malicious payload with worms as a delivery mechanism, malicious programs can potentially be used for industrial espionage and identity theft. The problem is compounded further by the increasing convergence of wired, wireless and cellular networks, since virus writers can now write malware that can *crossover* from one network segment to another, exploiting services and vulnerabilities specific to each network. This dissertation makes four primary contributions. First, it builds more accurate malware propagation models for emerging hybrid malware (i.e., malware that use multiple propagation vectors such as Bluetooth, Email, Peer-to-Peer, Instant Messaging, etc.), addressing key propagation factors such as heterogeneity of nodes, services and user mobility within the network. Second, it develops a *proactive* containment framework based on group-behavior of hosts against such malicious agents in an enterprise setting. The majority of today's anti-virus solutions are reactive, i.e., these are activated only after a malicious activity has been detected at a node in the network. In contrast, proactive containment has the potential of closing the vulnerable services ahead of infection, and thereby halting the spread of the malware. Third, we study (1) the current-generation mobile viruses and worms that target SMS/MMS messaging and Bluetooth on handsets,

and the corresponding exploits, and (2) their potential impact in a large SMS provider network using real-life SMS network data. Finally, we propose a new behavioral approach for detecting emerging malware targeting mobile handsets. Our approach is based on the concept of generalized behavioral patterns instead of traditional signature-based detection. The signature-based methods are not scalable for deployment in mobile devices due to limited resources available on today's typical handsets. Further, we demonstrate that the behavioral approach not only has a compact footprint, but also can detect new classes of malware that combine some features from existing classes of malware.

To my family.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Motivation

The landscape of malicious code attacks has changed considerably from large-scale Internet worm and virus incidents to more directed attacks against enterprise resources. While the primary damage from traditional worms and viruses such as Code Red [91], Nimda [42] and Slammer [92] has been clogged networks and caused expensive clean-up operations, the new generation of malware is designed to steal confidential information, control remote systems for malicious purposes, and disrupt mission-critical services. These malicious "agents" often deploy worm-like behavior as a spreading mechanism, and exploit multiple vectors for propagation — their intended purpose is to install spyware on enterprise systems customized to collect information (e.g., keystroke loggers), and install backdoors or trojans. Examples of such malware are bot networks ("botnets") [88], and topological worms [85, 121, 154, 158] that spread via file-sharing, instant messaging (IM), IRC chat and email networks. While there has been considerable progress in halting the spread of scanning worms and viruses, there have been few studies on understanding malware spread within a heterogeneous enterprise network, especially when such malware exploits multiple propagation and infection vectors. In general, epidemic models for malware propagation can be developed along two different but correlated time scales: propagation within an enterprise and large-scale propagation on the Internet. The latter usually relies on assumptions of homogeneity and aggregated behavior. To the best of our knowledge, there does not ex-

ist any study that considers the heterogeneity and complexity of an enterprise environment at a sufficient detail when modeling malware dynamics. In particular, three key aspects of malware propagation have not received adequate attention in existing models: (i) enterprise environments exhibit diverse network structures at many scales, e.g., wireless LANs, wired segments, and the core corporate network, with different bandwidth and latency limits, (ii) service interactions among hosts at these scales are crucial parameters affecting propagation, especially topological and mobile viruses, and (iii) mobile users with laptops, personal digital assistants (PDAs) and cell phones can potentially compromise perimeter security such as firewalls, by seeding and accelerating the spread of mobile viruses. In Chapter 2, we address these issues and present a fine-grained agent-based framework for modeling malware propagation in enterprise networks.

Proactive vs. Reactive Defense

As pointed out in [96], the interval between the announcement of a software vulnerability and the emergence of a malware exploiting it is also getting shorter and shorter. For instance, Code Red [91] and Nimda [42] appeared within only 30 and 45 days, respectively, of the corresponding vulnerability announcements. With the increasing speed and sophistication of today's malware agents, it is critical that automated malware detection and containment systems are developed to identify and isolate an attack in the very early stages of its spread.

This motivates the design of an automated malware containment system. The traditional signature-based anti-virus tools offer protection against *known* malware only. "Zero Day" attacks [118] based on previously-unknown attack signatures and vulnerabilities can be difficult to contain with signature-based tools. When a previously-unknown virus or worm is first detected, it currently takes 24 hours or more to develop and distribute an effective patch. Therefore, several studies have investigated automated worm detection and containment systems. For scanning worms, rate limiting techniques [148, 149] have been found to be promising in slowing down a worm during its initial propagation, allowing machines to be patched with appropriate anti-virus signatures. Other studies [49] have investigated behavior signatures an alternative to signature-based methods to detect general classes of worms. Malicious agents that exploit *local information* (e.g., topological, metaserver and

contagion worms [144]) are difficult to detect and contain since they may take advantage of multiple services to spread. Further, topological worms do not use random scanning of IP addresses to find victims since the IP addresses they target can be obtained from a compromised host. Therefore, rate limiting methods that use failed TCP connection attempts, may not be effective against them. Current threat mitigation technologies are mostly "reactive", i.e. the majority of these tools generate alerts whenever a worm or virus signature is detected at a host or in the network traffic. By the time, alerts from multiple hosts and network segments are correlated, the malware agent may have spread to other hosts and subnetworks in the enterprise. As a result, the traditional patching and anti-virus tools are used primarily for cleanup, and not for attack containment. Our primary focus in this thesis is how to provide a *proactive* response in the time window *between* the time an anomaly is detected (i.e., an alert is generated) either at a host or in the network, and the time at which the infection rate has reached that of a persistent epidemic. Chapter 3 presents such a proactive containment framework that applies selective service rate-limiting and quarantine to hosts within the enterprise by looking at their service interactions. Our results indicate that *proactive group-behavior containment* results in an order-of-magnitude stronger defense against a wide variety of worms and viruses than traditional reactive and rate-limiting defenses.

Mobile Devices and Malware

Mobile handsets are increasingly used to access services such as messaging, video/music sharing, and e-commerce transactions that have been previously available on PCs and servers only. However, with this new capability of handsets, there comes an increased risk and exposure to malicious programs (e.g., spyware, Trojans, mobile viruses and worms) [122, 123] seeking to compromise data confidentiality, integrity and availability of handset services. Malware targeting mobile devices use traditional social-engineering techniques (email and P2P file-sharing), as well as vectors unique to mobile devices such as Bluetooth and SMS (Short Messaging Service) messages described below. The past three years alone have witnessed an exponential rise in the number of distinct mobile malware families to over 30, and their variants to more than 170. These malware can spread via Bluetooth and SMS/MMS messages, enable remote control of a device, modify critical system files, dam-

age existing applications including anti-virus programs, and block MMC memory cards, to name a few. Studying such viruses — their capabilities, infection models and vulnerabilities they typically exploit — is therefore an important area of research. In Chapter 4, we provide an in-depth review of currently known mobile worms and viruses.

The mobile viruses discovered so far have caused little damage as they require explicit user interaction for installation and activation. However, potential harm from future malicious agents can be more severe in the form of handset downtime, service disruption due to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, physical damage to device hardware, and theft of sensitive data on the device. Similar to email viruses, these agents may also target SMS/MMS services for distributing spam and phishing messages. There are several factors that make mobile devices particularly vulnerable to future mobile viruses. First, recognizing customer demand for data-rich cellular services, carriers around the world have been deploying 3G (third generation cellular) systems at a rapid pace. Currently, there are more than 130 3G networks [66] (WCDMA and CDMA2000 1X EV-DO) worldwide. Many of these networks offer real-world data rates of 1.4Mbps and 128 Kbps for download and upload, respectively. The download data rates are expected to rise to 7.3 Mbps in early 2008 and 10.2 Mbps in 2009. At these rates, mobile users will be able to run many feature-rich applications on their mobile devices that traditionally require access to a high-speed enterprise network. The processing power (CPU speed and storage capacity) of handheld devices is also increasing rapidly. Many smart phones [12] already contain a full-fledged OS like Symbian, Windows Mobile and Palm OS, allowing users to download a wide variety of applications. Almost all of these OSs support services such as email, SMS/MMS, and application development in C++ and Java. Consequently, the malware writers increasingly find it easier to generate device-generic but vulnerability-specific malware for mobile devices. As a result, the current count of known mobile malware stands at 100, up from only 10 in previous years combined. Chapter 4 presents our study of mobile malware propagation in enterprise environments.

While there are a number of approaches to containing Internet worms and viruses, there are only a handful of solutions developed for mobile devices. These are limited to performing light-weight signature-based scanning of handset filesystem against a limited set of at-

tack signatures. Although such an approach is acceptable today due to the limited number of mobile viruses discovered to date, signature-based solutions are clearly not memory-efficient and do not scale well when dealing with a large number of malware signatures and their variations. Another serious problem to scalability is that a mobile device may receive malware with payloads targeting both wired and wireless devices, e.g., the "crossover" malware described in Chapter 4. This means that messages or data on handsets must be scanned for both mobile as well as regular malware — this will require searching against a *very* large database of known signatures. Due to limited CPU power, storage and memory, installing large signature databases is not an option for mobile devices. Therefore, there is a tremendous need for detecting malicious agents on handsets using alternative means. We investigate one such approach, called *behavioral detection*, in Chapter 5, based on the idea of behavior vectors for mobile viruses discussed in Chapter 4.

1.2 Primary Research Contributions

1.2.1 Enterprise-Level Malware Modeling

We have studied three parameters crucial to describing malware propagation in enterprise environments: *service interactions among hosts*, *local network structure*, and *user mobility*. The majority of the parameters in our study are derived from real-life network traces collected from a large enterprise network, and therefore, represent realistic malware propagation and infection scenarios. We propose a general-purpose agent-based malware modeling framework targeted to enterprise environments. We examine two likely scenarios: (i) a malicious virus such as Cabir spreading among the subscribers of a cellular network using Bluetooth, and (ii) a hybrid worm that exploit email and P2P file-sharing to infect users of an enterprise network. In both cases, we identify the parameters crucial to the spread of the epidemic based upon our extensive simulation results.

1.2.2 Proactive Group-Behavior-Based Defense

While previous research in worm defense identified the need for *proactive containment* for combating topological worms, there appears to be very little published work on algorithms for proactive containment and its comparison with traditional defense methods. We evaluate two key algorithms: *proactive rate-limiting* and *proactive quarantine* against topological worms. These algorithms are studied using traffic traces collected from a large enterprise network and a fine-grained agent-based malware modeling tool. We then propose a *proactive group behavior*-based worm containment algorithm in which vulnerable hosts proactively enter into a group-defense mode based on their interactions with other infected and suspicious hosts. This is motivated by the fact that topological worms exploit the social networking aspects of email, P2P, IM and SMS networks, rather than the physical layout of an enterprise network. We automate the calculation of group behaviors by first constructing a *service-behavior* topology of the enterprise from its service-level traces, and then finding clusters of *similar behavior* in the topology. We compare the effectiveness of individual and group proactive containment. Our results show that proactive containment can significantly slow down a fast-spreading worm in the early stage of the epidemic.

1.2.3 Understanding Emerging Mobile Worms and Viruses

We investigate the propagation of mobile worms and viruses that spread primarily via SMS/MMS messages and short-range radio interfaces such as Bluetooth. First, we study these vulnerabilities in-depth and derive the infection vectors based on a survey of current-generation mobile viruses. We then build an infection state machine of mobile worms on handheld devices and use it to build specific instance of a recent worm such as Commwarrior. Next, we simulate its propagation in a cellular network using data from a real-life SMS customer network. The simulator models each handheld device as an autonomous mobile agent capable of sending SMS messages to others (via an SMS Center), and is equipped with Bluetooth. We incorporate a shadow-fading model for Bluetooth to account for terrain and environment effects. Since mobile malware targets specific mobile OSs, we consider diversity of deployed software stacks in the network. Our results reveal that hy-

brid worms that use SMS/MMS and proximity scanning (via Bluetooth) can spread rapidly locally within a cellular network, making them potential threats in public meeting places such as sports stadiums, train stations, and airports.

1.2.4 Mobile Malware Detection

Current-generation mobile anti-virus solutions are primitive when compared to their desktop counterparts, and may not be scalable given the small footprint of mobile devices as new families of cross-platform malware continue to appear. We propose a novel behavioral detection framework to capture mobile worms, viruses and Trojans, instead of the signature-based solutions currently available for mobile devices. First, we generate a database of malicious behavior signatures by studying over 25 distinct families of mobile viruses and worms targeting the Symbian OS, including their 140 variants, reported to date. Next, we describe a two-stage mapping technique that constructs these signatures at run-time from monitoring the system events and API calls in Symbian OS. We discriminate malicious behavior of malware from normal behavior of applications by training a classifier based on Support Vector Machines (SVMs). Our evaluation results indicate that behavioral detection can identify current mobile viruses and worms with over 96% accuracy. We also find that the time and resource overheads of constructing the behavior signatures from low-level API calls are acceptably low for practical deployment. Most mobile device manufacturers and mobile service providers can implement our proposed framework without any major modification of the handset operating environment.

1.3 Organization of the Dissertation Proposal

The dissertation proposal is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes our work on enterprise-level malware modeling considering heterogeneity of nodes, services and user mobility. In Chapter 3, we present and evaluate a hybrid group-behavior-based defense for proactive containment of malware spreading within an enterprise network exploiting common enterprise services such as email, IM, P2P etc. Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive

survey of common exploits and vulnerabilities in SMS/MMS messaging and Bluetooth that are increasingly the target of mobile virus writers. We also simulate the propagation of a virus similar to Mabir in a cellular SMS network to study its potential spread. Chapter 5 presents the behavioral detection approach for mobile malware. We conclude in Chapter 6 with a discussion of several aspects of this problem where future work can be pursued.

CHAPTER 2

Enterprise-Level Modeling of Mobile Malware

2.1   Introduction

In this chapter, we develop realistic models of hybrid topological worms and mobile viruses at the time-scale and network structure of an enterprise environment, addressing the three requirements listed in Chapter 1. Most of the parameters in our epidemic models are derived explicitly from traces collected from the large Class-B IP network of an enterprise and a large cellular provider of SMS/MMS messages. Although our simulation results show the epidemic spreading within these target enterprise environments, our modeling approach is general and can be applied to any enterprise. We make three primary contributions. First, we demonstrate that the current epidemic models fail to capture services, bandwidth, user mobility and connectivity structure of an integrated enterprise environment consisting of wired, wireless and cellular segments. Second, we present a general-purpose simulation framework for understanding malware epidemics in such *integrated* environments. Our framework, called *Agent-based Malware Modeling* (AMM), explicitly incorporates non-homogeneous service interactions, host connectivities, network bandwidth, channel models of short-range radio devices and user mobility within an enterprise. The basis of AMM are autonomous agents that incorporate realistic models of services and mobility. The agents are arranged hierarchically in much the same way as how an enterprise network is designed. For example, in our implementation of AMM, *"base station agents"* can monitor and collect aggregated statistics of activities of *"mobile device*

agents" in their respective WLANs. Third, based on our extensive simulation results, we suggest a number of mitigation strategies that can be implemented in an enterprise. This is a complex task given the different types of network interfaces available for users in such environments. In Chapter 3, we describe an overlapping defensive system model combining quarantine and rate-limiting at access points and critical servers. This is motivated by the fact that mutually supportive multi-dimensional defenses will be necessary to combat future malware targeting the enterprise environment. A major benefit of our framework is that it can be used by enterprises to assess the vulnerability of their network from emerging malicious worms and viruses, and to decide where to place defensive measures before such attacks take place.

The chapter is organized as follows. We discuss the primary challenges in enterprise-level modeling of malicious agents in Section 2.2. Next, we discuss the most significant propagation vectors and likely attack scenarios in enterprise environments in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 describes our agent-based modeling and simulation framework in detail, including infection models for services commonly targeted by malware, and user mobility models as implemented in the framework. In Section 2.5, we simulate two likely attack scenarios presented earlier to understand the factors affecting the spreading rate of an epidemic. Section 2.6 briefly reviews existing literature on malware modeling. We provide concluding remarks in Section 2.7.

2.2   Modeling Challenges

There are three major challenges in accurate modeling of an epidemic within an enterprise setting. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any model of topological and mobile malware that takes into account all three aspects of an enterprise environment.

Service diversity   Enterprise environments consist of networked hosts with a variety of OSs, applications and services running on them. Even when a set of hosts are running similar services, not all of them are equally vulnerable to the same exploits due to delays in patching and different versions of client software. The epidemic models [91, 92] devel-

oped for wide-area networks, such as the Internet, do not consider such heterogeneity at the level of individual hosts and services. However, diversity is important when we consider enterprise-scale epidemics where the homogeneity assumption is no longer valid. A naive application of the popular Kephart-White epidemic model [72] to describe a mobile virus spreading in a cellular network does not produce the correct epidemic spread. To incorporate heterogeneity in epidemic models, many previous studies (e.g., [154]) have assumed a vulnerability ratio for the population. However, it is not clear how one can come up with a vulnerability ratio for hybrid worms that exploit multiple services as in the case of Nimda and Fizzer. The present epidemic modeling framework explicitly captures message-level service interactions among the hosts of an enterprise, and captures the diversity of services and the host environment (OS, application, transport protocols, etc.). The service interactions from malicious agents are superimposed on the normal background traffic calculated from collected traces, and therefore, represent a more realistic environment.

Network structure   The shortcomings of the uniform-mixing assumption have led to development of epidemic models that capture the effects of contact patterns between individuals, instead of the mean-field theory. In uniform-mixing models, an infected host has the same probability of infecting any vulnerable host in the population — this assumption is clearly not valid for topological worms that exploit the local network structure. Therefore, several recent studies have investigated the effects of local network connectivity on epidemic spreading. We refer to [97] and the references therein as the relevant literature, particularly on complex networks, small-world effects, models of network growth, and power-law degree distribution. The various models can be divided into two broad categories based on whether the contact network structure is either "small-world" [25] or "scale-free" [76]. The scale-free nature of technological networks and epidemic spreading in such networks have also been studied, for example, in [45] and [101], respectively. However, these studies derive only the steady-state outcome of the epidemic in the limit of long times, and do not provide the time evolution of the infection process which is crucial in understanding how an epidemic spreads in its initial stages. The propagation dynamics of malicious codes in various models of scale-free networks have been studied by a number

of researchers [24, 31]. In majority of these studies, topologies are generated with power-law degree distributions via either the Barabasi and Albert (BA) [25] or the Klemm and Eguiluz (KE) [76] algorithm for a specified number of nodes and a given power-law index. For example, Figure 2.1 plots a typical distribution of the computed "betweenness centrality" (BC) of P2P, email and overlapping (hosts having email and P2P services) topologies from our traces collected from a large class-B IP network. The BC at a vertex k is computed as follows. Let $C_k(i, j)$ denote the set of the shortest pathways between a pair of vertices i and j through the vertex k. The fraction $g_k(i, j) = \frac{C_k(i,j)}{\sum C_k(i,j)}$ indicates the importance of the vertex k between two vertices i and j. The BC of vertex k is then defined as $g_k = \sum_{i \neq j} g_k(i, j)$. Figure 2.1 confirms the scale-free nature of the service topologies in a real-life enterprise environment. However, replacing an enterprise service topology with a corresponding power-law network model still does not account for the true propagation dynamics. Since malicious agents exploit specific vulnerabilities in sequence of messages and in popular applications, the service interactions constitute an important criteria for infection. This is best captured when service topologies are constructed explicitly from traces collected from the target enterprise network.

Mobile users   The mobile communications devices introduce new propagation vectors such as Bluetooth, SMS/MMS messaging and object transfers in the enterprise environment. User mobility changes the service topology as devices move around the physical environment of the enterprise. The problems with the Kephart-White infection model applied to model epidemics that spread via short-range RF such as Bluetooth have been identified in a recent study [89]. The standard epidemic models fail because they ignore node velocity and the non-homogeneous connectivity distributions among the nodes. In addition, the location-specific density distribution of mobile devices can potentially affect the spread of an epidemic. Further, the spread of an epidemic has not been studied in an enterprise environment that consists of overlapping mobile wireless and wired segments with users switching to different network resources in different locations of an enterprise. Our framework addresses this by incorporating user mobility models along with the services and device diversity mentioned above.

Figure 2.1: Betweenness Centrality (BC) of email and P2P topologies

Next, we discuss emerging mobile malicious agents in more detail since they represent a growing threat to enterprise security.

2.3   Mobile Malware in Enterprises

2.3.1   Potential Harm by Mobile Viruses

The mobile viruses discovered so far have caused little damage as they require explicit user interaction for installation and activation. However, potential harm from future malicious agents can be severer in the form of terminal downtime, service disruption due to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, physical damage to device hardware, and theft of sensitive data on the device. Similar to email viruses, these agents may also target SMS/MMS services for distributing spam and phishing messages. We discuss below four primary factors that make enterprise networks particularly vulnerable to mobile viruses.

1. **Processing power:** The processing power (CPU speed and storage capacity) of handheld devices is increasing rapidly. Many smart phones [12] already contain

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a full-fledged OS like Symbian, Windows Mobile and Palm OS, allowing users to download a wide variety of applications. Almost all of these OSs support services such as email, SMS/MMS, and application development in C++ and Java. Consequently, the malware writers increasingly find it easier to generate device-generic but vulnerability-specific malware for mobile devices. For example, the current count of known mobile malware stands at 170, up from only 10 in previous years combined.

2. **Increased connectivity:** There is now widespread availability of 802.11b WLANs ("hotspots") and high-speed wireless broadband data services in major metropolitan areas. These services allow many mobile enterprise users to stay connected to their email, messaging and ERP (enterprise resource planning) applications from outside their corporate LANs. Increased availability, however, facilitates mobile viruses to cross over from wireless to wired network segments of an enterprise. More advanced crossover viruses than Cardtrap.A [61], designed for transfer between mobile devices and desktop PCs, may be developed to exploit this increased connectivity. There are also DoS attacks possible in connected WLANs [26] and SMS messaging networks [52] — such attacks can be launched by handsets compromised by mobile malware.

3. **Standardization:** Mobile devices are increasingly developed on a small number of OS platforms. The three most popular mobile OSs — Symbian, Windows (CE and Mobile) and PalmSource — share 62.8%, 15.9% and 9.5% of the global smart phone market, respectively [12]. The development environment is also increasingly consistent across devices. For example, the Java 2 Platform, Micro Edition (J2ME) is deployed on millions of consumer and embedded devices. Such standardization will allow virus writers to develop malware targeting both mobile and non-mobile hosts.

4. **Integration with enterprise applications:** Core enterprise applications such as customer relationship management (CRM) and enterprise resource planning (ERP) increasingly allow integration of third-party email and messaging services. These applications allow SMS gateway plug-ins providing a two-way interactive communication platform among the CRM and ERP application users. Since CRM and ERP applications are extremely popular among mobile users, any vulnerability in SMS

Figure 2.2: Enterprise malware propagation vectors

clients can be exploited within these applications by mobile malicious agents.

2.3.2 Propagation Vectors

Recent worms and viruses are shown to exploit multiple propagation vectors, such as email, file-sharing, and messaging in addition to IP address scanning. Bots such as Spybot.IVQ [124] even target enterprise applications (e.g., Microsoft SQL and MySQL servers with weak password protection) for propagation. In this subsection, we first consider spreading mechanisms of hybrid topological worms and mobile viruses. We then develop a set of most likely attack scenarios for an enterprise network. Finally, we model these scenarios in an emulated enterprise environment to study the epidemic spread and to identify the most significant parameters. Figure 2.2 presents a unified classification of malware based on two primary modes of propagation: *scanning* and *topological*. The different vectors are shown in rectangles with representative malware examples written underneath. Since the number of reported malware and their variants is very large, we only provide a few well-known examples for each class of malware. While earlier worms largely employed random and sequential scanning, virus generators increasingly write their malware that can spread using a combination of vectors. For example, as shown in Figure 2.2, the Fizzer

worm [121] exploits IM, IRC, e-mail and file-sharing networks, whereas Mabir [123] can spread via both proximity scanning using Bluetooth and SMS messages on cell phones. We discuss the current generation mobile malware in-depth in Chapter 4.

2.3.3 Enterprise Malware Payloads

Some of the common payloads found in enterprise environments are adware, phishing, keystroke loggers, unauthorized remote administration tools, browser-helper objects, distributed attack (e.g., DDoS) tools, tracking cookies and P2P software. Instead of specific examples, we give a common form of exploit that most spyware typically uses. The spyware injects a process into Internet Explorer (IE) which then logs keystrokes corresponding to certain key words into a text file. It may also monitor and log data in MS Windows clipboard as well as the protected storage area of IE. The protective storage area is used by the *AutoComplete* feature of IE for storing personal information such as addresses, social security numbers, credit cards, login and passwords to be filled out automatically on HTML forms. When the log file reaches a certain size, the spyware program sends a notification message with the key stroke information, TCP ports and the victim IP address to a web site controlled by the attacker. It periodically listens on these TCP ports for instructions from the remote attacker. Some spyware also disables anti-virus vendor web sites by adding them to the hosts file of Windows.

While email-based phishing [23] is a widespread problem in the Internet, SMS messages have also been exploited recently for this purpose [111]. The attacker sends out an SMS message to an unsuspecting cell phone user with a message that's designed to lure the user into dialing a number masquerading as a credit card company or a bank. Similarly, the potential for sending spam (both text as well as graphical/video messages) to many cellular subscribers using SMS and MMS gateways on the Internet is also very high. The virus definitions available on security vendor websites explain many other payloads commonly observed with hybrid and mobile malware.

Object	Components and Parameters	Source (T / M)
Wired	Number of hosts, N_h	T
	Network Topology (array), $G(E_h, N_h)$	T
	IP Addresses (array), $IP(N_h)$	T
	Background Traffic Matrix (array), $T_b(G)$	T
Wireless	Number of WLANs, N_l	T
	Access Point Locations (array), $\underline{\mathbf{x}}_w$	T
	Number of hosts in WLANs (array), N_{wl}	T
	Mobility Models, M_{wl}	M
	Background Traffic Matrix, $T_b(W)$	T/M
Cellular	Number of Base stations, N_s	T
	Cell Locations (array), $\underline{\mathbf{x}}_c$	T
	Number of devices in Cells (array), N_{cs}	T
	Mobility Models, M_{cs}	M
	Service Gateway Locations (array), $\underline{\mathbf{x}}_g$	T
Service Infection Models	List of vulnerable segments, S	T
	Service Topology (array), $G(S)$	T
	Infection Parameters (see Section 4)	T/M
	Vulnerability Ratio, v	T/M

T: Trace, M: Emperical Models, T/M: Some parameters are derived from traces

Figure 2.3: Parameters affecting domain-specific malware propagation

2.3.4 Parameters Affecting Malware Propagation

Enterprise networks consist of a combination of wired and wireless LANs, along with an overlapping cellular data/voice segment to facilitate the mobile workers across geographical locations. Not all of these network segments are equally vulnerable to a malicious worm or virus epidemic. The spreading rate of an epidemic within a segment is determined by a number of factors such as presence of vulnerable services, available bandwidth, density of vulnerable hosts/IP addresses, and user mobility patterns. These factors, along with a model of the service-infection process, constitute a high-fidelity model of the malicious agent. Figure 2.3 lists the parameters we have used for network segments in our malware modeling framework. We also show the data source of each parameter, indicating whether the data can be derived from enterprise traces (T), empirical models (M) and a combination of both (T/M). Note that for wireless and cellular segments, we need suitable models of

user mobility to reflect how services and service topologies change as users move around the enterprise network. The service gateways and access points play an important role in forwarding messages among the wired and wireless/cellular segments of an enterprise, and therefore, represents important mitigation points where detection and containment of malicious agents can be performed. Therefore, we have incorporated access points and base stations in our modeling framework. As Figure 2.3 shows, the service-infection models have a set of general parameters such as list of vulnerable segments over which the service exists, the topology of service interactions, and the ratio of vulnerable hosts (with the service targeted by the malware) to total number of hosts in the enterprise. The infection parameters are highly dependent on the type of service a malware targets. For example, in case of a mobile worm targeting Bluetooth, the range of the Bluetooth radio signal is an important parameter. On the other hand, an email virus requires user interaction to spread, so the probability of opening an infected email may constitute an important parameter to consider when modeling an email worm. We discuss our implementation of service-specific infection models in Section 2.4.

We now focus on several possible ways a malicious agent can spread in an enterprise exploiting the diversity of its network segments and devices. The goal is to model these scenarios explicitly and understand the vulnerability of our target enterprise to malware targeting popular services. Our target is the enterprise where we collected our traces from and derived the above infection parameters. The methodology can be applied to any enterprise network as long as one can collect a reasonable amount of traces, enough to derive the above parameters.

(1) Scenario 1 (mobile devices): This is the most immediate threat that exists today. Even if the core enterprise network is protected from outside attacks via firewalls and perimeter intrusion detection systems (IDSs), mobile devices such as laptops, PDAs and cell phones can get infected while outside the corporate firewall, and bring the malicious agent inside the enterprise perimeter by synchronizing with an internal desktop or a server. One possible way to contain such agents is to install anti-virus software on the mobile device itself. Several vendors have recently announced such software for mobile devices. However, most mobile systems are designed to make a tradeoff between energy consumption, processing

power and storage. Therefore, security schemes such as VPNs (processing-intensive) and signature-based detection may not be appropriate for cell phones and PDAs as more and more mobile viruses appear. Further, unlike desktops within the corporate network, users of mobile devices are often allowed to download or disable any application on their devices, further complicating the security requirements.

(2) Scenario 2 (vectoring): This refers to a form of attack in which a set of hosts are initially compromised and then used to launch attacks against more valuable systems within an organization. Such attacks can be targeted against specific access points or base stations, and can even take the form of a DDoS attack. Consider a busy airport in which passengers can download flight arrival/departure information or reserve seats via their wireless PDAs.[1] Virus writers may develop a malicious agent that can discover other nearby mobile devices via proximity scanning (explained later), and then send a large number of requests to the nearest base station, causing a DoS attack on a target service. Vectoring is not limited to mobile devices. It can potentially be used to spread cross-domain (i.e., wired to wireless or vice versa) malicious agents, for example, by piggybacking on email or IM and SMS messages.

(3) Scenario 3 (multi-scanning techniques): A future malicious agent may be capable of deploying multiple scanning techniques to spread widely in a given network. The limiting factors to its growth will be only available bandwidth and vulnerable/unpatched services. Current-generation worms already use a combination of scanning methods. The various scanning methods a malicious agent can deploy within an enterprise network are: (i) *proximity scanning* via the Bluetooth or IrDA interface in which nearby devices are discovered within the short-range radio distance, (ii) *history scanning* in which a malicious application, once embedded, can monitor recently-dialed phone numbers and incoming messages to create a hitlist, (iii) *topological scanning* in which the agent discovers vulnerable hosts via address books, URLs, buddy lists, application data caches, etc., (iv) *localized, sequential and subnet scanning* in which a set of local and sequential IP addresses are scanned for vulnerabilities rather than choosing IP addresses at random. Note that *random scanning* of vulnerable IP addresses, while effective in the large Internet, is not the best spreading

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[1]Such facilities have already been available in a number of airports across the world.

strategy in the context of an enterprise network. Therefore, we focus on combinations of strategies (i)–(iv) that yield a highly effective epidemic spread.

Next, we detail our agent-based malware modeling framework.

2.4 Modeling of Malware Propagation

2.4.1 Motivation

We argue that the standard epidemic models of malware propagation are not adequate to model an enterprise environment consisting of wired, cellular and wireless segments. The agent-based malware modeling (AMM) is viable and more accurate in this case.

Deterministic methods [91, 92] developed for modeling the previous generations of worms, such as Code Red, Sapphire and variants thereof, are well-suited to characterize the spread of an epidemic in large populations such as the Internet. However, they are not accurate for modeling small populations such as an enterprise environment. These models unrealistically assume perfect-mixing and homogeneity within the population. Malicious codes that propagate by exploiting local node connectivity can hardly be modeled by the homogeneity assumption. The homogeneity assumption fails to hold on both host attributes (i.e., diversity of OSs, services, and mobility) as well as the network structure among the hosts. The diversity of host attributes is an important consideration for realistic modeling because not all hosts are equally vulnerable within an enterprise from a given malicious code attack.

The homogeneity assumption also doesn't hold when interactions are highly correlated with network structure. Topological worms [24, 154] spread by targeting specific services such as IM, P2P and email — the topology of these service-interaction networks[2] may lead to significant deviations from the results of the differential equation-based models. Similarly, in case of mobile nodes, the connectivity patterns change depending on how users roam around the network as well as their speed and pause times. An agent-based modeling approach can relax the homogeneity and perfect-mixing assumptions by (i) in-

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[2]The term "contact networks" is also used in the epidemiology literature.

corporating heterogeneity in agent attributes, (ii) modeling the state transitions of an agent as an explicit stochastic process and (iii) allowing highly-structured topologies of service interactions among the agents. The service-interaction topologies can be generated from traffic traces collected from an enterprise network, and input to the agent-based model.

Note that AMM provides a natural description of an enterprise. It can easily incorporate changes in individual user mobility patterns and messaging patterns among the hosts (i.e., service interactions). This makes the model closer to reality than aggregated equation-based methods. As discussed in [29], agent-based modeling makes it possible to realize the full potential of the data an enterprise may have to describe the dynamics of a physical phenomenon. For example, mobility patterns and service interactions among the hosts can be extracted from traces and session logs. An accurate representation of an enterprise environment is important when one needs to assess vulnerability from malicious code attacks targeted to a *given* enterprise. Furthermore, the individual behavior of hosts can be complex given the many different applications and services running on a host. The complexity of differential equation-based approaches will have to increase exponentially to account for hosts running multiple services. On the other hand, AMM models activities at the host (i.e., at the agent level), and sources of randomness are applied to these activities and the underlying service queues as opposed to arbitrarily adding noise terms to an aggregate epidemic model.

While AMM can readily incorporate host diversity and interaction topologies, the computations required to perform a full sensitivity analysis can be expensive due to the large number of parameters in a typical agent-based model. Clearly, such an approach is not feasible for modeling malware propagation over the entire Internet. However, our studies show that enterprise-level modeling with AMM is feasible and offers a much richer simulation approach to mobile malware modeling. Due to the stochastic nature of AMM, it is possible that in some cases, either no epidemic is observed or the epidemic ends early even when the basic reproduction number ($R_0 > 1$) indicates otherwise. We investigate this further in our evaluation (Section 2.5), and show that the local network structure greatly influences the probability of an infection spreading through an enterprise.

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
Figure 2.4: Flowchart of AMM prototype

2.4.2 Modeling Framework

We now describe our AMM prototype developed for studying malware propagation in enterprise networks. We model an enterprise as a collection of networked and autonomous decision-making entities called *agents*. The agents represent networked devices within an enterprise, such as desktops, servers, laptops, access points, PDAs, and cell phones. The connectivity among these devices depends on the enterprise network topology. In case of agents representing mobile devices, the connectivity changes as users roam about the physical space of the enterprise. The behaviors of the agents are specified by a set of services running on them. For example, an agent may consist of client programs for email and instant messaging, whereas another agent may consist of an email (SMTP) server only. Thus, there are two types of topologies in our simulation environment. The *physical* connectivity is determined by the physical network infrastructure, movement of the agents, location of access points and base stations, whereas the *logical* connectivity is determined by the protocol messages exchanged among the agents. An agent may participate in multiple logical topologies corresponding to different services like email, IM, P2P, etc. We also group the agents in a hierarchical manner. For example, agents representing wireless access points can keep track of mobile devices in their respective wireless local area networks (WLANs). Accordingly, access point agents are able to collect information aggregated over the individual devices in their WLANs. This capability of higher-level agents to aggregate observations collected from lower-level agents reflects real-life processing of information within an enterprise. The information processed at these different levels can also be used to activate different response mechanisms against a spreading malware.

Figure 2.4 shows a flowchart of our prototype simulator. The first step is to prepare the following input parameters for AMM: (i) *infection-model parameters* for the target services, (ii) *topology* of service interactions among the hosts, (iii) *location* of access points and base stations, (iv) *mobility models* for hosts that are mobile, (v) *attack vector* of malware, (vi) *detection model* of malware and (vii) *an attack response model* (containment, rate-limiting, anti-virus, etc.), if any. At the beginning of a simulation run, agents are instantiated with appropriate class-specific data structures. At each timestep, the coordinates

Figure 2.5: Agent attributes and functions

of mobile agents are updated based on their mobility models resulting in new connectivity graphs. Next, each agent exchanges messages with other agents according to the service model — the probability of any of these messages being infected is calculated from the service-infection model. The time steps are repeated over a user-specified number of trials so that the results can be averaged over these trials. The simulator is general enough to experiment with different algorithms for malware detection and containment. The detection algorithm can be implemented at various levels of hierarchy, e.g., at individual devices, access points or networks segments, depending on the granularity of the detection algorithm. Similarly, when an infection is detected, containment steps can be activated at various levels.

The infection-model parameters and service topologies can be extracted from traces collected from an enterprise network. The infection-model of a service consists of parameters that affect the propagation of a malware targeting a specific service. We describe infection-model parameters for email, P2P, IM and Bluetooth in Section 2.4.2. The model parameters are ideally fitted to data from a set of network traces collected from the target enterprise environment as shown in Figure 2.4. However, data from existing literature are often sufficient for incorporating an infection model exploiting a given service. Examples of possible services that may be targeted by emerging malware are SMS/MMS, web services and VoIP. Reliable infection models for these services are not yet available. However, using our simulator, various possible infection models can be studied — this is where the trace-driven AMM can be very attractive and promising. The inclusion of a service-infection model results in a more realistic epidemic spreading in AMM. An alternative is to simply input the topology of a particular service like email, and consider all nodes in the graph equally vulnerable to an email worm. The spread of the epidemic in this case solely depends on a constant infection probability and the topology of the email network. While most modeling literature on malware spreading that exploits services follows this methodology, this simulates only the worst-case attack scenario and may not represent the true spreading of the epidemic within an enterprise.

Figure 2.6: Model of an infection targeting a service

Agent Attributes

Figure 2.5 shows an UML representation of our AMM prototype. The framework has three major classes of agents: *domain agents* maintain a list of all global parameters, perform averaging over multiple trials and contain a number of *network segment agents*. The network segment agents can be of three types: *wired, cellular* and *wireless* (e.g., 802.11b WLANs). Each segment agent contains a number of *device agents* (i.e., hosts). In case of wireless and cellular segments, the device agents are built with embedded mobility models (described later), whereas for a wired network segment, the device agents are stationary. Note that the segments can be overlapping, i.e., a wireless segment can be built on top of a wired segment with access points being the communication links between the two segments. As mentioned earlier, we also explicitly construct agents to model access points, base stations and service gateways for popular applications such as messaging and email. This allows us to investigate not only malware propagation but also containment and mitigation strategies.

Agent mobility   Mobile and wireless devices are a rapidly increasing constituent of an enterprise environment. To simulate such an environment, AMM employs mobile agents.

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There are a variety of mobility models available to simulate different cellular and ad hoc wireless environments. We refer to [28, 33] for a discussion of these models. We have implemented two commonly-used models proposed for ad hoc wireless and cellular environments, namely, Random Waypoint (RWP) and Gauss-Markov (GM) mobility models, respectively.

In the RWP model, a node randomly chooses a destination in the simulation area and moves at a speed v chosen randomly from the uniform distribution $[v_{min}, v_{max}]$ along a straight path towards the destination. Then, the node pauses for a constant time t_{pause} before it chooses a new destination randomly. A node in the RWP model is, therefore, characterized by its current coordinates, current speed, current destination point and pause time. Following [95], we avoid the initial high variability in average neighbor numbers by discarding the results of the initial 1000 seconds of simulation time and then saving the mobile positions as the initial starting locations of our simulation.

The GM mobility model uses a Markov process in updating both speed and direction of a mobile node. Originally proposed for simulation of PCS networks [82], GM allows adaptation to different levels of randomness via a tunable parameter. In GM, each node updates its speed (s_t) and direction (d_t) at time t based on their values at time $t-1$ as:

$$s_t = \alpha s_{t-1} + (1-\alpha)\bar{s} + \sqrt{(1-\alpha^2)} s_{x_{t-1}} \tag{2.1}$$

$$d_t = \alpha d_{t-1} + (1-\alpha)\bar{d} + \sqrt{(1-\alpha^2)} d_{x_{t-1}} \tag{2.2}$$

where $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$ is the tuning parameter, $\bar{s}$ and $\bar{d}$ are the mean value of speed and direction as $n \to \infty$, respectively. $s_{x_{t-1}}$ and $d_{x_{t-1}}$ are random variables drawn from a Gaussian distribution.

Service-Infection Models

In AMM, a device agent can be set up to run a set of services. Following the worm taxonomy model of Ellis [48], we denote the service availability as a mapping of services to ports and write it as a set of tuples $\{(s_1, port_1), (s_1, port_1), \cdots, (s_n, port_n)\}$. Some of these services constitute the set of exploits for a spreading malware. Figure 2.6 shows the state machine of a generic service running on an agent. The set of states of a service

Infection Model	Model Parameters	Source
SMS	message sending rate, $n_s(N_{cs})$	T
	message receiving rate, $n_r(N_{cs})$	T
	cdf of user-to-user message size, B	T
	SMS user topology, $G(N_{cs}, E_{cs})$	T
	cdf of message service time, T_s^{sms}	T
	malicious agent messaging rate, $m_s(I_{cs})$	M
	message reading probability, P_r^{sms}	M
Bluetooth	path loss component,	E
	standard deviation for fading model,	E
	threshold radius, r_0	M
	transmit power, p_t	E
	threshold receive power, $p_{r,th}$	E
IM	message sending rate, $n_s(N)$	T
	file transfer rate per user, $n_f(N)$	T
	cdf of message service time, T_s^{im}	T
	malicious agent messaging rate, $m_s(I_{cs})$	M
	message reading probability, P_r^{im}	M
P2P	file query rate, $n_q(N_p)$	T
	cdf of session duration, S	T
	cdf of peer uptime, T_{up}	T
	file opening probability, P_f^p	M
Email	email checking time interval, $T(\sim N(_T, {}^2_T))$	M
	email opening probability, P_m	M

T: Trace, M: Emperical Model, E: Calibration Experiement

Figure 2.7: Service-infection models and their parameters

are {Immune, Vulnerable, Infected, {Quarantined, Throttled}}. {Quarantined, Throttled} represents fine-grained states denoting the defensive action taken when an infection is detected. This allows one to simulate different defensive measures and compare their effectiveness. For known attacks, an anti-virus patch can also be applied to a service, thereby transitioning the state of the service from *Infected* to *Immune*. A device can attain any of the three final states {Quarantined, Throttled, Immune}.

A device agent sends and receives messages from other agents corresponding to each service tuple $(s, port)$. The service class data structure achieves this via separate send and receive message queues for each service. Each service also has an infection model of a malware exploiting the specific vulnerability. The state transition from *Vulnerable* to *Infected* is determined by this infection model. The infection model is service-specific and consists of a set of parameters with their values given either as data ranges or probability density functions. Figure 2.7 lists the service-infection model parameters for SMS, Bluetooth, IM, P2P and Email, that we have implemented in AMM. The sources of these

parameters are traces collected from an enterprise (T), emperical models of user behaviors (M) and calibration experiments (E). When the state of any service is *Infected*, the outgoing messages from an agent are tagged as *Infected* based on runtime values of these parameters. Similarly, when an infected message is received from another host, the infection model determines whether the service state should be changed from *Vulnerable* to *Infected*. Next, we detail service-infection models for SMS, Bluetooth, IM, P2P and Email.

Bluetooth RF model: The connectivity of an ad hoc wireless network such as those formed by Bluetooth and other short-range RF devices strongly influences the effectiveness of malware spreading via proximity scanning. To determine if two Bluetooth-enabled devices are neighbors, one can simply use a threshold distance (r_0). For example, in case of class-2 Bluetooth devices, $r_0 = 10m$. However, one should consider a more realistic wireless channel model by considering shadowing effects that are induced by the presence of obstacles. This means that the connectivity between two devices is now a stochastic parameter. Following Bettstetter and Hartmann [28], we adopt a log-normal shadow fading model to determine if an infected device can send a message to a nearby device using an existing vulnerability in the Bluetooth stack. In a shadow fading environment, the signal attenuation, $\beta(u,v)$ between a pair of nodes u and v is expressed as the sum of (i) a deterministic geometric component β_1 based on the relative distance $r(u,v)$ and (ii) a stochastic component β_2 where

$$\beta_1(u,v) = \alpha.10.log_{10}.(\frac{r(u,v)}{1m})dB \tag{2.3}$$

and β_2 is chosen from a log-normal probability density function:

$$f_{\beta_2}(\beta_2) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma}.exp(-\frac{\beta_2^2}{2\sigma^2}) \tag{2.4}$$

where α is the path-loss component ($2 \leq \alpha \leq 5$) and σ is the standard deviation ($\mid \sigma \mid \leq 10dB$). For a given transmit power p_t and a threshold receive power $p_{r,th}$, two devices u and v are neighbors if the attenuation between them satisfies: $\beta(u,v) \leq \beta_{th}$ where the threshold attenuation β_{th} is given by:

$$\beta_{th} = 10.log_{10}.(\frac{p_t}{p_{r,th}})dB \tag{2.5}$$

Eqs. (2.3) and (2.5) along with the mobility models give us a propagation model of a malware that exploits Bluetooth vulnerability and spreads to different areas of an enterprise as the users move about the physical space.

IM model: We refer to [85] for a dicussion of IM worms, client vulnerabilities and proposed defensive measures. The epidemic modeling of IM worms available to date does not consider realistic network topologies and IM user behavior. Further, user-behavior data for major IM networks such as MSN, YIM and AIM are not readily available. Our model for IM worm propagation consists of: message sending rate ($n_s(N)$), file transfer rate ($n_f(N)$), message service time (T_s^{im}), malicious agent messaging rate ($ms(I_{cs})$) and message (i.e., attachment or link) opening probability (P_r^{im}), where N and I_{cs} represent the total number of IM users and the set of infected IM users, respectively. Of these, $n_s(N)$, $n_f(N)$ and T_s^{im} can be derived from IM server logs within an enterprise.

P2P model: The authors of [154] present an epidemic simulator that takes as input Gnutella topology graphs and the probability of a node being a guardian node. They denote a guardian node as a member of the P2P network that can detect a worm and forward alerts to its neighbors. Although they consider the effect of node diversity by having a fraction of the nodes as initially immune to the attack, they did not consider the peer-level diversity. The propagation of a file-sharing worm is influenced by such factors as peer uptime (T_i^{up}), peer query activity (Q_i), and session duration (S_i). If peers tend to be unavailable frequently, a file-sharing worm will not spread quickly. This is because the degree of replication necessary to ensure that the file content is consistently accessible is low for peers with small up-times. Similarly, peer activity levels and how peers issue and respond to queries, influence the probability of an infected file to be downloaded. We adopt the distribution functions for peer up-time, query activity and session duration described in [108, 110] based on experimental observations of common P2P networks. Similar to mass-mailing worms, a downloaded file must be opened by the user for the file-sharing worm code to be activated. Therefore, we add a file opening probability (P_i^f) for each peer.

Email model: We adopt the model developed by Zou *et al.* [158] based on human behaviors affecting email worms. Their model is based on two key parameters: an email checking time interval (T_i) which is the time interval between checking two consecutive emails at host i, and an opening probability (P_i^m) which is the probability of a user on host i opening an email with a worm-infected payload or attachment. As in [158], we assume that the mean of T_i and P_i are generated from Gaussian-distributed random variables $T(\sim N(\mu_T, \sigma_T^2))$ and $P(\sim N(\mu_P, \sigma_P^2))$, respectively. The parameters used for T and P are: $\mu_T = 40, \sigma_T = 20, \mu_P = 0.5, \sigma_P = 0.3$.

Although there have been recent studies on the modeling of malware propagation using IM, P2P and Email, our work has important differences from these studies. The usage of real-life traces to construct the service-infection models creates realistic enterprise environments. In our framework, services can be composed for any given host in the network, and therefore, hybrid worms using IM and P2P (e.g., Bropia) can be easily simulated. These simulations generate realistic traffic corresponding to IM and P2P messages in topologies that are constructed directly from the enterprise traces. As an example of hybrid worms, we will later study a Mabir-like virus that spreads via both Bluetooth and SMS messages among the subscribers of a cellular network.

2.5 Simulation of Attack Scenarios

In this section, we investigate two likely attack scenarios using the AMM framework. First, we study the potential spread of a Bluetooth-based virus such as Cabir in a multi-cell cellular network. Next, we investigate the spreading rate of a hybrid topological worm that can spread via both Email and P2P file-sharing networks.

2.5.1 Proximity Scanning via Bluetooth

This attack scenario considers mobile subscribers of a cellular data and voice provider. We assume that a fraction of the subscribers have unprotected Class-2 Bluetooth-enabled

Parameter	Value
Path-loss component (α)	3
Standard deviation (σ)	4 dB
Threshold attenuation (β_{th})	30 dB
Threshold distance (r_0)	10m
RWP Model v_{slow}	[2,24]m/sec
RWP Model v_{fast}	[350,400]m/sec
Pause time (t_{pause})	0
Vulnerability ratio (v)	[0,0.1,0.9]
Initial Infections $I(0)$	[1,4]

Table 2.1: Parameters for proximity-based propagation

cell phones, PDAs and other mobile devices. The range of a Class-2 Bluetooth device is typically 10 m. The coverage area of the subscribers is serviced by 10 base stations. We consider two different channel models: (i) a threshold radius of 10 m, and (ii) shadow fading described in Section 2.4. In the latter case, the connectivity of the mobile nodes is dependent on the terrain conditions. We then simulate the spread of a Cabir-like virus [123], a much-publicized mobile virus that infects unprotected Bluetooth-enabled devices. The mobility of users is modeled using RWP and we consider both "slow"- and "fast"-moving users to study the effect of node velocity on the spread of the virus. The various parameters for the simulation are presented in Table 2.1. The notations are explained in Figures 2.3 and 2.7.

Let $E(I(t))$ be the expected number of infected nodes at time t over 10 trial runs of the simulator. We have used a time step of 200 ms, and all simulations were continued for 1000 time steps unless all nodes in the network were already infected. We consider two cases of initial infection, $I(0) = 1$ and 4. Since Cabir affects only devices running the Symbian OS, we have included the vulnerability ratio (v) to denote a fraction of the nodes with this particular OS. Figure 2.8 shows the effect of node velocity on the spread of the epidemic. At very high velocities, the connectivity of the nodes change very quickly,

Figure 2.8: Effect of node velocity on Cabir propagation

allowing for a high mixing between infected and vulnerable nodes. This accounts for the large difference in $E(I(t))$ between the slow- and fast-moving experiments, especially at a low vulnerability ratio ($v = 0.1$). It is interesting to note that when most of the nodes in the network are vulnerable ($v = 0.9$), the spread of the virus is no longer dependent on the node velocity because the majority of the interactions with an infected node result in new infections.

Figure 2.9 shows the impact of choosing a particular Bluetooth channel model on the growth of the epidemic. The shadow fading model results in higher connectivity among the nodes, thereby increasing the probability of contact with an infected node. This is in contrast with infection based on a threshold radius of 10m. The epidemic growth curves based on the threshold radius model for $v = 0.1$ and $v = 0.9$ are virtually identical. The data in Figure 2.9 illustrates the need for accurate modeling of the radio interface in mobile virus spreading. To account for devices running other mobile OSs, we present the results for different values of v and $I(0)$ in Figure 2.10. The results are intuitive since a higher value of either v or $I(0)$ will result in a higher growth rate of the virus. To understand the effect of pause times, we simulated the virus spreading with $v = 0.9$, slow-moving users and pause times of 0, 100ms and 1000ms. Figure 2.11 indicates that as pause time increases, the mixing among the infected and vulnerable nodes decreases, resulting in a slower spread

Figure 2.9: Effect of channel models on Cabir propagation

of the epidemic.

In a recent study [89], the authors studied the spread of a Bluetooth virus in a mobile adhoc network based on the threshold radius approach. Although they did not consider the effect of channel fading, we simulated one of the examples presented in [89] to compare the results. There is an important difference in the two sets of simulations. The infection model in [89] consists of a removal rate δ where as our study assumes that a mobile node, once infected, stays infected for the rest of the simulation, i.e. we consider a completely unprotected network. However, we can still compare the average connectivity among the nodes between the two approaches since this is an important parameter not considered by the traditional deterministic SI (Susceptible-Infected) and KW models. Following [89], we ran a simulation with 60 mobile nodes in an area of $1000x1000$ square meters and a speed range of $[5, 20]m/s$. We also assumed that the nodes are equipped with a class 1 Bluetooth device ($r_0 = 100m$). After 3000 time steps, we calculated the average connectivity of the nodes to be 2.09 as compared to a value of 2.37 in case of [89]. We also found the initial growth rates of the two simulations very similar. There is a persistent infection in case of [89] but the classical KW model overpredicts its magnitude.

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
Figure 2.10: Effect of vulnerability ratio on Cabir propagation

Table 2.2: Trace properties

Parameter	Value
Size (bytes)	5756476279
Duration (seconds)	3600
# Packets	120067838
# IP addresses	11647
# Vertices (email)	2126
# Edges (email)	2550
# Vertices (P2P)	7150
# Edges (P2P)	7287

2.5.2   Topological Spreading via Email and P2P File-sharing

Next, we study the propagation of hybrid topological worms that can spread via multiple vectors, in particular email and P2P file-sharing networks. Specific examples of this class of worms are Bagle.AH and Netsky.C (see Figure 2.2). From the collected traces of the Class-B IP network, our simulation framework reconstructs topologies of email and P2P networks at periodic intervals, corresponding to the respective protocols (SMTP, IMAP, and POP for email; Gnutella, eDonkey, and BitTorrent for P2P). These time-stamped service topologies are then input along with the corresponding infection models to simulate propagation of a hybrid mass-mailing and P2P file-sharing worm. Table 2.2 shows the properties of a typical trace we used for this set of simulations.

Figure 2.11: Effect of pause time on Cabir propagation

Figure 2.12 compares the number of infected hosts for the hybrid (email and P2P) worm with a mass-mailing worm, for an initial number ($N(0)$) of infected hosts $N(0) = 2$ and 10. Initially-infected hosts are chosen at random with an equal probability in the email and P2P topologies. We perform 1000 repetitions with each set of simulation parameters to calculate the average values of the number of infections. Figure 2.12 indicates that a hybrid worm can spread extremely fast through an enterprise by exploiting multiple services. Since the growth rate of spreading is very high, a fully-automated containment system is necessary to prevent the spread of such worms — human countermeasures will be useless. The results in Figure 2.12 assume that all email and P2P hosts are equally vulnerable to the worm attack. In practice, there is considerable diversity in client versions, OS, hardware and application software. This diversity especially affects hybrid worms targeting multiple services. To account for such diversity, we repeat the above simulations with different numbers of initially-immune nodes. Figure 2.13 shows the number of infected hosts for different fractions of the vulnerable population (denoted as *v*). The results indicate a significant reduction in the total number of infected hosts due to node diversity.

Figure 2.12: Propagation of single-vector and hybrid topological worms

Figure 2.13: Effect of end-host diversity on hybrid worm propagation ($N(0) = 10$)

2.6   Related Work

The most relevant literature are malware simulators such as [83, 103, 137]. However, these simulators assume a simplified model of Internet connectivity and employ a mathematical model for the worm traffic. They do not consider an *integrated* enterprise network that may contain wired, wireless and cellular segments. As a result, any change in topology due to user mobility is not reflected in the simulations, thus limiting these simulators to consider traditional worms and viruses that affect only wired hosts. To simulate epidemics in very large networks with millions of hosts (i.e., Internet-scale epidemics such as Code Red and Melissa), several researchers have developed distributed worm simulators. For example, the authors of [145] presented PAWS, a distributed simulator running on the Emulab testbed. The authors derived inter-AS (Autonomous Systems) bandwidth data from existing literature to simulate the major Internet ASes, and developed congestion models from worm traffic. They simulated scanning worms (Code Red v2 and Slammer) and showed excellent agreement with the experimental data from the real world. While very powerful for studying Internet-scale epidemics, PAWS may not be suitable for studying the heterogeneous environment of an enterprise network as well as topological worms. A number of simulators have attempted to recreate the AS topology of the Internet. Our approach is to generate topologies specific to the vulnerable services directly from the enterprise traces. Note that this is not possible for Internet-scale simulators. However, for enterprise-level modeling and vulnerability assessment, trace-based simulations provide a detailed and more realistic method. Another excellent distributed simulation framework for the Internet is presented in [103]. The authors used GTNetS and PDNS (a parallel version of NS-2) simulators to generate packet-level traces of worm traffic. Due to the large computational overhead, these simulators are typically run on powerful clusters (often deploying 100 CPUs or more).

There are many epidemiological models of worm spread reported in the literature. The deterministic models use simplified assumptions of homogeneous topologies and aggregated behavior. We have mentioned the relevant literature in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. The bulk of our simulation studies involve topological worms and mobile viruses. Section 2.4.2

refers to the existing literature for models of worms that spread via email, P2P and IM networks.

2.7   Concluding Remarks

The traditional epidemic models of malicious agent propagation do not capture several unique properties of a mobile enterprise network. Service interactions among the nodes at different time-scales create different vulnerable service topologies, rather than an average degree of connectivity among the nodes, as assumed by many epidemiological models. Mobile users with laptops, PDAs and cell phones not only contribute to these time-varying service topologies, but also introduce new vulnerabilities as well, e.g., Mabir-type viruses that can spread via SMS/MMS messages and Bluetooth connections. Further, today's enterprise networks consist of diverse network segments with different levels of bandwidth, services and latencies. All of these factors affect the growth rate of an epidemic. Our agent-based modeling framework captures these factors by using traffic traces collected from enterprise networks. Using this framework, an enterprise can perform a realistic vulnerability assessment of its popular services, such as SMS, Bluetooth, email, P2P and IM. These services are often targeted by virus writers and increasingly, new malware are designed to exploit multiple of these services simultaneously. Our extensive simulations show that combining these services increases the initial growth rate of the epidemic almost exponentially and therefore, human countermeasures will be useless. The simulation study of Cabir also points out the potential vulnerability from unprotected Bluetooth interfaces in a cellular network.

CHAPTER 3

Proactive Defense in Enterprise Networks

3.1 Introduction

In recent years, the landscape of malicious software attacks has changed considerably from large-scale network perimeter attacks to more targeted attacks on enterprise clients and resources. While the primary damage from traditional worms and viruses such as Code Red, Nimda and Slammer has been clogged networks and required expensive cleanup operations, the new generation of malware are designed to steal confidential information, control remote systems for malicious purposes, and disrupt mission-critical services. Their intended purpose is to distribute spam, install spyware on enterprise systems customized to collect information (e.g., keystroke loggers), and install backdoors or trojans. Examples of such malware are bot networks ("botnets") [88], viruses and worms [85, 123, 158] targeting various enterprise messaging systems such as email, IM and SMS.

The exponential growth of messaging in both home and enterprise environments has made it a potent vector for the spread of malicious code [125]. Social engineering techniques are very effective in spreading malware in these networks since infected messages appear to come from addresses in personal contact lists, address and phone books. The problem is compounded further by the increasing convergence of various messaging platforms. For example, users can now send IM messages from mobile phones, and SMS messages to mobile phones via SMS gateways on the Internet. Given the extremely large vol-

ume of messages in public IM and SMS networks,[1] the potential for damage from rapidly propagating malicious software is very high in messaging networks. This has not escaped the attention of malicious code writers. According to [125], self-propagating worms represented 91% of malicious code in large public IM networks in the second half of 2005 — a number that has been steadily rising. Similarly, there are now a growing number of malicious codes written for mobile handsets that exploit SMS/MMS to proliferate, as we will present in Chapter 4. It is clear that if a response can be taken in the early stages of an epidemic in these networks, the spread can be limited to a small number of clients. Therefore, developing *proactive security* frameworks in mobile messaging networks is an important area of research. However, most mobile network operators and messaging providers have not implemented proactive security for the following reasons.

A key aspect of proactive security is to take steps *before* a client is compromised or at the earliest indication of a virus or worm activity in the network. Therefore, finding vulnerable clients to a given malicious software is a key first step to any proactive security strategy. Note that this step must be entirely automated or the window of opportunity will be lost. Given the large number and distributed nature of messaging networks, it is not possible to place monitors everywhere in such networks. However, the messaging server — the Short Messaging Service Center (SMSC) in case of SMS/MMS messages, and the IM server — provides a natural way to identify such clients as we explain later.

It may be argued that the time window between detection and proactive containment can be very small and no proactive action can stop a fast-spreading malicious code. For example, it is theoretically possible to have "Flash Worms" [116, 118] that can infect most of the vulnerable hosts of an enterprise within seconds. While such attacks are possible, there has been a noticeable decrease in malicious agents that spread very fast via random scanning and simply clog corporate networks. However, there has been a steady increase in stealthy Trojans, and malicious agents that install adware and spam relays, exploit enterprise applications such as database servers, and host malicious websites. For example, Win32.Opanki.d [135] arrives as a link via the AOL IM network and when executed, it

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[1]More than 1000 billion SMS messages were sent in 2005, and according to [125], the three largest IM providers—AOL, MSN, and Yahoo!—each accounted for over 1 billion IM messages sent per day.

opens a backdoor via an IRC channel. For these emerging threats, discovering *group associations* with an already-infected or suspected client in near real-time will lead to better proactive containment and it is an important focus of our work.

Finally, any proactive response must address the potential loss of service and delays in the messaging network due to preemptive shutdown or policing of clients. Since it is common for anomaly detection systems to generate many false positives, a straightforward quarantine of clients based on alerts may result in unacceptable levels of message loss and delay. Therefore, one must design proactive strategies that increase the level of countermeasure with increasing alert correlation.

Most of the published studies on modeling and containment of malicious software have focused on scanning- and email-worms due to their prevalence and several successful large-scale attacks on the Internet. On the contrary, there appears to be very little published work on proactive security of messaging networks. This is the primary motivation of our work. In the present study, we would like to achieve three primary goals: (i) automated compilation of the list of messaging clients that are vulnerable to a spreading virus or worm attack, (ii) development of a group-behavior based proactive response framework using client interactions in a messaging network, and (iii) compare the effectiveness of proactive response with traditional reactive mechanisms (e.g. anti-virus tools). The starting point of our study are observed interactions among clients comprising the "service-behavior" topology of the messaging network. The containment itself is implemented in the form of *client rate-limiting* [148] (also known as "throttling") and *client quarantine*. However, instead of a straightforward application of these mechanisms, we build a behavioral alert-based system that progressively mounts a stronger response with increasing alerts, and backs off when alert levels decrease with time.

The framework is implemented typically at the messaging service center (i.e., SMSC in case of SMS/MMS and IM servers) where logs of client communication are available. These logs can be analyzed to generate a service-behavior graph for the messaging network. It is then further processed to generate behavior clusters, i.e., groups of clients whose behavior patterns are similar with respect to a set of metrics: *interaction frequency*, *attachment and message size distributions*, *number of messages*, *number of outgoing connections*

to other clients and *list of traced contacts*. When the number of alerts in a particular behavior cluster reaches a threshold, the messages belonging to that behavior cluster are first rate-limited to slow down a potential malicious worm or virus. The effect of repeated similar alerts and false positives is kept below a threshold during this initial containment step. When the alerts reach a second threshold, the containment algorithm applies proactive quarantine, i.e., it blocks messages from suspicious clients of these behavior clusters. This step essentially enables the behavior clusters to enter into a group defense mode against the spreading malware. This combined approach of rate-limiting and quarantine with increasing response to alerts in the network provides a graceful service degradation, yet a very powerful defense as our evaluation will show. From our discussion with several large enterprise IT departments, such a gradual approach is more desirable than either shutting down messaging completely, or chasing down the malicious software as it spreads from one client to another.

This study makes three primary contributions. First, it presents a method for automated identification of vulnerable clients in a messaging network. Second, it provides a practical solution for improving security in these networks based on an adaptive group-behavior-based proactive approach. Third, it demonstrates that proactive security can offer an order-of-magnitude improvement in containing malicious software in messaging networks, over existing "detect-and-block" approaches.

The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents motivations behind the behavior-clustering approach. Section 3.3 describes how behavior clustering can find vulnerable clients for proactive response. Section 3.4 describes the proactive rate-limiting and quarantine algorithms, and their group-behavior-based implementation. Section 3.5 evaluates proactive security in a messaging network using data from a large real-life SMS customer network. Section 3.6 reviews recent literature on malware targeting messaging networks, and malware containment. We describe future work and concluding remarks in Section 3.7.

3.2 Motivation: Finding Vulnerable Clients

The most common form of proactive defense is *getting there first*, for example, to patch a client to protect against an existing vulnerability, or to remove capabilities from the client, making it more secure. However, a central problem of proactive defense is to decide which clients are the most vulnerable when a malicious activity is identified in the network, be it an intrusion, a virus or worm. This is fundamentally different from reactive or "detect-and-block" defense which is activated only when a client is in the process of being compromised. Generating a list of vulnerable clients on-demand in near real time is, therefore, a fundamental problem to study in proactive defense. The more accurate the list of vulnerable clients, the faster the attack can be suppressed with less interruption to the users. Our motivation in studying group-behavior of clients is to generate this list by analyzing Charging Data Records (CDRs) [22] and message headers that are logged at the centralized store-and-forward messaging servers.

Before discussing our approach, we first need a brief discussion of the SMS messaging system. When a mobile user sends a message from a handset (i.e., Mobile Originated or MO) or a web-based gateway to another phone, the message is received by the Base Station System (BSS) of the service provider. The BSS then forwards the message to the Mobile Switching Center (MSC). Upon receiving a MO message, the MSC sends the end-user information to the Visitor Location Register (VLR) of the cell and checks the message for any violation. It then forwards the message to the provider's SMSC. The SMSC stores the messages in a queue, records the transaction in the network billing system and sends a confirmation back to the MSC. The status of the message is changed from MO to Mobile Terminated (MT) at this point. Through a series of steps, the message is then forwarded by SMSC to the receiving user's MSC. The MSC receives the subscriber information from the VLR and finally forwards the message to the receiving handset. The store-and-forward nature of SMS/MMS networks makes it possible to collect client interaction patterns from the time-stamped logs. A similar observation can be made for IM servers as well, although the procedure to store and forward messages is much simpler. Most IM messages between users are mediated by the IM server. In some networks, file-transfer request and response

messages are relayed through the server, but the actual file data are transferred between the entities directly. This makes the task of collecting information about client interactions very easy by simply monitoring the connection logs at the server.

Next, we provide the motivations for development of a group-behavior-based proactive defense strategy. Traditional end-point solutions, e.g. switching off service ports on individual clients or at firewalls, can detect and protect against only specific types of attacks. A more effective defense can be built by studying how clients interact with each other in the network from periodic inspection of the server logs. If clients can be grouped together based on their *common* behavior, it may be possible to contain a broad range of attacks that manifest in specific behavior anomalies. The building block of our approach is finding clusters of such common behavior called "behavior clusters". Once a virus or worm activity is detected at a client, members of its behavior cluster can be put on the list of vulnerable machines since they may be the most likely and immediate target of the malicious activity. This is often the case for topological worms that spread via IM, email, SMS and P2P file-sharing.

(a)   **(b)**

Figure 3.1: (a) Clustering of common behavior, (b) Microscopic view

We motivate the usefulness of behavior clusters with a simple example. We collected messages from a small departmental network of 200 unique hosts, and constructed a service-

behavior topology based on open client and server port bindings among the hosts (Figure 3.1(a)). Figure 3.1(b) shows the service-behavior graph for a small subset of nodes at a given time—the actual number of nodes (504, including nodes external to the network) and edges (230) are too large to display in both figures. We show a 4-color (blue, green, red and yellow) clustering of this subset of nodes. The arrows in Figure 3.1(b) indicate the directionality of messages as inferred from the traces. The nodes without any arrows denote bidirectional messages. To generate the clusters, we considered a simple metric of number of neighbors, and minimized the overlap among the four clusters. Note that nodes 10, 11 and 16 form a disjoint group from the rest of the nodes and have no interactions with the rest of the network, other than their internal dependencies. These nodes can be grouped into a single behavior cluster (denoted in red). Upon detection of a malicious software on any one of these three hosts, one can proactively quarantine the other two nodes without affecting messaging in the other clusters. On the other hand, if one quarantines the green cluster completely from the rest of the network, the total cost of quarantine will be the sum of messages exchanged along overlapping edges $e_{3,5}, e_{4,13}, e_{7,13}, e_{13,15}$, and $e_{5,14}$. Note that the three clusters form a logical partition of the network. Each cluster provides a list of vulnerable clients any time a client inside the cluster raises an intrusion or malware alert. We give a more formal treatment of the behavior clustering and partitioning problem in Section 3.3.2.

3.3 Finding Vulnerability By Association

We mentioned in Section 3.2 that the first step in applying any proactive mechanism is to find a set of vulnerable clients in near real time, i.e., as soon as an attack is detected. In this section, we propose an approach called *behavior clustering* to generate this list. The underlying principle of behavior clustering is to find vulnerability by association. It assumes that the vulnerability index of a client is increased sharply if it has come in *contact* with an infected client in recent past. By *contact*, we mean messages exchanged between the two clients, e.g., a text or multimedia message. Whether a client is infected by the way of such communication with an infected client depends on whether it shares the same

Figure 3.2: Generating behavior clusters from message logs

vulnerability. Therefore, our goal is to develop an automated procedure to cluster clients into behavior groups based on their messaging patterns and application/protocol stacks installed on them. The rest of this section describes the steps necessary to generate these clusters.

Figure 3.2 shows the three steps necessary for automated behavior clustering: (i) calculation of *behavior vectors* and service-behavior graph, (ii) short-term forecasting of behavior vectors, and (iii) generation of behavior clusters by partitioning the service-behavior graph. These steps are repeated periodically depending on how often the behavior vectors change among clients, and the outcome is a set of closely-related behavior clusters for the network that can be used to find vulnerable clients upon detection of an attack.

3.3.1 Step I: Behavior Vectors

We define a "behavior vector" as a collection of features about any client in the messaging network. The behavior vector, denoted as $\theta_u(t)$ at any client u at time t, is calculated from two sources: version information ('physical' feature) and messaging logs ('temporal' features). Most malware spread by taking advantage of known exploits in software and protocol stacks. Therefore, an accurate snapshot of how clients are configured across a network is very useful to determine which clients are vulnerable to a spreading malicious software. Enterprise networks typically install configuration management databases (CMDBs) [40] that contain details of the applications (email, P2P, IM, SMS) and software stack (OS, network) on each host. Queries to CMDBs can therefore yield the physical feature of the behavior vector at a host. We collectively denote the physical feature space as ϕ_c. This feature space can be partitioned to find clusters of similar configurations. Then,

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whenever a virus or worm is discovered targeting a specific application client or software exploit, one can readily find the most vulnerable clusters where a proactive action is needed. In public IM or SMS networks, it is not possible to access client OS and application stack information. However, most messaging clients transmit client version information and a few additional details about the client environment (e.g., Windows or UNIX) during the connection setup. This information can be extracted from the server logs where access to enterprise-level CMDBs is not possible.

The second component of a behavior vector is calculated by analyzing messages exchanged among the clients, and therefore, it is a temporal feature. The generic parameters that we have implemented are: CDF (cumulative density function) of neighbor interactions (n_m) ("how often a client exchanges messages with another client"), number of outgoing connections to unique user IDs (n_g) ("importance of a client"), and mean and maximum of message inter-arrival times (t_{mean}, t_{maxm}).

In summary, the vulnerability index of a client in the messaging network depends on its physical and temporal features, or, in short, its behavior vector. The components of the behavior vector at a client u at time t are given as:

$$\theta_u(t) = [\{\phi_c\}, \{n_m, n_g, t_{mean}, t_{maxm}\}].$$

This vector is updated whenever their values change based on filters placed on the server.

3.3.2   Step II: Service-Behavior Graphs

While behavior vectors represent client-level observations as logged by the server, they do not describe interactions among the clients. This is captured by creating a service-behavior graph for the network. We represent the service interactions with a *directed graph*, $G(V_d, E_d)$, in which V_d is the set of vertices (i.e., unique participants or client IP addresses) in the network and E_d is the set of edges. $G(V_d, E_d)$ is generated by applying the following simple rules.

R1. A pair of vertices $(u, v) \in V_d$ are assigned a *directed edge* $e_{uv} \in E_d$ if and only if there exists a non-zero contribution to their respective behavior vectors via e_{uv}.

R2. IP addresses that are external to the networks are labeled with an additional flag. The

edges belonging to these hosts represent "outside" connections to the network and therefore, should be quarantined during an attack. Examples are http links embedded in messages.

3.3.3 Step III. Short-term Forecasting of Behavior Vectors

Since behavior vectors of clients change frequently in most messaging networks, logs collected at different time intervals may indicate different behavioral patterns. Therefore, the service-behavior graph, generated at fixed time intervals, may differ from the actual behavioral patterns of the network when the list of vulnerable machines need to be generated. Therefore, a proactive action based on a straightforward application of behavior vectors computed in the last analysis period may not be the most effective. Since behavior vectors have a strong temporal component, we apply a short-term forecasting algorithm to the parameters such that a prediction can be made from the observed values in recent past. This is currently achieved by applying the standard exponential smoothing procedure [90].

3.3.4 Step IV. Behavior Clustering

The final step is to group the vertices in $G(V_d, E_d)$ into a number of clusters based on their behavior vectors, where clients in the same cluster are similar in terms of their physical and temporal patterns. There are a number of techniques for classification and clustering in the literature. We adopt a hierarchical graph partitioning approach as presented below, although other approaches can also be used.

The partitioning problem can be formulated as a multi-constraint, connected and bounded k-way graph partitioning problem as follows. <u>Given</u> an undirected graph of service interactions, $G(V_d, E_d)$ with scalar edge weights $w_e : E_d \rightarrow N$, each vertex $v \in V_d$ having an n-dimensional behavior vector $\theta_v^{(n)}$ of size n ($\sum_{\forall v \in V_d} \theta_v^{(i)} = 1.0$ for $i = 1, 2, \cdots, n$), and an integer $b \in \{2, 3, \cdots, \|V_d\|\}$, <u>partition</u> V_d into k clusters, $V_d^1, V_d^2, \cdots, V_d^k$, such that

- $G_i = (V_d^i, E_d^i)$ induced in G by the i-th cluster is connected;

- $\forall i \in \{1, 2, \cdots, k\}$: $1 \leq \|V_d^i\| \leq b$;

Figure 3.3: Behavior clustering of an IM network ($k = 4$)

Figure 3.4: k-means clustering of an IM network ($k = 4$)

- $\sum_s w_{(e)}(s)$ where $s \in E_d, s \notin E_d^i$, is a minimum $\forall k \in \{2, 3, \cdots, \|V_d\|\}$; and

- the following constraints are satisfied:

$$\forall k : \ell_i \leq \sum_{\forall v \in V_d^k} \theta_v^{(i)} \leq u_i \tag{3.1}$$

where $[\ell_i, u_i]$ for $i = 1, 2, \cdots, n$ are n intervals such that $\ell_i < u_i$ and $\ell_i + u_i = 1$.

Note that the number of clusters, k, is not provided as input to the above problem, and therefore, must be evaluated as the number of distinct behavior clusters in the graph. As an example of Steps I-IV, Figure 3.3 shows the partitioning of an Instant Messaging (IM) network of 450 clients (i.e., unique IP addresses) into four behavior clusters ($k = 4$) based on traces we collected from a large enterprise network. The IM users of this network used three public-messaging protocols — Yahoo Messenger (YMSG), MSN Messenger (MSNMS) and AIM — to communicate with each other. Therefore, ϕ_c for a host consisted

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of one or more elements of {YMSG, MSNMS, AIM}, depending on which IM proto-cols were used from that host. The rest of the behavior vector parameters were calculated directly from the traces. To compare our results, we calculate the standard *k*-means cluster-ing of the same behavior vectors and present the result in Figure 3.4. Note that the present behavior clustering algorithm results in more balanced partitions of the service-behavior graph by selectively weighting on vertices. In fact, this approach to behavior clustering offers several benefits when a proactive response is taken in the network.

(1) Connectedness among the vertices within a cluster: This property guarantees that any two vertices within a cluster be closer to each other in terms of their features and connectivity than vertices in another cluster. This is important for localizing messages within a cluster while other clusters are proactively contained, so that direct peer-to-peer file transfers between clients are always available.

(2) Minimization of service-edge costs: The cost of the cut (called "edge-cut") determines the quality of the clusters, and is, therefore, the primary partitioning objective. There are many possible choices for the partitioning objective function. For the containment problem, we minimize the sum of the weights of the edges that span multiple clusters. The goal is to minimize the number of messages exchanged between different clusters. Then, any proactive quarantine or rate-limiting of a cluster will cause minimal message interruption to other clusters.

(3) Satisfaction of vertex constraints within the clusters: The *k*-way partitioning algorithm takes into account the relative weights of the vertices as well as those of the corresponding edges. The constraints as shown in Eq. (3.1) can be used to balance the partitions in terms of the vertex constraints, e.g., for including the clients' geographic domains.

An important deployment question is how often the service-behavior graph should be updated. We can apply the *triggered updates* concept implemented in many intrusion de-tection systems, e.g. GrIDS [117]. Using triggered updates, the service-behavior graph is updated whenever (i) new vertices and edges are added (or subtracted) to (or from) the last computed graph, and (ii) the parameters of the behavior vectors change by a certain threshold over previous values. This is part of our ongoing work in which we are studying logs collected from a real-world messaging server to understand the temporal aspects of

service-behavior graphs.

The overall complexity of the partitioning phase is $O(\|E_d\|)$, and therefore, is determined by the size of messaging network, G. In reality, this step is extremely fast. For example, the time required to generate behavior clusters for a service-behavior graph with $V_d = 9269$ hosts and $E_d = 9836$ edges ranges from 0.04 second (2 clusters) to 0.16 second (32 clusters) on a dual-CPU (1.5GHz) AMD Opteron 240 platform.

3.4 Proactive Containment Methods

In this section, we explain the basic rate-limiting and quarantine mechanisms that serve as the building blocks of our proactive response framework. While scan detection-based methods [69, 143] protect an enterprise from incoming infections, rate-liming and quarantine seek to contain outbound infected messages. These methods can be applied on both individual as well as a group of clients. When these are applied on a group of clients as in the case of proactive defense, the first step is to obtain a list of vulnerable clients most relevant to the generated alerts. We assume that this list can be obtained on-demand via the behavior clustering algorithm described in Section 3.3.

3.4.1 Rate-limiting

The rate-limiting (also known as "virus throttling"[147–149]) is a general class of response techniques that seek to limit the spread of a worm or virus once it is detected on a host. For example, it has been applied to contain IM worms in [147]. It is based on the observation that normal or acceptable behavior of many Internet protocols such as TCP/IP, email and IM differs significantly from the corresponding worm-like behavior. Most users of email, SMS and IM interact with a slowly-varying subset of other users as compared to malicious codes that attempt to send messages to all contacts in a victim's address book or buddy list. The original virus throttling algorithm proposed by Williamson [148] limits the rate of outgoing connections to new machines that a host is able to make in a given time interval. Figure 3.5 explains the basic rate-limiting mechanism. A *working set* of speci-

Figure 3.5: Virus throttling algorithm by Williamson [11]

fied length ($n = 4$ in Figure 3.5) is maintained for each user that keeps track of n recent addresses that the user has interacted with. When the user attempts to send a message to a new contact, the recipient's address ("h" in Figure 3.5) is compared with those in the working set. If the address is in the working set, the message is allowed to pass through. Otherwise, the message is placed on a *delay queue* for sending at a later time. At periodic intervals, the delay queue messages are processed as follows: the destination address of the message at the head of the queue is added to the working set replacing the oldest address in the working set (using a least-recently used or LRU algorithm). Then, all messages in the delay queue destined for the newly admitted address are removed from the queue and sent to the recipient address. When the length of the delay queue exceeds a pre-determined threshold, all new contact attempts from the client can be blocked, e.g. by reducing the size of the working set to zero, and the user may be asked to validate the messages in the queue. The rate-limiting mechanism is implemented at the server since it initiates or processes all requests made by the clients. Further, when implemented at the server, users are not able to modify the rate-limiting configuration parameters. Therefore, rate-limiting can be implemented easily for email, IM, SMS and centralized P2P file-sharing (e.g. Napster). The most important advantage of rate-limiting is its ability to enforce containment in a gentle manner, as opposed to quarantine which results in complete shut-down of the client. Therefore, rate-limiting mechanisms are generally preferred by enterprise networks over quarantine.

We should note that several variants of rate-limiting have been proposed to date. Recently, Wong et. al. [149] have presented an excellent empirical study of these schemes as well as a new DNS-based rate-limiting algorithm for general worm containment.

For our implementation of proactive rate-limiting, we chose to implement the Williamson throttling algorithm as the basic per-client rate-limiting mechanism, with an important difference. We implement rate-limiting only for messaging services, and not the other ports on the host. This prevents the excessive delays and blockage of all legitimate applications on the host in case of an infection, as reported in [149]. Note that the messaging worm propagation doesn't result in large volumes of failed connections or data in the network. But, the rate at which an infected client sends messages to other clients in the network may deviate significantly from its normal sending rate. This can be detected efficiently by the Williamson virus throttling algorithm although the algorithm is prone to high false positive rates when a client has been infected. We deal with this problem by applying a group-behavior based approach that effectively reduces the false positive rates.

3.4.2 Quarantine

In contrast with rate-limiting, quarantine-based systems prevent a suspicious or infected client from sending or receiving messages. This can be implemented at the messaging server so that any connection attempt by the user on an infected client is refused. Recent industry initiatives such as Network Admission Control (NAC) [127] and Network VirusWall [132] are intended to enforce established security policies to endpoint devices as they enter a protected network. The Cisco NAC allows non-compliant devices to be denied access and placed in a quarantined local network, or given restricted access to resources. However, such systems are in very early stages of development for SMS/MMS networks.

In our implementation of quarantine, we simply reduce the size of the working set to zero in the rate-limiting module on a client and let the delay queue grow without triggering any new malicious software alert. This is enforced *after* an alert has already been issued from the client and a malicious activity has been detected. This effectively quarantines the client from sending any more messages.

Figure 3.6: Proactive rate-limiting and quarantine for a behavior cluster

Next, we propose a proactive group behavior containment (PGBC) algorithm that combines the basic rate-limiting and quarantine mechanisms described above with behavior clusters to develop a proactive response scheme at the messaging server.

3.4.3 Proactive Group Behavior Containment

Figure 3.6 presents the steps of the PGBC algorithm as implemented in the server. When an anomaly is detected at a client i, e.g. by monitoring its delay queue length (or via a malware detection agent running at the server), the algorithm increments a client alert level (δ_i) by a value δ_i^k that depends on the severity of the alert. The PGBC algorithm suppresses alerts for a period of π_{delay} seconds before allowing a single alert β_i^k for client i in the algorithm. The purpose of the hold-off counter, π_{delay}, is similar to the back-off counter described in [104]: it prevents a single client that triggers a stream of alerts from forcing the entire messaging network to enter into a proactive defense mode. When the alert level on a client violates a pre-determined threshold value (i.e. β_i^k is reached), the

server activates a rate-limiting for messages sent by the client, i.e. the size of its working set is reduced and outgoing messages from the client are queued at the server. A separate process decrements the alert level at every time step until it reaches zero, at which point, the rate-limiting is stopped for messages sent by the client.

The messaging server generates behavior clusters at periodic intervals from the messages exchanged among the clients, using the clustering algorithm described in Section 3.3. Whenever an alert level β_i^k is generated for a client, the algorithm updates the total alert level β of the corresponding behavior cluster. When the behavior cluster alert level reaches a threshold value (β_{th}), the server activates a rate-limiting on the most vulnerable clients of the behavior cluster, namely the nodes that have exchanged messages with the infected client. This list is computed via a set *intersection* of the client in the behavior cluster and the working sets of the infected client at current and previous time steps. This step of the algorithm also enforces a quarantine of all messages from the infected client (i.e. it is no longer rate-limited but is blocked from messaging). A separate process decrements a back-off timer (t_b) from the value of T assigned at the beginning of the group defense mode, and transitions the behavior cluster from the proactive defense mode back to the normal mode when either (i) there are no more alert messages or (ii) t_b becomes 0.

Note that PGBC gradually slows down outgoing messages from a group of clients and brings them back to the normal mode when no alerts are received for a period. This is in contrast with the traditional detect-and-block schemes that cause sudden message loss and delay in the network.

3.5 Evaluation of Proactive Defense in a SMS network

3.5.1 PGBC and Agent-Based Malware Modeling

As discussed in Chapter 2, in AMM, we model a mobile network as a collection of autonomous decision-making entities called *agents*. The agents represent clients within the network such as PDAs, mobile phones, service centers(e.g., SMS Center) and gateways. In case of agents representing mobile devices, the connectivity changes as users roam about

the physical space of the network. For evaluation of PGBC, we consider mobile users exchanging SMS messages. An agent may consist of client applications for email and SMS/MMS messaging, whereas the SMS Center (SMSC) agent may consist of a store-and-forward server only. Thus, there are two types of topologies in our simulation environment. The *physical* connectivity is determined by the physical network infrastructure, movement of the agents, location of access points and base stations, whereas the *logical* connectivity is determined by the messages exchanged among the agents.

The first step is to prepare the following input parameters: (i) *infection-model parameters* for a malware targeting SMS, (ii) *topology* of SMS messaging patterns among the users, (iii) *location* of base stations,(iv) *mobility models* for agents that are mobile, (v)*infection and replication state machine* (i.e., "attack vector") of the malicious software, (vi) *detection model* and (vii) *an attack response model*. We have implemented PGBC, Williamson rate-limiting (WRL) and reactive (i.e. "detect-and-block") responses to compare their effectiveness. At each time step, the coordinates of mobile agents are updated based on their mobility models resulting in new connectivity graphs. Next, each agent exchanges messages with other agents according to the SMS service model— the probability of any of these messages being infected is calculated from the service-infection model. The time steps are repeated over a user-specified number of trials so that the results can be averaged over these trials. The simulator is general enough to experiment with different algorithms for malware detection and containment.

3.5.2 SMS Messaging Logs

The topology of a messaging network can be extracted from CDRs collected from a real-world cellular network, and the relevant parameters are then input to AMM. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any malware propagation model using SMS/MMS services in a cellular network. A recent study [107] of SMS usage characterization collected call data records and SS7traces over a three-week period from a large cellular carrier with10 million mobile users. The data allowed us to reconstruct a realistic SMS messaging network with the following parameters: message sending rates, message receiving rates, cumulative

Figure 3.7: Overall performance of PGBC and WRL

density functions (CDF) of user-to-user message size (B) and message service times at the SMSC, and the SMS service topology. The original data involved a very large number of messages (over 59 million) and users (over 10 million). Therefore, we scaled the data to a small number of users (2000), while still preserving the basic characteristics of the original data sets. In the present study, we focus on the proposed proactive defense strategy.

3.5.3 Performance of PGBC

In the following, we evaluate and compare three different defense strategies, Williamson rate-limiting (WRL), reactive (i.e. "detect and block") and PGBC, against a malicious code that spreads from one client to another using the address book contacts found on an already-infected client. We will denote this as the "SMS worm" for the rest of this section. We used a working set of 5 for WRL and a delay queue threshold of 20 to indicate a malicious code infection. All simulations started with only 1 initial infection (i.e. $I(0) = 1$) and we averaged the results of 20 runs for each parameter to compute the expected number of infections, $E(I(t))$, clients with WRL, $E(RL(t))$, and clients under quarantine $E(Q(t))$, at each time step t. We report these numbers as a percentage of the total number of clients in the messaging network.

Figure 3.8: Percentage of clients rate-limited (WRL) and proactively contained (PGBC)

Overall Performance

Figure 3.7 shows the overall performance of WRL and PGBC against the SMS worm during the first 500 seconds of its propagation. For comparison, we also show the epidemic in a network with no defense, i.e. an entirely unprotected network. Note that in the unprotected network, nearly 40% of the clients are already infected, indicating very fast propagation in a highly-connected topology such as an SMS network. The PGBC algorithm performs an order-of-magnitude ($E(I(t)) = 2\%$) better than Williamson rate-limiting ($E(I(t)) = 21\%$). Given this excellent performance, we now explore the effect of various PGBC parameters on its performance. Figure 3.8 shows the percentage of clients that are rate-limited ($E(RL(t))$) using WRL, proactively contained ($E(P(t))$) in PGBC and infected($E(I(t))$) in case of an unprotected network. PGBC results in a larger number of clients participating in proactive group defense, approximately 20% more than WRL allows — this is one of the reasons why PGBC keeps the infection level so small in the network. However, when proactive group defense is applied, the affected messages are delayed by an amount equal to the PGBC backoff timer, T.

Figure 3.9: Effect of PGBC backoff timer ($\beta_k = \beta_{th} = 8$, $r = 30s$)

Effect of PGBC Backoff Timer, T

The PGBC backoff timer (T) determines how long a behavior cluster should remain in the proactive defense mode once it has been activated (i.e. its alert level, β, has reached the threshold β_{th}). Figure 3.9 shows the percentage infections for different values of $T = 30$, 60 and 90 seconds. To eliminate the effect of other parameters, all the results are for $\beta_k = \beta_{th} = 8$ and a throttle rate (denoted as r) of 30 seconds. It is clear from Figure 3.9 that a longer group defense timer results in smaller number of infections. However, this has a delaying effect on the messages in the SMS network since clients undergoing proactive rate-limiting will have to wait till the expiration of T seconds before sending messages again. Note that $T = 60$ seconds or a minute results in approximately 7% of infections compared to a longer timer (2%). Since the overall infections are still much lower than that of an unprotected network as well as a network with WRL, we recommend using $T = 60$seconds — a delay of one minute in sending/receiving SMS messages is reasonable during an attack. Figure 3.10 shows the percentage of proactive client nodes for different values of T. The growth of proactive clients in the group defense mode is nearly identical for all three values— this means that the decision to choose T should be guided by the maximum level of infections that can be tolerated by the messaging service provider. For example, critical messaging networks may decide to choose a higher value of T to keep

Figure 3.10: Number of proactive clients for different PGBC backoff timer values ($\beta_k = \beta_{th} = 8$, $r = 30s$)

$I(t)$ very small.

Effect of Alert Levels, β_k

The alerts (β_k or "L" in Figures 3.11 and 3.12) are generated for individual clients when their delay queues reach a threshold indicating the presence of a worm. However, the hold-off counter (π_{delay}) makes sure that repetitive alerts from the same client in consecutive periods are suppressed so that one client node cannot force a behavior cluster to enter the PGBC mode. The choice of β_{th} determines how frequently a behavior cluster enters PGBC given β_k alerts sent from its constituent clients. Figure 3.11 presents the results for different alert levels β_k equal to $2, 4$ and 8. The rest of the parameters are: threshold alert level $\beta_{th} = 8$, backoff timer $T = 60$ seconds and throttle timer $r = 60$ seconds. We also plot the same results for a different throttle timer of $r = 20$ seconds in Figure 3.12. The results indicate that client alert levels (β_k's) are sensitive to the throttle timer, especially at low alert levels. Based on our experimental results, we recommend setting $\beta_k = 4$, i.e. two new alerts force the behavior cluster enter into PGBC mode.

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
Figure 3.11: Number of infections for different PGBC alert levels ($T = 60s, r = 60s$)

Figure 3.12: Number of infections for different PGBC alert levels ($T = 60s, r = 20s$)

Figure 3.13: Comparison of reactive and PGBC defense approaches

Comparison of Reactive vs PGBC approaches

Next, we compare the traditional reactive ("detect-and-block")defense adopted by most anti-virus solution providers with a more efficient approach such as PGBC. In reactive defense, a client can be quarantined as soon as its delay queue reaches the threshold, i.e. all incoming/outgoing messages are blocked. The problem with this approach is that by the time the infection is detected, the worm may have already spread to other clients via previously sent messages. Figure 3.13 compares the reactive approach with two different combination of PGBC parameters. The reactive approach results in over 12% of the total clients being infected within 500 seconds, where as either of the two PGBC configurations allows only less than half that amount. This clearly demonstrates the need for a group-behavior based defense strategy in messaging networks instead of isolated quarantine of clients.

Effect of False Positives

We define the false positive rate as the percentage of clients that were misidentified as malicious by the detection mechanism. Since PGBC applies proactive rate-limiting to some of the clients in the same behavior cluster as the false-positive clients, we calculate two quantities: percentage of false-positive clients(denoted by $E(F(t))$) and percentage of clients that were proactively rate-limited (denoted by $E(P(t))$)due to $E(F(t))$.Figure 3.14

Figure 3.14: E(P(t)) and E(F(t)) rates for different PGBC backoff timer values ($\beta_k = \beta_{th} = 8$, $r = 30s$)

plots E(P(t)) and E(F(t)) for different PGBC backoff timer values. From our results, we found that E(F(t)) was limited to 6% of the clients, and E(P(t)) to 12% of the clients in most cases. This means that approximately12% of the clients experienced a delay in receiving messages during the outbreak of the malicious code. This is very promising, given that PGBC also limited the spread of the epidemic to only 2-5% of the total number of clients. Figure 3.15 plots E(P(t)) for different values of PGBC alert levels. The data for various parameters do not show a correlation, confirming that the false-positive rates depend for the most part on the detection mechanism and not on the containment strategy.

Overall, PGBC is found to perform very well against the SMS worm. Our results indicate that a key benefit of PGBC is that one can maintain a small throttle timer for per-client rate-limiting with an appropriate choice of PGBC parameters (T, β_k andβ_{th}). Therefore, the SMS users do not experience a large delay in receiving messages during an attack. One aspect of PGBC that needs further study is how to choose among the different tunable parameters for a given messaging network.

Figure 3.15: False-positive detection rates for different PGBC alert levels ($T = 60s$, $r = 20s$)

3.6 Related Work

The most relevant to the present study are malicious codes that target messaging networks, intrusion detection systems such as GrIDS [117], behavior-based worm detection [49] and Primary Response from Sana Security [64]. We refer to [85, 125] for a description of malicious codes targeting IM networks. The above references also detail specific vulnerabilities and social engineering techniques these malicious codes typically exploit.

For Spyware and "zero-day" attacks, the conventional signature-based anti-virus tools may result in high false negatives, i.e., attacks that cannot be detected. The behavioral approaches [49, 64] are more suitable to detect these types of attacks due to correlation of behaviors among running processes and application-specific rules. Moreover, upon detection of an attack at a given client, a behavioral host-based intrusion prevention system (HIPS) may be able to determine which services were targeted. Since it is crucial to contain these attacks at the earliest, PGBC can proactively rate-limit clients in the same behavior-cluster identified by the detection system so that these clients can be checked for updated HIPS and anti-virus rules. For both known vulnerabilities and zero-day attacks, the primary role of proactive defense is to slow down the infected messages while the quarantined clients can be patched. The authors of [86] recently presented a "Community of Interest" (COI) approach for discovering host profiles within an enterprise network and then applying rate-limiting to those that show worm-like behavior.

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GrIDS [117] is a hierarchical intrusion detection system (IDS) that aggregates host and network information as activity graphs representing the causal structure of network activity. GrIDS organizes the hierarchy in terms of departments within an organization. The edges represent network traffic and attributes between the departments. Each department collects information from its child nodes and passes summary information to its parent. GrIDS uses multiple rule sets to determine how graphs are built and alerts generated. In contrast, the hierarchy in PGBC is based on messaging patterns, not the physical network infrastructure. The rule sets for generating service-behavior graphs are very simple to implement since they can be derived from server logs.

Ellis *et al.* [49] presented a novel approach to automatic detection of worms using behavioral signatures. These signatures are generated from temporal and characteristic patterns of worm behaviors in network traffic, e.g., during transfer of infected payloads to other hosts, tree-like propagation and reconnaissance and changing a server into a client. Although not considered, the behavioral signatures can be the basis for quarantining individual clients or groups of clients in their abstract communications network (ACN). The Primary Response from Sana Security [64] is another host-based behavioral approach that monitors running applications and employs multiple behavioral heuristics (e.g., writing to registry, calls to keylogging procedures, process hijacking, etc.) to identify a malicious application. It also correlates actions of multiple running applications to decide whether an application is Spyware. The current detection mechanism in PGBC monitors the length of delay queues to identify worm-like behavior. However, any of the above detection mechanisms can be implemented in PGBC, resulting in more robust and reliable detection of messaging worms.

The "Firewall Network System" described in [156] places firewalls on physical segments of an enterprise network. The firewalls specify access policies to allow only predefined service requests. This approach requires accurate specification of all service requests and firewall access rules for the entire enterprise network. The "dynamic quarantine" method in [155] is based on a preemptive quarantine approach that quarantines a host whenever its behavior is considered suspicious by blocking traffic on the suspicious port. The authors of [142] discuss the possibility of deploying automated responses to malicious

code, e.g., by proactively mapping the local network traffic components and topology using *nmap*-like tools. Upon receipt of an alert with concrete information about the underlying vulnerability, the corresponding traffic may be blocked before it can reach other parts of the network. The basic premise of our approach is similar but based on a systematic study of messaging patterns among the clients.

3.7   Concluding Remarks

We have presented a novel framework called *Proactive Group Behavior Containment* (PGBC) to contain malicious software spreading in messaging networks such as IM and SMS/MMS. The exponential growth of malicious software targeting these networks in recent years requires development of proactive security approaches such as PGBC. Since all the information needed to build PGBC can be obtained from server logs, it can be easily deployed in store-and-forward networks such as SMS/MMS and server-initiated networks such as IM. The primary component of PGBC are service-behavior graphs generated from client messaging patterns and behavior clusters that partition the service-behavior graph into clusters of similar behavior. PGBC uses a combination of message rate-limiting and quarantine with increasing reaction to alerts in the network. In our evaluation results for a SMS network, PGBC is found to be several orders-of-magnitude more effective than traditional defenses such as "detect-and-block"and individual client rate-limiting. From our simulation results, it is evident that proactive defense is key to slowing down malicious codes during the early stages of its spreading. This is critical because there is only a small time window between the time an infection is detected and the time the cumulative infections reach an epidemic threshold. PGBC makes most of this time window by proactively quarantining and rate-limiting vulnerable clients in the network. There are several aspects of PGBC that are part of our ongoing study. The time scale at which a service-behavior graph should be updated for a given messaging network needs further investigation. The scalability of PGBC to very large messaging networks, perhaps with millions of clients,is yet to be investigated. Finally, the effect of false negatives(i.e. infected clients that were not detected by the detection mechanism) on overall infection rates should be studied as

well.

CHAPTER 4

Mobile Malware Exploiting Messaging and Bluetooth

4.1 Introduction

The majority of the published studies on modeling and containment of malware have focused on scanning- and email-worms due to their prevalence and several successful large-scale attacks on the Internet. On the contrary, there appears to be very little published work on mobile viruses and worms. This is the primary motivation of our work. We study the mobile viruses discovered to date and the various target discovery, infection and replication mechanisms they deploy to spread to other devices. We then create a table of common behavior vectors of these viruses so that appropriate detection and containment strategies can be developed in near future. Since the majority of these viruses have so far exploited Bluetooth and SMS/MMS services on cellular handsets, we investigate vulnerabilities in these two vectors in-depth. We then develop an infection state machine of a generic mobile virus exploiting Bluetooth and SMS, and incorporate the model in a fine-grained agent-based malware simulator that we develop for studying mobile worms. Using data from a real-world SMS network, we emulate the propagation of this virus in a small mobile network representative of a public meeting place such as a stadium or airport.

Our study makes two primary contributions. First, it provides a detailed analysis of vulnerability from mobile viruses and develops their common behavior vectors. Second, it proposes a new emulation framework for studying propagation models and containment strategies of viruses in mobile environments.

The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we provide an overview of mobile viruses and vulnerabilities. We map the replication and infection mechanisms of these viruses into a set of common behavior vectors. We then present a generic mobile virus model that can be used for modeling propagation and containment strategies in Section 4.2.3. The vulnerabilities associated with Bluetooth and SMS/MMS messaging services are discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Next, we discuss briefly our agent-based simulation framework in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 presents the results of our simulation studies using data from a real-world SMS network. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in Section 4.7.

4.2 Analysis of Mobile Viruses

Malicious agents that specifically target mobile phones and handheld devices are on the rise. The earliest versions of these were considered harmless since these were not written to spread from one device to another. The most recent mobile viruses, however, are capable of spreading to nearby devices via Bluetooth, and, therefore, pose a more serious threat to enterprise networks. In what follows, we list the most common spreading mechanisms, target platforms, and client vulnerabilities of mobile viruses discovered to date. Further details on them are available on a number of security-vendor web sites.

- One of the earliest viruses written for handheld devices (Palm PDAs), the PalmOS Liberty.A virus (2001), had to be manually installed and executed for it to become active. The virus deleted all applications and databases on a Palm OS-compatible device. The Liberty virus and other similar Trojans by their design are not likely to spread quickly due to their manual infection process and therefore, represent a relatively low threat.

- A virus for Palm OS, called Phage [120] (2000) was conceived mostly as a demonstration — it could spread from one PDA to another if infected files were shared via infrared beaming or a docking station. This was an improvement from manual infection.

- The Spanish Timophonica [105] worm (2000) was programmed to send SMS messages to random GSM phone numbers via a specific SMS gateway. Only reported in Spain, this worm represented the beginning of more advanced mobile viruses to come, since it modified MS Outlook settings and the device registry of an infected phone. If the accompanied Trojan code was successfully installed, it also deleted CMOS memory and Master Boot Records of the device. It could propagate via the Outlook email client using stored address book entries. Worms such as Timophonica are early examples of hybrid mobile malware since they can spread via both wireless and wired networks.

- The Japanese 110 worm (2000) took advantage of a vulnerability in the NTT DoCoMo i-mode mobile phones. This phone has a capability similar to "mailto:" available in html — users can automatically dial a number by clicking on the linked number contained in an email or web page. Therefore, individual phone numbers in the address book can become victims of DoS attacks.

More recent mobile viruses have targeted Nokia series 60 cell phones running Symbian OS due primarily to their popularity and advanced features, such as Bluetooth and SMS/MMS services. These viruses can search for nearby Bluetooth-enabled devices using *proximity scanning*. Note that proximity scanning requires physical proximity (e.g., up to 10 meters for Bluetooth Class 2 devices) between an infected device and a target device, whereas SMS or MMS requires only a network connection between an infected device and the service gateway for sending messages and worm payload to other devices. Similar to email viruses, the mobile viruses use social engineering techniques to entice unsuspecting users to click on infected audio, video or picture attachments. Some examples are:

- The Mabir (2004) worm spreads by selecting addresses of newly-received MMS messages. The primary damage from Mabir is the transmission of MMS messages.

- Cabir (2004-2005) and its variants replicate over Bluetooth connections, and install the worm payload as a Symbian System Installation (SSI) file. Cabir drains the power of the infected phone as it continually scans for other Bluetooth devices nearby.

An outbreak of Cabir was reported at the 2005 world athletics championships in Helsinki, Finland, affecting Nokia cell phones.

- Lasco (2005) propagates by transferring its payload to any device in range. It attaches itself to SSI files on the compromised device.

- Commwarrior (2005) is another worm that propagates by sending messages (along with the payload as attachments) to an MMS-enabled phone number randomly chosen from the compromised device's address book, and resets the infected device on the first hour of 14-th of any month. Once it infects a phone, it starts searching for nearby Bluetooth devices for sending infected files. A similar virus, Minuka (2004), finds targets from SMS address books at predetermined web sites. Mos (2005) is a variant of Minuka that dials a high-cost phone number (e.g., 1-900).

- Skulls (2005) is a Trojan that propagates by sending both SMS and MMS messages, and overwrites many default phone applications such as the address book, and e-mail viewer and to-do lists. Many variants of Skulls have been observed in the wild.

- Drever (2005) propagates by prompting a user to install an update for Symbian OS. The primary damage from this Trojan is disabling Symbian antivirus programs (SimWorks) on the device.

- Locknut (2005) is another Trojan that propagates similar to Lasco, but overwrites ROM binaries and may crash the OS. It can also drop variants of Cabir on the infected device.

- *Cardblock* (2005) is the first known malware to attack MultiMedia Cards (MMC) flash memory of mobile phones — it is a trojanized version of Symbian application InstantSis that allows users to repack already-installed SIS files and copy them to another phone. However, when users try the trojanized version, a payload blocks the memory card by setting a random password to it and deletes critical system and mail directories.

- The *Redbrowser* Trojan (2006) is the first malware targeting J2ME (Java 2 Mobile Edition) phones and represents a major evolution in mobile viruses. Instead of focusing on high-end smart phones running on Symbian or Pocket PC, it works on many low-end phones with J2ME support. Redbrowser pretends to be a WAP browser offering free WAP browsing and SMS messages — the purpose is to use a social engineering technique to fool the user into sending SMS messages. However, it actually sends a flood of SMS messages to a specific number and therefore, can cause financial damage to the user.

The example of Redbrowser shows that the emergence of mobile viruses is not unique to Symbian OS. Another malware, WinCE.Duts (2005) is the first proof-of-concept Windows CE (Pocket PC) virus infecting only ARM-based devices. It simply appends itself to executable files (*.EXE) in the root folder of the device and modifies the program execution header so that the payload runs first. The virus takes advantage of a vulnerability in the "coredll" API of Windows CE for appending itself to executables.

4.2.1 Crossover Malware

Before we discuss common behavior vectors of these viruses, we must mention an emerging class of malware called "crossover" infectors that can spread from mobile devices to desktop PCs, or vice versa. For example, Cardtrap.A (2005) is a Symbian SIS file Trojan that disables a number of applications on Nokia series 60 cell phones in addition to installing variants of skulls and Cabir. However, the most significant characteristics of Cardtrap is that it also installs three Windows worms (Win32.Rays, Win32.Padobot.Z and Win32.Cydog.B) onto the device's memory card. Once the card is inserted into the PC, Padobot.Z will attempt to start automatically on machines running Windows OS via the "autorun.ini" file. However, since Windows does not generally support autorun from a memory card, the current version depends on user interaction to be launched.

Conversely, a recent virus called Crossover (2006) spreads from Windows desktop PCs to mobile devices running on Windows Mobile Pocket PC. Once it is installed on a Windows PC, the virus makes a copy of itself and adds a registry entry pointing to the new

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Vulnerability	Behavior Vectors	Probe Location
Bluetooth	B1. Scanning for Bluetooth devices (cached, pre-known, active discovery modes) B2. Transmission of file over Bluetooth using OBEX of type .sis, .pkg, etc.	Bluetooth Stack
Filesystem Modifications	F1. Creating a subdirectory under system folder (C:\SYSTEM in Symbian, My Device in Windows CE) F2. Overwriting files in system folder with corrupted/damaged/other language files (e.g. replacing svchost.exe in Windows CE with a similarly named executable) F3. Installing files in existing Antivirus directory (e.g. \system\apps\AntiVirus in Symbian) in unsupervised mode F4. Replacement of system font files F5. Replacing application icon files F6. Replacing File Manager Utilities	Filesystem , Fonts, Icons, Applications
File Infection/ Code Injection	I1. Insert code into executables (*file type, location and size*) I2. Program execution pointer changed	Filesystem, OS
SMS/MMS	M1. Sending of messages to telephone numbers embedded in an executable M2. Sending of messages to all addresses/telephone numbers in the address book consecutively	Messaging
Networking	N1. Opening unregistered (backdoor) TCP ports (e.g. port 2989 in case of Brador)	Network Stack
Operating System	S1. Accessing critical dynamic-link library modules (e.g. coredll.dll in Windows CE) S2. Modifying program execution pointer S3. Running a system process from non-system directory S4. Installing new application in autostart/ezboot via a module (Symbian)	OS

Figure 4.1: Common behavior vectors of existing mobile viruses

file so that the payload is activated each time the machine is rebooted. It then waits for an ActiveSync[1] connection with the PC. When a connection is detected, it copies itself over to the Pocket PC device, deletes all files in the *My Documents* directory, copies itself to the system directory and places a link to itself in the startup directory. Current-generation crossover viruses such as Cardtrap and Crossover are not powerful enough to cause concern at the present time. Nonetheless, these viruses demonstrate the future possibility of an attacker using a Bluetooth- or SMS/MMS-capable handset to transfer a malicious agent designed to spread to millions of desktop PCs on the Internet.

4.2.2 Mobile Virus Behavior Vectors

We study the mobile viruses mentioned in Section 4.2 and extract a set of common behavior patterns of these viruses in terms of their infection and replication actions. Figure 4.1 presents these behavior vectors along with the appropriate location of any probe that may capture a given behavior. These probes can collectively monitor the message buffers, filesystem, service requests, Bluetooth and other network interfaces, for detection of po-

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[1]ActiveSync is an application for synchronizing Pocket PC devices with Windows desktop PCs.

tential malicious activity. A behavior vector such as B1 or F1 (Figure 4.1) by itself may not appear malicious. However, when multiple behavior vectors are correlated, it may be possible to detect a mobile virus similar to behavior-based detection [50] developed for Internet viruses. For example, Lasco replicates via Bluetooth (B1, B2) and when executed, it performs the following actions: scans the disk for SSI files archives, infects these files by inserting its code (I1, I2), creates a directory called `c:\system\symbiansecuredata\velasco` (F1), and places an autostart file in `c:\system\recogs\marcos.dll` (S4). Note that the behavior vectors are not arbitrary in their temporal patterns. For example, when Brador is launched, it first creates a *svchost.exe* file in the Windows CE startup folder (F2). This gives Brador full control over the compromised handset whenever it is switched on. Once the svchost.exe process is running, it opens a backdoor on port 2989 and listens for remote commands (N1). Therefore, there is a clear precedence order of its actions, $F2(svchost.exe) \rightarrow N1(backdoor)$. For malware with multiple propagation vectors, there can be multiple branches that merge at some point in their behavior tree, typically at the point of infection taking advantage of one of the filesystem and code injection vulnerabilities (F1-F6, I1-I2). This motivates the needs for behavior-based detection algorithms for mobile viruses. Due to limited storage and memory capacity on mobile devices, traditional signature-based detection may not scale well for mobile viruses, especially if their number grows exponentially in the coming years.

Table 4.1 maps the behavior vectors manifested by several recent mobile viruses onto the six categories presented earlier. Almost all malicious codes need access to applications and system files for exploiting specific vulnerabilities and therefore, (F1, F2) are the two most widely exploited behavior vectors by mobile viruses. While exploiting network vulnerabilities such as opening TCP ports for remote communications as a backdoor is highly popular among non-mobile malware, Table 4.1 does not indicate the prevalence of this vector in mobile viruses. The most obvious explanation is that current-generation mobile handsets, except for a small fraction of smart phones, are not yet fully equipped for IP networks. When IP becomes common on these platforms, one can expect mobile backdoors and Trojans for theft of sensitive information stored on these devices.

Next, we present the design of a generic mobile virus that we will use for our simulation

Mobile Virus	B1	B2	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	I1	I2	M1	M2	N1	S1	S2	S3	S4
Cabir	x	x	x														
Brador				x									x			x	
Lasco	x	x	x						x	x							x
Skulls			x	x			x										
Duts														x	x		
Locknut			x	x													
Mosquit			x									x					
Dampig				x				x									
Comwarrior	x	x	x									x					x
Drever				x	x												
AppDisabler				x													
Blankfont			x			x											

Table 4.1: Mapping of behavior vectors to existing mobile viruses

studies later on.

4.2.3 Model of a Generic Mobile Virus

In order to study propagation models and containment strategies of mobile viruses, we
have incorporated mobile malware propagation into our fine-grained agent-based malware
modeling (AMM) framework described earlier. It explicitly models each roaming hand-
set in a mobile network using a set of services such as email, SMS/MMS, Bluetooth, etc.
As explained in Chapter 2, an agent-based modeling approach in the context of handset
virus/worm propagation relaxes the homogeneity and perfect-mixing assumptions of stan-
dard epidemiological models by (i) incorporating heterogeneity in agent attributes (e.g., dif-
ferent mobile OS's, handsets), (ii) modeling the state transitions of an agent as an explicit
stochastic process, and (iii) allowing highly-structured topologies of service interactions
(e.g., SMS senders and receivers) among the agents. The service-interaction topologies
can be generated from traffic traces sampled from a real-world network, and input to the
agent-based model as we have done for SMS (see Section 4.6). In order to model a mobile

Figure 4.2: State diagram of a mobile virus in AMM

virus in AMM, a state diagram of its infection and replication phases is needed. Figure 4.2 shows the state diagram of a *Commwarrior*-like mobile virus that we have implemented in AMM. The different state transitions taken by the mobile virus are shown along with code snippets using J2ME Wireless Toolkit API and Symbian C++ API. We have not presented the entire virus program although we doubt that a real-world mobile virus will be programmed in the manner we have shown. We implement virus state transition models in AMM in high-level languages (C++ and Java) for ease of programming.

The first state transition takes place when a user accepts an incoming SMS message or a Bluetooth file exchange request. The process of acceptance allows the virus to write its executable and associated files (various .exe and .mdl files in case of Commwarrior) in the system and startup directories. Next, it prepares a payload to be sent to other vulnerable devices, a process called *packaging*. This state may make use of packaging applications already on the infected device, e.g. the *makesis* utility on Symbian phones. The third

transition advances the virus to the *target acquisition state* in which it may use several propagation vectors, e.g., searching for a nearby Bluetooth device ("Scan for BT devices") or finding a contact address from the phone book on the device ("Choose number from Phone Book"). In case of Bluetooth, it may exploit device addresses already cached or pre-known (via the pairing process described in Section 4.3) in addition to discovering nearby device addresses and their available service profiles. Access to the Phone Book can similarly be made via APIs provided by the device manufacturer or the OS (e.g., Symbian Series 60 Phone Book Engine API). The next state, *payload transfer*, comprises the actual process of sending the payload either via SMS/MMS or Bluetooth (e.g., using the Object Exchange or OBEX protocol). The target acquisition and payload transfer states can loop for ever. Note that there is a second transition before the packaging state. Some viruses may test a condition, most commonly the current time and date, and cause damage to the handset. For example, Commwarrior.A (the initial version) resets the device if it is the first hour of the 14-th of any month.

The state diagram in Figure 4.2 and its implementation in AMM provide us with a realistic reconstruction of a real-world mobile virus exploiting Bluetooth and SMS, and study its propagation via simulation. In what follows, we focus on vulnerabilities of Bluetooth and SMS, before presenting our simulation results in Section 4.6.

4.3   Bluetooth Vulnerabilities

Bluetooth is a short-range radio technology, providing wireless connectivity in ranges from 10 m (Class 2) to 100 m (Class 1), with throughput up to 723.2 Kbps, or 2.1Mbps (with enhanced data rates introduced in 2005) using the globally available 2.4GHz radio band. Each device can simultaneously communicate with up to seven other devices to form a piconet. Since the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) [14] was founded in 1998, a number of enhancements, such as synchronous modes for voice, piconet formation and enhanced data rates, have been made to the original standard, making it a popular choice for interconnecting mobile and handheld devices. One industry research report estimates that nearly 300 million devices were shipped with Bluetooth enabled in 2005. A recent study

from IDC estimates that there will be over 922 million Bluetooth-enabled devices world-wide by 2008. The primary application area of Bluetooth to date has been in mobile and wireless consumer products such as mobile phones (nearly 60% of the market), headsets, mobile printing, hands-free control (e.g. in cars), computer peripherals (e.g., keyboard and mouse), and for synchronization of handheld devices. With the recent adoption of ultra wideband (UWB) radio [21] by the Bluetooth SIG, Bluetooth devices will soon be able to transmit data at a rate similar to USB and firewire, and will allow transmission of high-definition video to other mobile devices and files for digital music players.

A number of potential vulnerabilities and exploits have been identified with Bluetooth devices. The authors of [89] proposed an analytical model called probabilistic queuing for modeling malware spreading in an ad-hoc Bluetooth environment. Although their model does not consider fading effects and Bluetooth software stack issues, such a model can be useful to estimate the final size of an epidemic involving a mobile Bluetooth virus. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits (CVE) [15] and National Vulnerability Database [17] have recorded a sharp increase in reported vulnerabilities for several popular Bluetooth software stacks. The majority of the resulting exploits are due to programming flaws and incorrect implementation of Bluetooth protocols for pairing, data transfer and device discovery. We first provide a brief description of the Bluetooth link-layer security model, and then review the major vulnerabilities.

4.3.1 Bluetooth Security Model

The simplest security mechanism provided by Bluetooth is a *device discovery* mode in which the device is either "discoverable" (i.e., visible to other nearby devices) or "non-discoverable." When a mobile virus or worm uses proximity scanning to search for nearby devices, a "non-discoverable" device has *theoretical* protection against a Bluetooth-based attack. It is theoretical because there are techniques to search for devices that are in non-discoverable mode, as we will describe shortly. Even a non-discoverable device is still visible to previously-paired devices and users who are familiar with its Bluetooth MAC address. The device discovery mode with current-generation Bluetooth devices has several

implementation issues. The majority of the mobile phones are enabled with their Bluetooth interface always discoverable by default. Some Bluetooth headsets never return the interface to a non-discoverable mode after closing a connection with a paired phone. The need to be discoverable for pairing with another device can also be exploited by an attacker to learn of nearby devices. Therefore, setting the discovery mode of a Bluetooth device to non-discoverable does not guarantee a strong protection against mobile malware.

The basic security mechanism provided by Bluetooth is *link-level authentication*. A link is defined as a communication channel established between two Bluetooth devices. During the link establishment protocol, a *link key* is used to verify the authenticity of the two devices. The link keys are also used to generate *link encryption keys* that control the encryption of data sent over the established link. The procedure by which the two devices establish a shared secret is also known as *pairing*. The pairing operation results in a link key that the two devices can use for link authentication and encryption after the pairing as well as for later reference. Each device stores the shared link key associated with the remote device address. The pairing process involves user interaction, e.g., entering a *pass key* (maximum 128 bits). For convenience, Bluetooth devices must be able to store a number of [*link key, device address*] pairs in a database. This opens up the possibility of link key compromise by a mobile virus as discussed in Section 4.3.2. The pairing procedure itself consists of several steps [14]: initial key generation by the Host Controller Interface (HCI), generation and exchange of shared link key by the Link Management (LM), and baseband events. Programming errors and incorrect state machines in the Bluetooth stack can introduce exploits during the pairing procedure, as discussed in Section 4.3.2. We discuss below potential vulnerabilities in Bluetooth that may be exploited by future mobile viruses.

4.3.2   Bluetooth Exploits for Mobile Malware

Figure 4.3.2 lists several vulnerabilities and exploits that have been reported for popular Bluetooth-enabled devices such as cell phones, headsets and Bluetooth software stack from vendors. Our goal is to provide a general classification of the vulnerabilities and

Vulnerability	Exploit	OS/BT Stack	Damages	Comments
"Helo Moto" attack on port 8	Incorrect state of "trusted device"	BT OBEX Push Profile and vcard	Attacker can take control of victim device via AT commands	Combination of BlueSnarf and BlueBug attacks [19]
"Blueline" attack	Buffer overflow	BT OBEX setpath()	Crashes cellular handset	Pre-attack pairing is required [11]
Pairing not needed for using a BT service profile	Malformed user interface when responding to "0x0d" or newline character	BT Voice Gateway user interface	Attacker can access phone book entries, SMS and other personal information via AT commands	Users can be enticed to grant connection via social engineering exploits [11]
L2CAP DoS Attack	Send multiple malformed (short) L2CAP packets to target device	BT L2CAP layer (l2cap.c in most BT implementations)	Denial of service (DoS) attack (device slows down and freezes after a short time).	Affects phones from multiple vendors [20,21]
OBEX Object Push buffer overflow OBEX File Share buffer overflow	Send a long filename (longer than 256 Bytes) in either ASCII or Unicode	OBEX Object Push application (Blue Neighbors.EXE) BT FTP client	Crashes device (memory stack is corrupted), remote code execution is possible via suitably formed packet	Affects devices deploying BT stack from selected vendor [22,23,24]
OBEX Object Push directory traversal	Can place a file anywhere on victim device regardless of user-specified path	ussp-push executable	Can place trojans in startup and system folders (e.g. worm/virus payload)	Requires victim to grant connection, no filename or path is presented at the time of connection request [11]
Remote audio eavesdropping	Null authentication and authorization values in Windows registry entries for BT headset and audio gateway	BT stack/driverfrom vendor	Allows attacker to remotely inject audio into a victim's speakers, as well as remotely monitor audio via the microphone	Requires special-purpose software to exploit the vulnerability [16]
Failure to handle exceptions	Malformed BT nickname in remote device	BT stack in Mobile OS (Symbian)	Denial of service (DoS) attack (device restarts when it discovers the remote nickname)	No known patches, affects a specific combination of Symbian and Nokia phones [18]
Failure to verify input string	Malformed remote device name request	HCI remote name request function call in Linux/BT implementation	Allows attacker to send any command string in place of device name, can take control of victim	Affected multiple Linux distributions [17]
Integer underflow	No check on sign of protocol value	Linux implementation of BT (Affix and Bluez)	Crashes BT, may allow root access via separate exploit	Affected multiple Linux distributions [15]

Figure 4.3: Vulnerabilities and exploits in Bluetooth (BT)

therefore, we do not mention the specific manufacturer and model names that are affected by these vulnerabilities. The references cited in the last column of Figure 4.3.2 provide detailed information on each exploit and names of affected devices. Many of these exploits can be prevented by downloading the appropriate patches from the Internet. However, it should be noted that service providers and mobile phone vendors do not currently have any infrastructure in place to patch an existing Bluetooth software stack on phones when an exploit is discovered. They typically correct the software flaw in their future phones and model releases, since any recall of mobile phones is an expensive and time-consuming process. Therefore, a mobile virus may take advantage of multiple unpatched vulnerabilities in an older Bluetooth stack. The risk can be partially mitigated by installing anti-virus software for mobile handsets. However, the anti-virus tools do not patch exploits in OS and Bluetooth software stack — they simply remove the infected files and directories from the handset. Therefore, it is crucial to develop *secure procedures* for on-demand and over-

the-air (OTA) (or over-the-Internet) patching to protect against future mobile attacks. We discuss the potential exploits and vulnerabilities next.

- *Brute-force proximity scanning:* There are brute-force techniques such as Red-Fang [146] that can be used to guess the Bluetooth device identifier (48-bit) of a remote device. The last 3 bytes of the identifier should be unique to each Bluetooth device.[2] In practice, some cellular phone manufacturers choose not to assign a unique Bluetooth identifier to each phone. By reducing the size of the searchable address space (e.g., when the manufacturer of the remote device is known, i.e., the device is within the visual range) and by improving the address search algorithm, it is now possible to find all hidden Bluetooth devices within range in about four and half days [146]. This means that the spreading rate of a mobile virus based on current-generation brute-force proximity scanning techniques is relatively low. However, further reduction in time is possible due to pseudo-random number generators used for addresses by device manufacturers, and by employing an approach similar to permutation scanning [144] used by regular Internet worms. The brute-force approach is not a limiting factor for a malicious attacker who uses a Bluetooth-enabled device simply to launch a crossover worm or virus (discussed in Section 4.2.1).

- *Discovering addresses during communication:* Since a Bluetooth device must be discoverable for pairing with a new device, its address can be recorded by a malicious user during the short time required to complete the pairing process. In many Bluetooth implementations, when a remote device is discovered, its address (device identifier) is not shown along with the device name. Since a device name can be easily forged by a malicious user, the remote user may think of it as a legitimate device in the network. A variation of this attack works very similarly to attacks involving setting up a fake public wireless LAN (WLAN) access point (AP) for enticing unsuspecting users. A malicious Bluetooth AP can accept connection requests from Bluetooth devices and record their addresses and paired link keys.

- *Compromise of link key database:* If a malicious agent gains root access on a Blue-

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[2]The first 3 bytes of the address are specific to each manufacturer and are assigned by IEEE.

tooth device using a known exploit (e.g., the integer underflow exploit in Figure 4.3), it may be able to read the stored [link key, device address] pairs, effectively gaining access to a set of previously-paired devices. Finding victim hosts in this manner is very similar to an email- or instant messaging (IM) worm obtaining addresses of potential victims from an address book or buddy lists on the compromised host.

- *Software errors:* Software and programming errors such as improper exception handling, buffer overflows, integer underflows, etc., can make the Bluetooth software stack highly vulnerable to remote attacks. We have highlighted several vulnerabilities [9, 11, 16, 19] of this type in Figure 4.3. For example, in one Bluetooth implementation, failure to check the received remote device name allowed an attacker to send any command string in place of the remote device name and therefore, take control of the device via a known root exploit. Software errors, in particular an application's failure to properly bound-check user-supplied input data, remain one of the most popular and effective exploits by Internet virus writers.

- *Incorrect protocol handling:* Incorrect protocol handling is another vulnerability that can be exploited by a mobile virus. The most notable vulnerabilities of this type are found in the Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) layer [6, 18, 20] and Object Exchange (OBEX) protocol [8, 10, 13] of certain Bluetooth software stack (see Figure 4.3). These vulnerabilities can be exploited to launch Denial of Service (DoS) attacks or crash the target device.

4.4 SMS/MMS Vulnerabilities

Unlike proximity scanning whose range is limited to a small area, mobile viruses that exploit Short (SMS) or Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) to spread to other devices are capable of causing worldwide damage, similar to the scale of attacks seen on the Internet. This is because the structure of real-world SMS/MMS networks resembles a scale-free topology similar to email and IM networks, as we will see in Section 4.6. The primary reason why we have not witnessed any large-scale attacks involving SMS is a limit on the

size of messages (up to 160 B) that can be sent via SMS. An MMS message does not have a size limit unless imposed by a service provider (typically up to 300 KB). While SMS messages are primarily restricted to text, MMS messages can have embedded text, audio (MP3, MIDI), images (JPEG, GIF) and video (MPEG). For example, the payload size of Commwarrior is 27 KB which can be easily sent to another phone as an MMS attachment.

Before discussing the vulnerabilities, a short discussion of the SMS messaging system is in order. When a mobile user sends a message from a handset (i.e., Mobile Originated or MO) or a web-based gateway to another phone number, the message is received by the Base Station System (BSS) of the service provider. The BSS then forwards the message to the Mobile Switching Center (MSC). Upon receiving a MO message, the MSC sends the end-user information to the Visitor Location Register (VLR) of the cell and performs checks on the message for any violation. It then forwards the message to the Short Messaging Service Center (SMSC) of the provider. The SMSC stores the messages in a queue, records the transaction in the network billing system and sends a confirmation back to the MSC. The status of the message is changed from MO to Mobile Terminated (MT) at this point. Through a series of steps, the message is then forwarded by SMSC to the receiving user's MSC. The MSC receives the subscriber information from the VLR and finally forwards the message to the receiving handset. The store-forward nature of SMS makes it vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, as demonstrated by a recent study [52]. In the following, we focus on vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a future mobile virus.

- *SMS gateway errors:* Many wireless providers allow Internet users to send short text messages directly to their mobile phone subscribers via a web-based SMS gateway. When not designed correctly, such a gateway opens the door to send large volumes of SMS spams and other malicious content. These gateways can benefit by using a visual challenge-response test such as CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) [136] to prevent automated spam generators from using the system. However, implementation errors, e.g. by not having enough characters in the CAPTCHA image, can make the SMS gateway vulnerable to brute-force attacks.

- *Software errors:* SMS/MMS systems can suffer from software vulnerabilities in embedded objects such as images or video. For example, a vulnerability in GIF image execution function [7] in MSN Messenger 6.2 could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code caused by improper bounds checking of user-supplied input in the width and height fields of a GIF image file. MPEG stream buffer overflows due to incorrect bound checking in MPEG players have also been reported — this can be exploited by invoking a vulnerable MPEG player within MMS. Similarly, a design flaw in the graphical user interface (GUI) of the Java API on a particular mobile phone allowed remote attackers to send unauthorized SMS messages by overlaying a confirmation message with a malicious message [5]. Successful exploits of software errors may allow a mobile virus to send unauthorized messages and execute arbitrary machine code within the context of the SMS/MMS application on the handset.

- *SMS spoofing attacks:* SMS address spoofing is an emerging threat that allows a malicious agent to make an SMS message appear as though it came from a different user and network. This is similar to how email spams and spam relays work. The SMS web-based gateways can also be exploited to spoof the message's origin. There appears to be even an open-source tool on the Internet called "SMS Spoof" for Palm OS that allows any user to send spoofed messages through any SMSC supporting the EMI/UCP protocol.

4.5   AMM for SMS and Bluetooth Threats

In this section, we briefly discuss capabilities added to the agent-based malware modeling (AMM) framework that we described in Chapter 2 to investigate mobile viruses exploiting SMS, MMS and Bluetooth vulnerabilities on cellular handsets. We added a SMS Center (SMSC) as a gateway for all SMS messages exchanged among the handsets in the cellular network. The agent services consist of client programs for SMS/MMS messaging, whereas the SMSC agent consists of a store-and-forward server only. As before, there are two types of topologies in our simulation environment. The *physical* connectivity is deter-

mined by the cellular network infrastructure (base stations and SMSC) and movement of the agents, whereas the *logical* connectivity is determined by the SMS messages exchanged among the agents, and the Bluetooth piconet formations.

The SMS/MMS service topologies are extracted from traces collected from a real-world cellular network, as we have used in our simulation results. The inclusion of a state diagram of the mobile virus results in a more realistic epidemic spreading in AMM. An alternative is to simply input the topology of a particular service such as SMS, and consider all nodes in the graph equally vulnerable to a SMS virus. The spread of the epidemic in this case solely depends on a constant infection probability and the topology of the SMS network. While most modeling literature on malware spreading that exploits specific services such as email or IM follows this methodology, this simulates only the worst-case attack scenario and may not represent the true spreading of the epidemic within the network.

SMS infection model: The SMS infection model has the following parameters: message sending rates ($n_s(N_{cs})$), message receiving rates ($n_r(N_{cs})$), cumulative density functions (cdf) of user-to-user message size (B) and message service time (T_s^{sms}), and the SMS user topology ($G(N_{cs}, E_{cs})$), where N_{cs} and E_{cs} represent the total number of cellular subscribers in the network and the number of service-interaction edges, respectively. We also introduce two parameters describing the malicious agent: malicious agent messaging rate ($m_s(I_{cs})$) for the set of infected mobile users (I_{cs}) and a probability of clicking on an infected message (P_r^{sms}). In the absence of traces collected during an actual occurrence of a mobile worm or virus, one has to estimate these two parameters.

4.6   Simulation of a Mobile Virus

In this section, we present simulation results for propagation of a generic mobile virus developed in Section 4.2.3 and implemented in AMM. Our goal is to study the epidemic growth rate of a mobile virus in a realistic messaging network. The mobile virus uses both SMS and Bluetooth to spread to other devices. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any malware propagation model using SMS/MMS services in a cellular network. A recent study [107] of SMS usage characterization collected call data records and SS7 traces

Figure 4.4: Total messages exchanged in the SMS network

over a three-week period from a large cellular carrier with 10 million mobile users. The data allowed us to construct a realistic SMS messaging network with the following parameters: message sending rates, message receiving rates, cumulative density functions (CDF) of user-to-user message size (B) and message service times, and the SMS service topology. The original data involved a very large number of messages (over 59 million) and users (over 10 million). Therefore, we scaled the data to a small number of users and messages, while still preserving the basic characteristics of the original data sets. Figure 4.4 shows the total number of messages sent and received in the original data. From this graph, we computed total number of messages sent and received by the mobile users over our simulation time window of 3600 seconds. Figure 4.5 shows the topological structure of the SMS network by plotting the number of receivers for each unique sender. From the graph, it is clear that the real-world SMS network can be represented by a power-law network. We therefore fitted a power-law equation of the form $y = a + b \times x^{-k}$ to the data and calculated the power-law exponent, $k = 2.45$. From the data, we were able to scale the overall size of the network from over 10 million users to 2000 users while maintaining its power-law properties. Figure 4.6 shows the CDF of message service times for delivered messages. The service time includes the queuing time at the SMSC and reflects the store-and-forward

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Parameter	Value
α	3
σ	4 dB
β_{th}	30 dB
v (RWP)	[2,24]m/sec
t_{pause}	0
v	[0,0.1,0.9]
$I(0)$	[1]

Table 4.2: Parameters for Bluetooth channel and mobility models

nature of the short messaging system.

Using the above data, we generated an SMS network in the form of an SMSC agent and 2000 mobile handsets in AMM. Table 4.2 presents the parameters for Bluetooth channel and RWP mobility models used in the simulation. We assumed 30% of the Bluetooth-enabled and 10% of the SMS-capable handsets immune from the virus. The initial number of infections ($I(0)$) are 1 (Bluetooth) and 10 (SMS), respectively. Note that not all devices in our simulation have both Bluetooth and SMS services available. Figure 4.7 compares the average number of infections (averaged over 100 runs) for the virus exploiting Bluetooth-only and both Bluetooth and SMS vulnerabilities. In order to simulate the heterogeneity in Bluetooth software stack, we introduced a Bluetooth vulnerability ratio (v) that specifies a fraction of the Bluetooth-enabled devices as susceptible to the virus. Figure 4.8 shows the effect of vulnerability ratio (v) on the overall growth rate of the virus.

Figures 4.4-4.7 indicate that the growth rate of a mobile virus targeting SMS/MMS depends strongly on the message rates and the topology of the messaging network. If the initial infection of the virus is at a highly-connected node (e.g. an SMS stock quote server or a web-based SMS gateway), the spread will be very fast. However since the vast majority of the SMS users have only a neighbor-degree of 1, the epidemic growth rate is small when the virus infects the average SMS user. On the other hand, when the users have a Bluetooth interface that is both vulnerable and discoverable, the mobility of the users have a strong effect on the mobile virus propagation. In this case, a hybrid worm (SMS and Bluetooth)

Figure 4.5: Topological structure of the SMS network

propagates much faster, utilizing both proximity scanning and the topological structure of the messaging network.

4.7 Concluding Remarks

The proliferation of mobile devices such as smart phones, PDAs and handsets has introduced new mobile viruses such as Commwarrior, Mabir, etc., that can spread via SMS/MMS messages and by exploiting Bluetooth vulnerabilities. In this chapter, we have analyzed the existing mobile viruses to extract a set of their common behavior vectors that can be used to develop mobile virus detection and containment algorithms. We have studied the vulnerabilities of Bluetooth and SMS/MMS messaging systems in depth, and pointed out the vulnerabilities that may be exploited by future mobile viruses. We have also developed the state diagram of a generic mobile virus that can spread via SMS/MMS and Bluetooth. The discovery, infection and replication states of the generic virus were implemented in the AMM modeling framework, to study its propagation. We used data from a large real-world cellular carrier to generate a scaled-down topology of an SMS network and studied the propagation of the mobile virus. Our results indicate that due to heterogeneity

Figure 4.6: CDF of message service times (seconds)

of mobile handset platforms and scale-free nature of the SMS network, the growth rate of a mobile virus exploiting SMS messages is small. But the growth rate increases significantly when these handsets are highly vulnerable to Bluetooth exploits.

Figure 4.7: Average number of infections for SMS and hybrid (SMS, Bluetooth) virus propagation

Figure 4.8: Effect of vulnerability ratio on mobile virus propagation

CHAPTER 5

Behavioral Detection of Mobile Malware

5.1 Introduction

Although there has not been a major worldwide outbreak of mobile malware, which make most people mistakenly think that mobile malware exist only in the labs of anti-virus companies, the threats posed by mobile malware are far more realistic and mobile handsets are expected to increasingly become targets of these malware [75]. For example, in less than one year, the infection of both Cabir and Commwarrior worms have been reported in more than 20 countries [79] and 0.5–1.5% of MMS traffic in a Russian mobile network is made up of infected messages (which is already close to the fraction of malicious code in email traffic) [80]. In response to this increasing threat, a number of handset manufacturers and network operators have partnered with security software vendors to offer anti-virus programs for mobile devices [39, 41, 67]. However, current anti-virus solutions for mobile devices rely primarily on signature-based detection and are thus useful mostly for post-infection cleanup. For example, if a handset is infected with a mobile virus, these tools can be used to scan the *system* directory for the presence of files with specific extensions (e.g., .APP, .RSC and .MDL in Symbian-based devices) typical of virus payload. Although the infected files are deleted by the anti-virus tool, the underlying vulnerability — *overwriting the system directory* — is *not* patched. As a result, a cleaned handset may get infected again by another instance of the same virus, requiring repeated cleanup. Another approach is to only trust and install digitally signed applications on the phone. For example, the Symbian

Signed [126] framework derives a unique application certificate from the Symbian Root certificate issued by its Certificate Authority (CA) for signing an application. When a signed application is installed, the Symbian installer program verifies that the signature is valid before proceeding with the installation. This ensures that the software has not been tampered with during its distribution and has undergone a standard testing procedure as part of being Symbian Signed. However, given the vast number of mobile applications available on the Internet, especially peer-to-peer sites, one can not expect all applications to be signed with a certificate.[1] An application that has been self-signed cannot be trusted to be free of malicious code. Moreover, even when an application is signed by a trusted CA, a malicious program can still enter the system via downloads (e.g., SMS/MMS messages with multimedia attachments), and it may exploit known vulnerabilities of an unsigned helper application.

Several important differences exist between mobile environments and traditional desktop settings, making the conventional anti-virus solutions unsuitable for mobile devices. First, mobile devices generally have limited resources such as CPU, memory, and battery power. Although handsets' CPU speed and memory capacity have been increasing significantly at low cost in recent years, they are much less than their desktop counterpart. In particular, energy-efficiency is perhaps the most critical issue for battery-powered handsets that limits innovations in mobile devices. Since the signature-based approach must check if each derived signature matches any signature in the malware database, it will not be efficient for resource-constrained mobile devices, especially in view of the fact that their malware threats will grow at a very fast rate with soon-to-emerge all IP mobile devices based on Wibro and WiMAX technologies. The emergence of crossover worms and viruses [54] that infect a handset when it is connected to a desktop for synchronization (and vice versa) requires mobile applications and data to be checked against both traditional as well as mobile virus signatures. Furthermore, signature-based checking can be easily evaded with the help from simple obfuscation, polymorphism and packing techniques [36, 93], thus requiring a new signature for almost every single malware variant. These all limit the extent to which the signature-based approach can be deployed on resource-constrained handsets.

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[1]Currently, very few operators lock down handsets to prevent users from installing unsigned applications.

Second, most published studies [43, 109, 114, 157] on the detection of Internet malware have focused on their network signatures (i.e., scanning, failed connection, and DNS request). However, due to the mobility of devices and the relatively closed nature of cellular networks, constructing network signatures of mobile malware is extremely difficult. In addition, the emergence of mobile malware that spread via non-traditional vectors (i.e. SMS/MMS messaging and Bluetooth [30, 52]) makes possible malware outbreak whose progress closely tracks human mobility patterns [75] and hence require novel detection methods. Also, compared to traditional OSes, Symbian and other mobile OSes have important differences in the way file permissions and modifications to the OS are handled. Thus considering all these differences, a low-overhead classifier that accounts for new malware behaviors is more suitable for mobile phone settings, and the goal of this work is to develop such a detection framework that overcomes the limitations of the signature-based approach while addressing unique features and limitations of the mobile environment.

An alternative to signature-based methods, *behavioral detection* [49], has emerged as a promising way of preventing the intrusion of spyware, viruses and worms. In behavioral detection, the run-time behavior of an application (e.g., file accesses, API calls) is monitored and compared against a set of malicious and/or normal behavior profiles. The malicious behavior profiles can be specified as global rules that apply to all applications, as well as fine-grained application-specific rules. Behavioral detection is more resilient to polymorphic worms [98] or code obfuscation, because it assesses the effects of an application based on more than just specific payload signatures. For example, a widely-used polymorphism technique is the program packer that encrypts the executable file and decrypts it before its execution. Since encryption/decryption does not alter the malware behavior, multiple malware variants generated via executable packers e.g., UPX[4] can be detected with a single behavior specification. As a result, a typical database of behavior profiles and rules should be smaller than that needed for storing specific payload signatures of many different classes of malware. This makes behavioral detection methods particularly suitable for handsets. Moreover, behavioral detection has potential for detecting new malware and zero-day [140] worms, since many new malware are constructed by adding new behaviors to existing malware [87] or replacing the obsolete modules with fresh components.

Consequently, they share similar behavior patterns with existing malware.

However, there are two challenges in deploying behavioral detection. The first is *specification* of what constitutes normal or malicious behavior that covers a wide range of applications, while keeping false positives low. The second is *on-line reconstruction* of potentially suspicious behavior from the run-time behavior of applications, so that the observed signatures can be matched against a database of normal and malicious signatures. The main contribution of our work is to overcome these two challenges in the mobile operating environment.

The starting point of our approach is to generate a catalog of malicious behavior signatures by examining the behavior of current-generation mobile viruses, worms and Trojans that have thus far been reported in the wild. We specify an application behavior as a collection of system events and resource-access attempts made by programs, interposed by a temporal logic called the *temporal logic of causal knowledge* (TLCK). Monitoring system call events and file accesses have been used successfully in intrusion detection [59, 60] and backtracking [74]. In our approach, we reconstruct higher-level behavior signatures on-line from lower-level system calls and file accesses, much like how individual pieces are put together to form a jigsaw puzzle. The TLCK-based behavior specification addresses the first challenge of behavioral detection, by providing a compact "spatial-temporal" representation of program behavior. The next step is fast and accurate reconstruction of these signatures during run-time by monitoring system calls and resource accesses so that appropriate alerts can be generated. This overcomes the second challenge for deployment of behavioral detection in mobile handsets. In order to detect malicious programs from their partial or incomplete behavior signatures (e.g., new worms that share only partial behaviors with known worms), we train a machining learning classifier called *Support Vector Machines* (SVMs) [35, 63] with *both* normal and malicious behaviors, so that partial signatures for malicious behavior can be classified from those of normal applications running on the handset. For real-life deployment, the resulting SVM model and the malicious signature database are preloaded onto the handset by either the handset manufacturer or a cellular service provider. These are updated only when new behaviors (i.e., not minor variants of current malware) are discovered. The updating process is similar to how anti-virus

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signatures are updated by security vendors. However, since totally new behaviors are far fewer than new variants, the updates are not expected to be frequent.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes how to construct behavior signatures using the TLCK logic and shows examples from current-generation mobile malware. These signatures are generated based on our extensive survey of mobile viruses, worms and Trojans discovered to date. We also describe generalized behavior signatures that cover broad categories of malware so that a compact malicious behavior database can be created. In Section 5.3, we describe the implementation of a monitoring layer in Symbian that constructs these signatures from captured API calls and system events via a two-stage mapping technique. Section 5.4 discusses a class of machine learning algorithms called *Support Vector Classification* (SVC) that we use to tell malicious behavior from normal behavior based on captured partial signatures. This step is necessary in order to detect a malware before its complete behavior signature can be captured by the monitoring layer. We evaluate the effectiveness of behavioral detection in Section 5.6 against real-world mobile worms. We review the related literature in Section 5.7 and make concluding remarks in Section 5.8.

5.2 Malicious Behavior Signatures

In this section, we discuss how to construct malicious behavior signatures of common mobile worms and viruses.

5.2.1 Temporal patterns

We define **behavior signature** as the resulting manifestation of a specification of resource accesses and events generated by applications, including malware. We are interested in only those behavior signatures that indicate the presence of a malicious activity such as damage to the handset operating environment (e.g., draining the battery or overwriting files in the system directory), installing a rootkit or worm payload, sending out an infected message, etc. To this end, it is not sufficient to monitor a single event (e.g., a file read or write access) of a process in isolation in order to classify an activity to be mali-

cious. In fact, there are many steps a malicious worm or virus performs in the course of its life-cycle that may appear to be harmless when analyzed in isolation. However, a logical ordering of these steps over time often clearly reveals the malicious intent. The *temporal pattern*—i.e., the precedence order of these events and resource accesses in time—is therefore key to detecting such malicious intent. For example, consider a simple file transfer by calling the Bluetooth OBEX system call (e.g., *CObexClient::Put()* and related OBEX operations) in Symbian. This is often used by applications for exchanging data such as games and music files among nearby handsets. On their own, any such calls will appear to be harmless. However, when the received file is of type *.SIS* (Symbian installation file) *and* that file is later executed, *and* the installer process seeks to overwrite files in the *system* directory, we can say with a high degree of certainty that the handset has been infected by a virus such as Mabir [123] or Commwarrior [122]. With subsequent monitoring of the files and processes touched by the above activities, the confidence level of detection can be improved further. This means that if we view the handset as a system exhibiting a wide range of behaviors over time, we can classify some of the temporal manifestations of these behaviors as malicious. Note that the *realization* of specific behaviors is dependent on how a user interacts with the handset and the specific implementation (e.g., infection vectors) of a malware. However, the *specification* of temporal manifestation of malicious behaviors can still be prescribed *a priori* by considering their effects on the handset resources and the environment. This is why behavioral detection is more resilient to code obfuscation and polymorphism than the signature-based detection.

A simple representation of malicious behavior can be given by ordering the corresponding actions using a vector clock [81] and applying the "and" operator to the actions. However, for more complex behavior that requires complicated temporal relationships among actions performed by different processes, simple temporal representations may not be sufficient. This suggests that behavior signatures are best specified using temporal logic instead of classical propositional logic. Propositional logic supports reasoning with statements that evaluate to be either true or false. On the other hand, temporal logic allows propositions whose evaluation depends on time, making it suitable for describing sequences of events and properties of correlated behaviors. There have been significant research in applying

temporal logic to study distributed systems, and software programs. There are also various branches of temporal logic such as linear time and branching time logic [51]. In Linear Time Temporal Logic (LTTL), program execution behavior can be modeled as a linear sequence of states, where each state has a fixed (i.e., deterministic) output. On the other hand, the Branching Time Temporal Logic (BTTL) allows state transitions via a finite (or infinite) number of reachable states where the states can be seen to form a reachability tree. Since program execution and file/memory accesses are not always linear in time, LTTL is not a suitable choice for our purpose. A variant of BTTL called the *temporal logic of causal knowledge* (TLCK) [102], on the other hand, allows concurrency relations on branching structures that are naturally suitable for describing actions of multiple programs. Therefore, we adopt the specification language of TLCK to represent malicious behaviors within the context of a handset operating environment.

5.2.2 Temporal Logic of Malicious Behavior

This section describes how to specify malicious behavior in terms of system calls and events, interposed by temporal and logical operators. The specification of malicious behavior is the first step of any behavioral detection framework. Although our presentation is primarily targeted to the Symbian OS, it can be extended for other mobile operating systems as well.

First, let us formally define a behavior signature as a finite set of propositional variables interposed using TLCK, where each variable (when true) confirms the execution of either (i) a single or an aggregation of system calls, or (ii) an event such as read/write access to a given file descriptor, directory structure or memory location. Note that we do *not* keep track of all system calls and events generated by all processes — doing so will impose unacceptable performance overhead in constructing behavior signatures. Therefore, only those system calls and events that are used in the specification of malicious behavior are to be monitored. In fact, we find that specifying behavior signatures for the majority of mobile malicious programs reported to date, requires monitoring only a small subset of Symbian API calls.

Let $PS = \{p_1, p_2, \cdots, p_m\} \bigcup \{i | i \in N\}$ be a set of m atomic propositional variables belonging to N malicious behavior signatures. Atomic propositions can be joined together to form higher-level propositional variables in our specification. The logical operators *not* ($\neg$) and *and* ($\wedge$) are defined as usual. The temporal operators defined using past-time logic are as follows:

- $\odot_t$ *true at time t*

- $\diamondsuit_t$ *true at some instant before t*

- $\square_t$ *true at all instants before t*

- $\diamondsuit_t^{t-k}$ true at some instant in the interval $[t-k, t]$.

$\diamondsuit_t^{t-k}$ is a quantified temporal operator to range k time instants over the time variable t. We make the following assumptions.

1. Time is represented by an infinite sequence of discrete time instants.

2. A duration is given by a sequence of time instants with initiating and terminating instants.

3. A system call or an event is instantiated at a given instant but may take place over a duration.

4. The strong synchrony hypothesis [27] holds for the handset operating system environment, i.e., the instantiation of a single event at a given instant can generate other events synchronously. In case of synchronous events, one can still use relative order to denote relationship among events.

5. Higher-level events and system calls of greater complexity can be composed by temporal and logical predications of the above atomic propositional variables.

To illustrate the application of the above logic, we apply it to specify the behavior of a family of mobile worms known as Commwarrior. Following this, we will specify behavior signatures that are general enough to cover different families of mobile worms. This generalization is a key benefit of using a behavioral detection approach as opposed to payload signatures, given the small memory and storage footprint of these devices.

Figure 5.1: Symbian filesystem directories targeted by malware (OS v8 and earlier)

5.2.3 Example: The Commwarrior worm

The Commwarrior worm [122] targets Symbian Series 60 phones and is capable of spreading via both Bluetooth and MMS messages. The worm payload is transferred via a SIS file with randomly-generated names. The payload consists of the main executable *commwarrior.exe* and a boot component *commrec.mdl* that are installed under `\System\updates`, `\System\Apps` and `\System\Recogs` directories. Figure 5.1 shows the organization of the Symbian filesystem. Each of the drive letters (*C:, D:, E:* and *Z:*) has an identical (but separate) filesystem tree rooted at *System*. Once the payload is installed, the SIS file installer automatically starts the worm process *commwarrior.exe*. It then rebuilds a SIS file from the above files and places it as `\System\updates\commw.sis`. Commwarrior spreads via Bluetooth by contacting all devices in range and by sending a copy of itself in a round-robin manner during the time window from 08:00 to 23:59 hours based on the device clock. It also spreads via MMS by randomly choosing a phone number from the device's phonebook, and sends an MMS message with *commw.sis* as an "*application/vnd.symbian.install*" MIME attachment so that the target device invokes the Symbian installer program upon receiving the message. The daily window for replication via MMS is only from 00:00 to 06:59 hours, again based on the device's own clock. Figure 5.2 presents a graphical representation of the behavior of the Commwarrior worm. Our goal is to convert this graphical representation into a behavior signature using logical and temporal operators defined in Section 5.2.2. Note that the specification of Commwarrior behavior requires monitoring of a small number of processes and system calls ($N = 6$), namely, the Symbian installer, the worm process (commwarrior.exe), two Symbian Bluetooth API calls and the native MMS messaging application on the handset. By generalizing the behavior

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signatures across many families of mobile malware, we hope to keep *N* to be a small number. To specify Commwarrior in terms of TLCK logic, we first identify the set *PS* of atomic propositional variables:

ReceiveFile(f,mode,type): Receive file *f* via either mode=
Bluetooth or mode=MMS of type SIS. When mode=MMS, the MIME attachment is of type *application/vnd.symbian.install*.

InstallApp(f,files,dir): Install a SIS archive file *f* by extracting *files* and installing them in directory *dir* of the handset. The specific elements of *f*, *files* and *dir* are as shown in Figure 5.2.

LaunchProcess(p,parent): Launch an application *p* by a parent process *parent*, which is typically the Symbian installer.

MakeSIS(f,files): Create a SIS archive file *f* from files *files* (files are assumed to have fully-qualified path names).

BTFindDevice(d): Discover a random Bluetooth device *d* nearby.

OBEXSendFile(f,d): Transfer a file *f* (with fully-qualified path name) to a nearby Bluetooth device *d* via the OBEX protocol.

MMSFindAddress(a): Look up a random phone number *a* in the device Phonebook.

MMSSendMessage(f,a): Send MMS message with attachment *f* to a random phone number *a*.

SetDevice(act,< condition >): Perform action *act* (e.g., reset device) when $< condition >$ holds true. $< condition >$ is typically expressed as a set of other predicates to verify device time and date (see below).

VerifyDayofMonth(date,< mm : dd >): Verify if current date is $< mm : dd >$, e.g., "the 14th day of any month."

Next, we combine the atomic variables into seven higher-level signatures that correspond to the major behavioral steps of the worm family. These seven signatures can be monitored during run-time and out of these seven, four signatures can be placed in our malicious behavior database to trigger an alarm. In particular, "$bt - transfer$" and "$mms - transfer$" are perfectly harmless signatures, where as "$activate - worm$", "$run - worm - 1$", "$run - worm - 2$" and "$run - worm - 3$" can be used to warn the user, or trigger

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
Figure 5.2: Behavior signature for Commwarrior worm

an appropriate preventive action, e.g. quarantine the outgoing message instead of sending it right away. Later, in Section 5.4, we show that the detection of malicious behavior can be made more accurately by training an SVM.

- $\odot_t(bt-transfer) = \Diamond_t(BTFindDevice(d)) \wedge$
  $(\odot_t(OBEXSendFile(f,d)))$

- $\odot_t(mms-transfer) = \Diamond_t(MMSFindAddress(a)) \wedge$
  $(\odot_t(MMSSendMessage(f,a)))$

- $\odot_t(init-worm) = \odot_t(ReceiveFile(mode=Bluetooth))$
  $\vee \odot_t(ReceiveFile(mode=MMS))$

- $\odot_t(activate-worm) = \Diamond_t(init-worm) \wedge$
  $(\odot_t(InstallApp) \wedge \odot_t(LaunchProcess))$

- $\odot_t(run-worm-1) = \Diamond_t(activate-worm) \wedge$
  $(\odot_t(MakeSIS) \wedge \odot_t(VerifyDayofMonth) \wedge$
  $(\Diamond_{1:00}^{0:00}(SetDevice)))$

- $\odot_t(run-worm-2) = \Diamond_t(activate-worm) \wedge$
  $(\odot_t(MakeSIS) \wedge (\Diamond_{23:59}^{8:00}(bt-transfer)))$

- $\odot_t(run-worm-3) = \Diamond_t(activate-worm) \wedge$
  $(\odot_t(MakeSIS) \wedge (\Diamond_{6:59}^{0:00}(mms-transfer)))$

5.2.4 Generalized Behavior Signatures

In order to create generalized signatures that are not specific to each variant of malware, we studied more than 25 distinct families of mobile viruses and worms targeting the Symbian OS, including their *140* variants, reported thus far. For each family of malware, we generated propositional variables corresponding to its actions, identified the argument lists for each variable and assigned TLCK operators to construct the behavior for the malware family. Then, we looked at these signatures across families of malware, and wherever possible, extracted the most common signature elements and recorded the Symbian API calls and applications that must be monitored to reconstruct a possible match. The result is a database of behavior signatures for malware targeting Symbian-powered devices reported to date that depends very little on specific payload names and byte sequences, but rather on the behavior sequences. We find that the malware actions can be naturally placed into three categories i.e., actions that affect *User Data Integrity (UDI)*, actions that damage *System Data Integrity (SDI)* and *Trojan-like Actions*, based on which layer of the handset environment the behavior manifests itself. The categorization identifies three points of insertion where malware detection and response agents can be placed in the mobile operating system.

(1) *User Data Integrity (UDI)*: These actions correspond to damaging the integrity of *user* data files on the device. Most common user data files are address and phone books, call and SMS logs, and mobile content such as video clips, songs, ringtones, etc. These files are commonly organized in the `\System\Apps` directory on the handset. The actions (and, in turn, propositional variables defined to express them) in this group, when true, confirm execution of system and API calls that open, read/write and close these data files.

Example: Acallno [57] is a commercial tool for monitoring SMS text messages to and from

a target phone — the tool has been recently classified as a spyware by security software vendors. Acallno forwards all incoming and outgoing SMS messages on the designated phone to a pre-configured phone number. We define three UDI variables, *CopySMSTo-Draft(msg)*, *RemoveEntrySMSLog(msg)* and *ForwardSMSToNumber(msg,phone number)*, to represent the major tasks performed by Acallno. *CopySMSToDraft(msg)* copies the last SMS message *msg* received into a new SMS message in the Drafts folder. *RemoveEntrySMSLog(msg)* is true when the corresponding entry for *msg* is successfully deleted from the SMS log so that the user is not aware of the presence of Acallno. *ForwardSMSToNumber(msg,phone number)* is true when *msg* is forwarded to an external *phone number*. These three variables, when interposed with appropriate temporal logic, represent the behavior of "SMS spying" on a device. The UDI variable called "*InstallApp(f, files, dir)*" that we have already used earlier for Commwarrior has the following argument values for Acallno: f [SMSCatcher.SIS], files [s60calls.exe, s60system.exe, s60system1.exe, s60calls.mdl, s60sysp.mdl, s60syss.mdl] and dir [\System\Apps, \System\recogs]. These four UDI actions are present in all SMS spyware programs such as Acallno, MobiSpy and SMSSender, and the resulting *generalized* behavior signature can be used for their detection in place of their specific payload signatures.

(2) *System Data Integrity (SDI)*: Several malware attempt to damage the integrity of system configuration files and helper application data files by overwriting the original files in the Symbian system directory with corrupted versions. This is possible for two reasons: (i) the malware files are installed in flash RAM drive C: under Symbian with the same path as the operating system binaries in ROM drive z:. The Symbian OS allows files in C: take precedence over files in z: with the same name and pathname, and therefore, any file with the same path can be overwritten; and (ii) Symbian does not enforce basic security policies such as file permissions based on user and group IDs and access control lists. As a result, the user, by agreeing to install an infected SIS file, unknowingly allows the malware to modify the handset operating environment. The SDI actions (and the propositional variables) correspond to attempts to modify critical system and application files including files required at device startup.

Example: The actions of Skulls, Doomboot (or, SingleJump), AppDisabler, and their variants can be categorized under SDI. These malware overwrite and disable a wide range of applications running under Symbian, including InfraRed, File Manager, System Explorer, Antivirus (Simworks, F-Secure), and device drivers for camera, video recorders, etc. The target directories are, for example,

`\System\Apps\IrApp\` and `\System\Apps\BtUi\` for Infra Red and Bluetooth control panels, respectively. Any file with the ".APP" extension in these directories is an application that is visible in the applications menu. If any of these files is overwritten with a corrupted version, the corresponding application is disabled. Since there are many application directories under `\System\Apps`, our goal is to monitor only those directories that contain critical system and application files such as fonts, file manager, device drivers, startup files, anti-virus, etc. We define the variable *ReplaceSystemAppDirectory(directory)* where *directory* is a canonical pathname of the target directory of a SIS archive.[2] The variable returns true when *directory* matches against a hash table of pre-compiled list of critical system and application directories. At this point, the installation process can be halted until the user permits to go ahead with the installation.

Another serious SDI action is deletion of subdirectories under `\System`. One of the actions performed by the Cardblock Trojan is deleting `bootdata, data, install, libs, mail` in `C:\System`. The `install` directory contains installation and uninstallation information for applications. Many Symbian applications log error codes in `C:\System\bootdata` when they generate a panic. Without these directories, most handset applications become unusable. As a general rule, no user application should be able to delete these directories. We, therefore, define a variable called *DRSystemDirectory(directory)* where *directory* checks against a hash table of these directories whenever a process attempts to either delete or rename a subdirectory under `C:\System`.

(3) *Trojan-like Actions*: This category of actions are performed by a malware when it is delivered to a device via either another malware ("dropper") or an infected memory card.

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[2]When there are multiple target directories, *ReplaceSystemAppDirectory(directory)* is evaluated for each entry in the target list.

These actions attempt to compromise the integrity of user and system data on the device (without requiring user prompts) by exploiting specific OS features and by masquerading as an otherwise useful program ("cracking"). Once a malware infects a device with Trojan-like actions, it may use UDI and SDI actions to alter the handset environment. To date, we find that there are two types of vectors for mobile Trojans: (i) memory cards and (ii) other malware. The memory cards used in cell phones are primarily Reduced-Size MultiMedia-aCard (RS-MMC) and micro/mini Secure Digital (SD) cards that can be secured using a password. As shown in Figure 5.1, the Symbian drive `E:` is used for memory cards with the same `\System` directory structure as of the other drives.

Example: The Cardblock Trojan mentioned earlier, is a cracked version of a legitimate Symbian application called InstantSis. InstantSis allows a user to create a SIS archive of any installed application and copy them to another device. Cardblock appears to have the same look and feel of InstantSis, except that when the user attempts to use the program, it blocks the MMC memory card and deletes the subdirectories in `C:\System` (SDI action). The Trojan-like action of Cardblock is the locking of the MMC card which it accomplishes by setting a random password to the card. Detection of Cardblock must be done either when it is first installed on the device or before it actually performs its two tasks (MMC blocking and deleting system directories). We define a variable called *SetPasswdtoMMC()* to capture the event that a process is attempting to set a password to the MMC card without prompting the user.

SDI Actions and Symbian OS V9

In order to restrict applications from accessing the entire filesystem, Symbian has recently introduced *capabilities* beginning with Symbian OS v9 [126]. A capability is an access token that allows the token holder to access restricted system resources. In previous versions of Symbian OS, all user-level applications had read/write access to the entire filesystem, including `\System` and all its subdirectories. Therefore, malicious applications can easily overwrite or replace critical system files in all previous versions of Symbian, including OS v8. However, in the new Symbian platform security model, access to

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certain functions and APIs will be restricted by capabilities. In order to access the sensitive capabilities, an application must be "Symbian Signed" by Symbian. In case of self-certified applications, the phone manufacturer must recommend the application developer for access to desired capabilities from Symbian. The three capabilities that can prevent many SDI actions currently performed by mobile malware are *AllFiles*, *TCB* (Trusted Computing Base) and *DiskAdmin*. Without these capabilities, an application will no longer be able to access the "/sys" directory where most of the critical system executables and data are stored. For example, it requires *AllFiles* capability to read from and *TCB* capability to write to "/sys". Most user applications in Symbian OS v9 are allowed to access a single directory called "/sys/bin" to install executables and create a private directory called "/private/SID" for temporary files, where SID refers to the Secure ID of the caller application, assigned when the application is Symbian Signed. There are also important changes in OS v9 regarding how an application is installed. The "\System\Apps" subdirectory previously used by applications for storing application information (resource files, bitmap files, helper application, etc.) is no longer supported. Instead, a separate filesystem path called "\resource\apps" is used for storing application information. By separating system and application data in different filesystems and by introducing capabilities for accessing sensitive system resources, Symbian OS v9 clearly improves the security model for mobile devices and will prevent a number of current-generation malware from damaging the integrity of the device. However, it may not prevent (i) mobile worms that spread via SMS/MMS or Bluetooth and social engineering techniques, (ii) malware from launching DoS attacks on other phones or communication infrastructure due to other vulnerabilities.

5.3   Run-Time Construction of Behavior Signatures

To build a malware detection system, the behavior signatures described in Section 5.2 must be constructed at run-time by monitoring the target set of system events and API calls. For the early generation of mobile handsets, building such a monitoring layer in the OS would cause unacceptably high performance overhead. However, in recent years, many embedded microprocessor vendors, especially ARM, have implemented features that allow

real-time tracing of program instruction flow and data accesses. There are already a number of commercial tracing and debugging tools for ARM cores with an Embedded Trace Macrocell (ETM) unit, for resolving real-time application issues when traditional "halt-and-debug" methods cannot be used. In what follows, we describe the implementation of the monitoring layer in Symbian. Next, we describe the implementation of the monitoring layer in Symbian.

5.3.1 Monitoring of API calls via Proxy DLL

Since Symbian is a proprietary OS and provides neither kernel monitoring APIs nor system-wide hooks (e.g., Windows *message hooks* or Linux *netfilter hooks*), intercepting API calls is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Fortunately, the Symbian SDK is accompanied with a Symbian OS emulator which is a Windows application that accurately emulates almost all functionalities of a real handset, such as input devices, user interfaces and APIs for services (Bluetooth, SMS/MMS, filesystem accesses). Most Symbian-based handset developers, therefore, build and test mobile applications using the emulator before transferring them to the real handset. Moreover, the emulator implements all the Symbian APIs in the form of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) which are loaded into memory at run-time. This is the feature that we were able to utilize to build our monitoring layer. Specifically, due to the dynamic load feature of the DLLs, the API traces of applications running in the emulator could be collected via a "*Proxy DLL*" shown in Figure 5.3. Proxy Dll is a popular technique used by many anti-virus tools written for Windows, e.g., to hook into Winsock's I/O functions and network data for virus signatures [70].

Before delving into the details of *Proxy DLL*, we briefly discuss how DLLs work in the Windows OS. When a DLL is built, each function exported by the DLL is assigned a unique integer value known as its *ordinal number*. DLL functions are invoked at run-time by first loading the DLL library into memory, then looking up this ordinal in the DLL to find the memory address of the corresponding functions, and finally executing them. However, since the ordinal number is difficult to use and remember, programs using functions in the DLL often statically link to an *import library* (.lib). The role of the import library is to

Application   Foo.lib   Foo.dll

```
Func(a,b)        Rlibrary::Load(Foo.dll);     EXPORT_C Func(a,b)
                 FuncAddr =                    {
                 Rlibrary::Lookup(FuncOrd);      ....
                 Return (*FuncAddr)(a,b);      }
```

a) An application invoke an exported function in DLL

Application   Foo.lib   Foo.dll (Proxy dll)   orign_foo.dll

```
Func(a,b)   Rlibrary::Load(Foo.dll);   EXPORT_C Func (a,b) {       EXPORT_C
            FuncAddr =                    Rlibrary::Load(orign_foo.dll);   Func (a,b) {
            Rlibrary::Lookup(FuncOrd);    FuncAddr =                        ....
            Return (*FuncAddr)(a,b);       Rlibrary::Lookup(FuncOrd);     }
                                          ret = (*FuncAddr)(a,b);
                                          log(timestamp , ret, a, b) ;
                                          return ret;    }
```

b) Using Proxy DLL to log API call events

Figure 5.3: Proxy DLL to capture API call arguments

define the same set of functions as their counterparts in the DLL that are statically linked
to the corresponding executables. In each function, the import library simply invokes its
counterpart in the DLL file based on its ordinal number. Therefore, with the import library,
we can invoke functions with more meaningful (and easy to remember) function names
instead of their ordinal numbers.

Figure 5.3 shows an example of Proxy DLL that we implemented in the Symbian OS
emulator to log our target API calls (e.g., func(a,b) exported by foo.dll). Figure 5.3(a)
shows that without the Proxy DLL, when an application makes a function call func(a,b),
the import library will load the corresponding DLL (i.e., foo.dll), search for the function
address and invoke the correct function. The DLL is loaded at run-time and transparently
to user applications. Thus, we can replace the original DLL files with new Proxy DLLs
instrumented with logging functionalities without any modification of both applications
and import libraries. For instance, in Figure 5.3(b), the original foo.dll is replaced with
a Proxy DLL with the same name and exported function (func(a,b)). When the import
library (foo.lib) loads the DLL with the name foo.dll, the new Proxy DLL is loaded into the
memory. After the application makes a function call func(a,b), the import library invokes
the exported func(a,b) in the Proxy DLL which then loads the original DLL (origin_foo.dll)
into the memory and runs the true func(a,b). Meanwhile, the Proxy DLL logs information
about these API invocation events, including process ID, timestamp, parameters passed to
the function and its return value.

Figure 5.4: Major components of the monitoring system

Since we are not interested in logging every API call, the monitoring system was customized to log only those functions that can be exploited by mobile malware. In particular, only functions that constitute the atomic proposition variables described in Section 5.2 were entered in the Proxy DLL so that they can be logged. The number of function calls to be monitored may increase in future as new malware families emerge. However, the logging overhead is relatively low: (600 microseconds). For microprocessors that allow real-time tracing, e.g., ARM cores with an Embedded Trace Macrocell (ETM) unit, this overhead is expected to be minimal.

The rest of this section describes a two-stage mapping technique that we have used to construct the behavior signatures from the captured API calls. Figure 5.4 presents a schematic diagram of how low-level system events and API calls are first mapped to a sequence of atomic propositional variables (see Section 5.2.2), and then by graph pruning and aggregation, a set of behavior signatures. These two stages are elaborated next.

5.3.2 Stage I: Generation of Dependency Graph

Using the Proxy DLL, our monitoring agent logs a sequence of API calls invoked by all processes running in the system. The next step is to correlate these API calls using the TLCK logic described in Section 5.2.2, and build the behavior signatures (see Section 5.2). Note that the monitoring layer captures system-wide events and therefore API calls from different processes are intermingled with each other in the log. However, constructing behavior signatures requires application of TLCK logic to calls made by different processes. To efficiently represent the interactions among processes, we construct a dependency graph

from logged API calls that effectively correlates different processes. This is achieved by applying the following rules to the captured API calls.

Intra-process rule: API calls that are invoked by the same process IDs are directly connected in the graph according to their temporal order. For example, in Figure 5.5, we represent the dependency graphs for two processes that generate two atomic propositional variables,

MakeSIS(f,files) and *OBEXSendFile(f,d)*, respectively. The dependency graph for Process 2 (a set of API calls for sending files via Bluetooth) is an example of intra-process temporal ordering. Because all the functions had been called by a single process, they are connected with directed arrows indicating their temporal order. The result of this temporal ordering is the atomic propositional variable *OBEXSendFile(caribe.sis,d)* becoming true.

Inter-process rule: Since malware behavior signatures often involve multiple processes, we define two inter-process rules.

1. **Process-process relationship** where a process creates another process by forking and cloning within the context of a single application. In this case, the API calls become a new branch in the forked or cloned process.

2. **Process-file relationship** where a process creates, modifies or changes the attributes of a file, *and* the same file is read by another process. Establishing a chain of events from *process-file access* relationships is similar to the concept of backtracking [74], which identifies potential sequences of activities that occurred during an intrusion. We use a similar procedure to construct calling-process dependency relationships. Figure 5.5 shows an example of the inter-process dependency rule, where *Process 1, createsis* packages some files into a SIS archive file (caribe.sis), and subsequently, *Process 2* reads the file and sends it via Bluetooth. The result of this step is the construction of a larger signature: $MakeSIS(caribe.sis,..) \wedge$ $OBEXSendFile(caribe.sis,..)$.

Figure 5.5: Dependency graphs for constructing atomic propositional variables

5.3.3   Stage II: Graph Pruning and Aggregation

Since every process has its own call-chain graph and may be connected to other processes via dependency links, the graph for system-wide process interactions could be very large. Note that propositional variables created from the monitoring log should be automatically assigned an expiration time so that one can discard as many unnecessary dependency graph elements as possible. A simple expiration policy is to destroy the call-chain graph of a process upon its termination. However, this has an undesirable consequence because it will not allow building a future inter-process dependency graph with propositional variables generated by another process or application. This "information loss" can be exploited by a mobile malware by waiting for some time after each of its steps and avoiding detection by not letting its behavior signature to be completely built! To avoid such a scenario while still keeping memory requirements reasonable for generating behavior signatures, we implemented the following rules in the monitoring layer.

The dependency graph and propositional variables generated from API calls made by a process are discarded (upon its termination) if and only if:

1. The process didn't have inter-process dependency relationships with any other process (i.e., it is independent);

2. Its graph doesn't *partially* match with any behavioral signature that has inter-process dependencies;

3. It didn't create or modify any directory in the list of directories maintained in a hash table of critical user and system directories (see Section 5.2.4); and

4. It is a helper process that takes input from a process and returns data to the main process.

Since the dependency graphs can grow over time, we aggregate each API call sequence (e.g., Process 1 and Process 2 in Figure 5.5) as early as possible to reduce the size of the overall storage.

Finally, To construct a behavior signature by composing TLCK operators over the propositional variables, we use a state transition graph for each behavior signature, where the transition of each state is triggered by the invocation of one or more atomic propositional variables. The advantage of encoding each atomic variable into a state transition graph is that the monitoring system can easily validate the variable from operations performed in Stage I. A behavior signature is, therefore, constructed as a jig-saw puzzle by confirming a set of atomic propositional variables along its state transition graph until a terminal state is reached. This process of applying TLCK operators in the state diagram is shown in Figure 5.6 for the behavior signature *FindDevice*. It shows two parallel branches used to discover Bluetooth devices nearby, depending on which protocol is invoked by the application. State transitions along a branch are invoked by specific Symbian API calls.

The outcome of the two stages is a behavior signature that is to be classified either malicious or harmless by the detection system.

5.4 Behavior Classification by Machine Learning Algorithm

The behavior signatures for the complete life-cycle of a malware, such as those developed in Section 5.2, are placed in a malicious behavior database for run-time classification

State Diagram for Bluetooth discovering other devices

Figure 5.6: State-transition diagram for signature FindDevice

of signatures constructed via the two-stage mapping technique described above. However, if we wait until the complete behavior signature of a malware is constructed by the monitoring layer, it may be too late to prevent the malware from inflicting some damage to the handset. In order to activate early response mechanisms, our malicious behavior database must also contain partial signatures that have a high probability of manifesting as malicious behavior. These partial signatures (e.g., *bt-transfer*, *sms-transfer* and *init_worm* in Section 5.2.3) are directly constructed from the complete life-cycle malware signatures in the database. However, this introduces the problem of false-positives, i.e., partial signatures that may also represent the behavior of legitimate applications running on the handset, but may be falsely classified as malicious. Moreover, we would like the behavior detection system to be able to detect new malware or variants of existing malware, whose behavior is likely to be only partially matched with the signatures in the database. Therefore, instead of exact signature matching, we need a mechanism to classify the partial (or incomplete) malicious behavior signatures.

We use a learning method for classifying these partial behavior signatures from the training data of both normal and malicious applications. In this study, we focus on the

binary classification problem where the goal is to generate a function that can classify the input behavior signatures as belonging to either malicious (+1) or not (-1). In what follows, we describe a particular machine learning approach called *Support Vector Machines* (SVMs)that we implemented for the binary classification problem of partial behavior signatures.

5.4.1 Support Vector Machines

SVMs, based on the pioneering work of Vapnik [134] and Joachim [68] on statistical learning theory, have been successfully applied to a large number of classification problems, such as intrusion detection, gene expression analysis and machine diagnostics. SVMs are a supervised learning method that addresses the general problem of learning to differentiate between positive and negative members of a class of n-dimensional vectors [100]. SVMs address the problems of overfitting and capacity control associated with the classical learning machines such as neural networks. Traditional neural networks suffer from generalization, resulting in models that can overfit the training data. For a given learning task with a finite training set, the learning machine must strike a balance between the accuracy obtained on the given training set and the *capacity* of the machine which measures its ability to learn future unknown data without error. A machine with either high or low capacity may result in falsely classifying new observations. The flexible generalization ability of SVMs makes the approach suitable for real-world applications with a limited amount of training data. Here we refer to solving classification problems using SVMs as *Support Vector Classification* (SVC).

Let $(\mathbf{x}_1, y_1), \cdots, (\mathbf{x}_m, y_m)$ denote m observations (or the training set) of behavior signatures $\mathbf{x}$. Each behavior signature $\mathbf{x}_i$ is of dimension d corresponding to the number of propositional variables, and $y_i = \pm 1$ is the corresponding class label (i.e., malicious or non-malicious) assigned to each observation i. Since behavior signatures are specified as propositional variables interposed with TLCK operators, we encode each signature with two types of features: Propositional Variable (PV) and Temporal Order (TO) features. In the current implementation, the first 10 elements in the feature vector $\mathbf{x}$ specify the PV

features, each of which corresponds to one atomic propositional variable defined in Section 5.2.3 and has a value indicating the number of executions of the variable. For instance, 4-*th* and 5-*th* elements in **x** correspond to the variables: BTFindDevice and OBEXSendFile and their values indicate how many times the monitored program has searched for nearby devices and sent files via Bluetooth. The rest of the elements in **x** are TO features, encoding the temporal constraints dictated by TLCK logic. For example, the 11-*th* element in **x** records how many times variable BTFindDevice *happened before* OBEXSendFile (i.e. the high-level signature bt-transfer) . As a result, each normal or malicious behavior signature is encoded into a the feature vector **x**, which is then learned by the SVM algorithm to generate the optimal classifiers for detecting malicious codes.

We denote the space of input signatures (i.e., $\mathbf{x}_i$'s) as Θ. Given this training data, we want to be able to *generalize* to new observations, i.e., given a new observation $\bar{\mathbf{x}} \in \Theta$, we would like to predict the corresponding $y \in \{\pm 1\}$. To do this, we need a function, $k(\mathbf{x}, \bar{\mathbf{x}})$, that can measure similarity (i.e., a real-valued scalar distance) between data points **x** and $\bar{\mathbf{x}}$ in Θ:

$$k : \Theta \times \Theta \to \Re \tag{5.1}$$

$$(\mathbf{x}, \bar{\mathbf{x}}) \rightarrowtail k(\mathbf{x}, \bar{\mathbf{x}}). \tag{5.2}$$

The function *k* is called a *kernel* and is most often represented as a canonical dot product. For example, given two behavior vectors **x** and $\bar{\mathbf{x}}$ of dimension d, the kernel *k* can be represented as

$$k(\mathbf{x}.\bar{\mathbf{x}}) = \Sigma_{i=1}^{d} (\mathbf{x})_i \cdot (\bar{\mathbf{x}})_i. \tag{5.3}$$

The dot-product representation of kernels allows geometrical interpretation of the behavior signatures in terms of angles, lengths and their distances. In fact, the dot product represents the cosine of the angle between vectors **x** and $\bar{\mathbf{x}}$ when their lengths are normalized to 1. A key step in SVM is mapping of the vectors **x** from their original input space Θ to a higher-dimensional dot-product space, F, called the *feature space*. This mapping is represented as $\Phi : \Theta \to F$. The mapping functions are chosen such that the similarity measure is preserved as a dot product in F:

$$k(\mathbf{x}, \bar{\mathbf{x}}) \to K(\mathbf{x}, \bar{\mathbf{x}})) := (\Phi(\mathbf{x}).\Phi(\bar{\mathbf{x}})) \tag{5.4}$$

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There are many choices for the mapping functions in the feature space, such as polynomials, radial basis functions, multi-layer perceptron, splines and Fourier series, leading to different learning algorithms. We refer to [35] for an explanation of requirements and properties of kernel-induced mapping functions. We found the Gaussian radial basis functions an effective choice for our classification problem:

$$K(\mathbf{x}, \bar{\mathbf{x}})) = \exp(-\frac{\|\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}\|^2}{2\sigma^2}). \tag{5.5}$$

With these definitions, the two basic steps of SVC can be written as: (i) map the training data into a higher-dimensional feature space via Φ, and (ii) construct a hyperplane in feature space F that separates the two classes with maximum margin. Note that there are many linear classifiers that can separate the two classes but there is only *one* that maximizes the distance between the closest data points of each class and the hyperplane itself. The solution to this linear hyperplane is obtained by solving a distance optimization problem given below. The result is a classifier that will work well on previously-unseen examples leading to good generalization. Although the separating hyperplane in F is linear, it yields a nonlinear decision boundary in the original input space Θ. The properties of the kernel function K allow computation of the separating hyperplane without explicitly mapping the vectors in the feature space. The equation of the optimal separating hyperplane in the feature space to determine the class of a new observation $\mathbf{x}$ is given by:

$$y = f(\mathbf{x}) = sgn\left(\sum_{i=1}^{m} y_i \alpha_i . (\Phi(\mathbf{x}) . \Phi(\mathbf{x}_i)) + b\right)$$

$$= sgn\left(\sum_{i=1}^{m} y_i \alpha_i . K(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_i) + b\right). \tag{5.6}$$

The Lagrange multipliers α_i's are found by solving the following optimization problem:

$$maximize \ W(\alpha) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_i - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i,j=1}^{m} \alpha_i \alpha_j y_i y_j K(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_i) \tag{5.7}$$

subject to the following constraints:

$$\alpha_i \geq 0, i = 1, 2, \cdots, m \tag{5.8}$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_i y_i = 0, \tag{5.9}$$

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where $\mathbf{x}_i$'s denote the training data of the behavior vectors. Note that only those data that have non-zero α_i contribute to the hyperplane equation. These are termed *Support Vectors* (SVs). If the data points are linearly separable, all the SVs will lie on the margin and therefore, the number of SVs will be small. As a result, the hyperplane will be determined by a small subset of the training set. The other points in the training set will have no effect on the hyperplane. With an appropriate choice of kernel K, one can transform a linearly non-separable training set into one that is linearly separable in the feature set and apply the above equations as shown. The parameter b (also called the "bias") can be calculated from:

$$b = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_i y_i [K(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}_r) + K(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}_s)] \tag{5.10}$$

where $\mathbf{x}_r$ and $\mathbf{x}_s$ are any SVs from each class satisfying $\alpha_r, \alpha_s > 0$ and $y_r = -1, y_s = 1$.

In practice, a separating hyperplane may not always be computed due to high overlap of the two classes in the input behavior vectors. There are modified formulations of the optimization problem, e.g., with slack variables and *soft margin classifiers* [35], resulting in well-generalizing classifiers in this case. We have not explored this in the present study.

5.5 Possible Evasion & Limitations, and Their Countermeasures

We now discuss (i) several possible ways attackers may evade our detection framework as well as a few limitations associated with it, and (ii) possible countermeasures for them.

A malware writer who has learned our detection system may try to evade it by modifying the behaviors of existing malware or creating new malicious behaviors. Similar to code obfuscation [87], program behavior can be obfuscated by: behavior reordering, file or directory renaming, normal behavior insertion and equivalent behavior replacement. For behavior reordering, note that attackers cannot arbitrarily reorder the program behaviors, since some temporal constraints must be satisfied in order to maintain the correct functionality. For example, the temporal ordering of ReceiveFile and InstallApp cannot be reversed, because installation of malware depends on first receiving the malware file. Similar temporal ordering must hold for Bluetooth or MMS transfer. On the other hand, the ordering

between Bluetooth and MMS transfers can be changed arbitrarily. Our approach is resilient to reordering because we only use TLCK to captures these inherent constraints to construct high-level behavior signatures (Section 5.2), thus providing strong protection against behavior-reordering obfuscation. File/directory renaming is done by assigning different names to malware executables or installation directories so that exact matching will fail to detect the variant. To resist such obfuscation, we abstract away the file/directory name and keep only file types, e.g., installation type (.SiS) and system directory names in the behavior signatures($\backslash$system). The third type of obfuscation (i.e, normal behavior insertion) inserts useless or innocent behavior sequences that do not influence the program functionality among malicious behaviors. Our approach is resilient to this obfuscation because it does not seek any exact match of some malicious template with program behavior. Instead, the signature is constructed by validating each behavior predicate and then classified via a machine learning algorithm. Moreover, in our framework, most of the behavior predicates on their own are normal, but they together, when connected with temporal relationships, become strong indicators of malicious behaviors. Hence, insertion of useless or normal behavior cannot evade our detection scheme. Finally, equivalent behavior substitution replaces groups of behaviors with other sequences that have the same functionality but are not captured with our signature predicates. Alternatively, attackers may try to circumvent the detection by mimicry attacks [138], i.e., disguising its behavior as normal sequences while having the same effect on the system. Although our approach cannot completely handle this type of obfuscation, it makes substitution or mimicry more difficult. First, the high-level definition of behavior signature hides many implementation details. Finding equivalent behavior sequences is not as easy as that for machine instruction sequences, where a rich instruction set is available [87]. Second, even if the monitor layer misses some malware behaviors due to lack of predicate specification for equivalent behavior sequences, the machine learning algorithm may still be able to make correct classification if the remaining behaviors captured are similar enough to existing worm behavior.

However, our approach also has a few limitations. First, since the current set of behavior predicates is defined based on the existing mobile malware, the detection might not succeed if most behaviors of a mobile worm are the same as normal programs or completely new

(this is equivalent to the case when attackers manage to substitute most of their malicious behaviors with equivalent sequences that are not detectable by our system). This is a fundamental limitation of any behavioral approach which detects unseen anomalies based on their similarities or dissimilarities from existing training data. Fortunately, in most cases, new malware share a great deal of similarity with their predecessors for the following reasons. First, the modularization and complexity of current malware make addition of new behaviors to existing malware a common technique used by malware writers [87]. Creation of truly new malware is very rare. Second, runtime packers (e.g., UPX [4], MEW [2], FSG [1], etc.) are one of the most widely-used techniques for generating malware variants (for example, over 92% of malware files in wild list 02/2006 are packed [32]). Running these packed malware essentially unpacks the original executable codes and then transfers control to them. This means that the behavior of these packed variants is the same as the original executables. A recent report by Symatec [38] also confirms our observation that most new malware are variations of existing ones and the number of new malware families is declining. In future, however, we would like to derive a similarity threshold for detection, i.e., how dissimilar the new malware has to be from the previous malware behavior in order not to be caught by our framework. Second, as a general problem for all host-based mechanisms, our system can be circumvented by malware that can bypass the API monitoring (e.g., install rootkit, place hook deeper than the monitor) or modify the framework configuration (e.g., disable the detection engine). Countermeasures have been proposed for desktop environments, such as the rootkit revealer [3], trusted virtual machine monitor [129], etc. These approaches may be applied in mobile settings as handsets become more powerful.

While there are several ways an attacker could attempt to evade detection, our approach, as demonstrated in the next section, is still effective in detecting many mobile malware variants and thus significantly raises the bar for mobile malware writers to overcome, unlike the traditional signature-based detection.

5.6 Evaluation and Results

5.6.1 Methodology

Due to limited access to source code[3] of worm and normal applications, we evaluate the proposed behavioral detection framework first by emulating program behavior and then testing it against real-world worm. First, we wrote several applications that emulated known Symbian worms: Cabir, Mabir, Lasco, Commwarrior and a generic worm that spreads by sending messages via MMS and Bluetooth. For each malware, we reproduced the infection state machine, especially the resource accesses and system events that these malware trigger in the Symbian OS. We also included variants of each malware based on our review of the malware family published by various anti-virus vendors. For most malware, this required addition of different variations in application lifetime, number and subject of messages sent to other devices, file name, type and attachment sizes, different installation directories for the worm payload, etc. We also built 3 legitimate applications that shared several common partial behavior signatures with the worms. These are Bluetooth OBEX file transfer, MMS client, and the *MakeSIS* utility in Symbian OS that creates an SIS archive file from a given list of files.

These 8 (5 worms and 3 legitimate) applications contain many execution branches corresponding to different behavior signatures that can be captured by the runtime monitoring. To execute all possible branches, we run these applications many times so that most branches are executed at least once. Each run of an application results in a set of behavior signatures captured by the monitoring layer. Depending on the time window over which these behavior signatures are created from the monitoring logs, we obtain partial/full signatures of various predicate lengths. Next, we remove all repeated signatures and collect only the unique signatures generated from the above runs to create a training dataset and a test dataset that are subsequently used for our evaluation. We generate several training and test datasets by repeating the above procedure so that expected averages of classification accuracy, false positive and false negative rates can be calculated. Next, we use the training data to train the SVM model and classify each signature in the test data using this model

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[3]Since the monitor is implemented in Symbian emulator which requires applications to be recompiled in order to be executed

to determine the classification accuracy. Here we refer to solving classification problems using SVMs as *Support Vector Classification* (SVC).

5.6.2   Accuracy of SVC

To evaluate the effectiveness of the kernel function, we first vary the size of the training set to determine its effect on the classification error. Table 5.1 shows the classification accuracy, number of false positives and false negatives for a test data size of 905 distinct signatures and different training data sizes. We found that SVC almost never falsely classifies a legitimate application signature to be malicious. On the other hand, for small training data sizes, the number of false negatives (malicious signatures classified as legitimate) is high. However, as the training data size is increased, the classification accuracy increases quickly, reaching near 100% detection of malicious signatures. In our experiments with other training and test dataset sizes, we observed very similar classification results.

Table 5.1 also shows the number of Support Vectors (SVs) for each training set. SVs indicate the size of the SVM model that must be included in the monitoring layer for classifying the run-time behavior signatures. Since a training data size of 150 is sufficient for the 5 worms we studied, on average, about 50 SVs are included in the SVM model for run-time detection. Each SV corresponds to a signature in the training dataset and therefore, the number of signatures needed for classification for hundreds of variants of these worms is relatively small.

5.6.3   Generality of Behavior Signatures

A major benefit of behavioral detection is its capability of detecting new malware based on existing malicious behavior signatures if the new malware is written, as is commonly the case, to possess some of the behavior of the existing malware signatures. In case of payload signature-based detection systems, their signature database must be updated to detect the new malware. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of 'generalization' in our malicious behavior signatures, we divide the 4 worms (Cabir, Mabir, Lasco, and Commwarrior (CW)) into 2 groups. The signatures of the first group ("known worms") are placed in the malicious behavior signature database including their partial signatures. These worms are used

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to train the SVM classification model. The worms in the second group ("unknown worms") are then executed in the emulator; their signatures are captured in the monitoring layer and comprise the test dataset. The resulting detection rates for different combinations of known and unknown worms are summarized in Table 5.2. The results show that the combination of TLCK-based signature generation and SVC methodology can detect "unknown" worms even when the training data sets are relatively small. This is especially true for malware that are similar in behavior to each other. We plan to explore this further in future so that the size of the malicious signature database may remain small as new strains of malware targeting handsets are discovered.

5.6.4 Evaluation with Real-world Mobile Worms

To confirm the effectiveness of our behavior-based detection, we tested it against real-world mobile malware. We were able to collect the original samples for 2 Symbian worms, Cabir and Lasco, whose source codes are available online. Cabir [55] replicates over Bluetooth connections by scanning to discover Bluetooth devices in its range and sending copies of infected worm file (SIS file). Lasco [56] propagates via Bluetooth in the same manner as Cabir. It is also capable of inserting itself into other SIS file found in the devices, so that Lasco will start during the installation of the injected file.

We collected the behavior signatures for these worms by compiling and running them on the Symbian emulator. Considering the fact that the dynamic analysis results may depend on the run-time environment, we ran each malware sample 10 times with different environmental settings such as running time, number of neighboring devices, number of failed Bluetooth connections, etc. For example, in one setting, the number of neighboring device is zero, thus making the worm continuously search for new devices. This generates varying-size signatures that describe the worm behavior in each specific environment. We apply the trained classifier (with training set 92 as in Table 5.1) on each signature. SVC was found to achieve 100% detection of all worm instances.

In order to test the resilience of SVC to the variations of worm, we modified the source code and implemented known worm variants based on the information in F-Secure mobile malware descriptions [58]. Since we did not find any description for Lasco variants, we

only created variants for Cabir which has 32 variants (Cabir.A-Z, AA, AB, AC,AD, AE, AF). Most of these variants are found to be minor variations of the original Cabir worm. For example, Cabir.Z differs only in the infected SIS file name (i.e., file-renaming obfuscation) from Cabir.B, which, in turn, differs trivially from the original Cabir by displaying a different message on the screen. Since the behavioral detection abstracts away the name details, these variants are easily detectable by our approach.[4] As a result, we only implement major variations which fall into 3 categories. First, the original Cabir has an implementation flaw that makes it lock on the device found first and never search for the others, which slows down its spreading speed. One major variant (e.g., Cabir.H) fixes this bug by enabling the worm to search for new targets when the first device is out of range. We modified the replication routine and implemented this variation. The second major variant is Cabir.AF, which is a size-optimized recompilation of the original Cabir. We implemented this variation by incorporating the compression routine found in Lasco source code, which utilizes the zlib library to compress the SIS file. Third, we implemented a synthetic behavior-reordering obfuscation. The original Cabir worm always prepares an infected SIS file before searching for nearby Bluetooth devices. In contrast, the new variant finds an available device first, then creates SIS file and finally transfers it via Bluetooth. We collected behavior signatures for these variants by running each of them 10 times in different environments and apply the trained classifier. Again, SVC is found to be resilient to these obfuscation, and successfully detects all the variants.

5.6.5 Overhead of Proxy DLL

The major overhead of our monitoring system comes from the Proxy DLL that logs API calls in real-time. To estimate the overhead imposed by Proxy DLL, we measure the execution times of functions before and after they are wrapped by Proxy DLL. Average overheads for some of the typical function calls are: 564.2 μs (establish a session with the local Bluetooth service database), 670 μs (display a message in the screen), 625.8 μs (SMS

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[4]Although the signature-based approach is also resilient to simple renaming obfuscation, some of the variants (e.g., Cabir.AA) modify and recompile the source code, thus resulting in different binary images from the original worm, which may require additional signatures in case of the signature-based detection. By contrast, in the behavioral detection, a single behavior signature for the original worm suffices.

messaging library calls) and 608.5 μs (allocate new objects). The overhead of Proxy DLL is, on average, 600 microseconds. We conjecture that this is primarily due to the disk access overhead. Because we only monitor a small subset of API calls, this overhead is acceptable low for practical deployment.

5.6.6 Summary and Discussion of Evaluation Results

Overall, we find that the behavior signature-based detection is highly effective for mobile malware and its variants. However, we also noticed the limitation of current evaluation: the monitoring layer has not yet been implemented in a real handset due to the restricted access of the Symbian OS kernel information which is only available to their business partners or licensed users. This keeps us from testing the framework against a wide range of normal applications whose source codes are not available. Thus, we have to resort to emulation to accurately reproduce the programs' real behavior. However, the synthetic traces could overestimate the detection accuracy and/or underestimate the framework overhead. We are currently collaborating with a major mobile phone manufacturer to implement the proposed framework on real handsets. Despite this limitation, our evaluation results on real mobile worms still suggest that the behavioral detection offers a good alternative to signature-based detection, because of a small number of behaviors that are sufficient to represent many families of malware.

5.7   Related Literature

The most relevant to our work are analysis of mobile viruses and worms [89, 131], behavior-based worm detection [49, 64], backtracking [74] and Support Vectors for intrusion detection [65, 94]. Many well-known mobile viruses and worms, including some of the malware mentioned in this section, have been analyzed in Chapter 4 and [131]. There have also been recent studies to model propagation of such malware in cellular and adhoc (e.g., in Bluetooth piconets) networks. For example, the authors of [89] proposed an analytical model called probabilistic queuing for modeling malware propagation in an ad-hoc Bluetooth environment.

Recently, to overcome the limitations of signature-based detection, behavior based malware analysis and detection techniques have been proposed, mostly for the desktop environment. Here we compare and contrast our approach with related work in the area of behavior-based malware detection. Besides the difference in the target environment (our approach focuses primarily on mobile malware), several important features also distinguish our work from previous research.

Early efforts, such as the one by Forrest *et al.* [60, 115], are designed for host-based anomaly detection. These approaches observe the application behavior in the form of system calls and create a database of all the fixed-length consecutive system calls from normal applications. Possible intrusions are discovered by looking for call sequences that do not appear in the database. Later work improves the behavior profile by applying advanced mining techniques on the call sequences, e.g., rule learning algorithms [37], finite-state automata [77, 113], and Hidden Markov Model [141]. All these share the same concept of representing programs' normal behavior with system calls and performing anomaly detection by measuring the deviation from normal profiles. One limitation of these approaches is that they ignore the semantics of system call sequences and thus, could be evaded by simple obfuscation or mimicry attacks [138]. To address this deficiency, Christodorescu *et al.* proposed semantics-aware malware detection [87],that attempts to detect polymorphic malware by identifying semantically-equivalent instruction sequences in the malware variants. In their work, malicious behavior e.g, decryption loop is described with a template of instruction sequences. A matching algorithm is applied on the disassembled binaries to find the instruction sequences that match the predefined malicious template. By abstracting away the name of register and symbolic constants, it is resilient to several code obfuscation techniques. However, as it requires exact matching between the template node and application instructions, attacks using the equivalent instruction replacement and reordering are still possible. Similar to [87], several other existing efforts also use static analysis of application behavior to detect unwanted programs e.g., rootkit [78] and spyware [47]. The authors in [78] propose to detects the kernel rootkits by statically analyzing kernel modules and looking for suspicious instruction sequences. The approach in [47] determines a spyware component by statically extract a list of Windows API calls invoked in response to

browser events, and combines it with dynamic analysis to identify the interactions between the component and the OS. A spyware-like behavior is detected if the component monitors user behavior and leaks this information by invoking some API calls. Static analysis is also widely used to collect the structural information of an executable file (e.g., control and data flow) and detect various attacks [34] or malware [73].

Our approach differs from those mentioned above in several ways. The most significant difference lies in the definition of application behavior. Our approach observes the programs' *run-time* behavior at a higher level (i.e., system events or resource-access) than system calls [60, 115, 141] and machine instructions [87]. This higher-level abstraction improves resilience to polymorphism and facilitates detection of malware variants, as it abstracts away more low-level implementation details. Second, our approach employs a run-time analysis, effectively bypassing the need to deal with code/data obfuscation [130]. Run-time analysis also avoids the possible loss of information of the static approach, since a static analysis often fails to reveal inter-compnet/system interaction information [130] and/or disassembly is not always possible for all binaries (Linn and Debray [84] showed that disassemblers can be thwarted with simple obfuscations). Moreover, in contrast to Forrest's anomaly detection [60] which learns only normal applications' behavior or Christodorescu's misuse detection [87] which matches against only malicious templates, our approach exploits information on *both* normal programs' and malware's behaviors, and employs a machine learning (instead of exact matching) algorithm to improve the detection accuracy. Since the learning and classification are based on two opposite-side data sets, this approach conceptually combines the anomaly detection with misuse detection and therefore, could strike a balance between false positives and false negatives.

Like our approach, some existing work also leverages on the run-time analysis for improving the detection accuracy. Newsome and Song [99] proposed a dynamic taint analysis to detect the buffer overflow exploits on commodity software. Their approach is to perform binary rewriting at run-time to track the propagation and improper use of unsafe or tainted data. Lee and Mody [130] collected a sequence of application events at run-time and constructed an opaque object to represent the behavior in rich syntax. Their work is similar to ours in that both apply a machine learning algorithm on high-level behavior represen-

tations. However, their work focuses on clustering malware into different families using nearest-neighbor algorithms based on the edit distance between data samples, while we are only interested in distinguishing normal from malicious programs. Moreover, we use a supervised learning procedure to make best of existing normal and malicious program information while clustering is a common unsupervised learning procedure.

Ellis *et al.* in [49] present a novel approach for automatic detection of Internet worms using their behavioral signatures. These signatures were generated from worm behaviors manifested in network traffic, e.g., tree-like propagation and changing a server into a client. Along the same line, NetSpy [139] performs behavior characterization and differential analysis on the network traffic to help automatically generate network-level signatures of new spyware. Our approach is fundamentally different from [49] and [139] in that we focus on characterization of host-based malware behavior, incorporating a wide range of system events into behavior signatures. The Primary Response from Sana Security [64] is another host-based behavioral approach that monitors desktop applications and employs multiple behavioral heuristics and correlations (e.g., Registry modification, keylogging procedures, process hijacking, etc.) to identify a malicious application. BackTracker [74] aims to automatically identify potential sequences of activities that occurred in an intrusion. Starting with a single detection point (e.g., a suspicious file), BackTracker recursively identifies files and processes that could have affected the detection point, and displays chains of events in a dependency graph. We use a similar technique to build dependency graphs for generating behavior signatures that manifest in interactions among multiple applications.

Previous research we have discussed so far dealt primarily with the desktop environment and thus does not address mobile malware that can spread via non-traditional vectors such as Bluetooth and SMS/MMS messages. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to construct a behavioral detection model for mobile environments. The most relevant to our work is the analysis of mobile viruses and worms [30, 89, 131]. Many well-known mobile viruses and worms, including some of the malware mentioned herein, have been analyzed in [30] and [131]. Morales et.al in [93] test virus detectors for handsets against windows mobile viruses and show that current anti-virus solution performs poorly in identify virus variants. There have also been recent studies to model propagation of such

malware in cellular and ad-hoc (e.g., in Bluetooth piconets) networks [89, 119, 151, 152]. For example, the authors of [89] proposed an analytical model called *probabilistic queuing* for modeling malware propagation in an ad-hoc Bluetooth environment. Although our focus is primarily handset-based detection, analysis and propagation modeling of mobile viruses and worms help us devise appropriate behavior signatures and response mechanisms.

Applying machine learning algorithms in anomaly detection has also received considerable attention [62]. Recently, Support Vector Machines (SVMs), a supervised learning algorithm based on the pioneering work of Vapnik [134] and Joachim [68] on statistical learning theory, have been successfully used in a number of classification problems. For example, [94] compares the performance of neural networks-based and SVM-based systems for intrusion detection using a set of DARPA benchmark data. The authors of [65] describe Adaptive Model Generation (AMG), a real-time architecture for implementing data mining-based intrusion detection systems. AMG uses SVMs as one specific type of model-generation algorithms for unsupervised anomaly detection. Methods for unsupervised SVM [112] can be easily implemented in our framework, eliminating the need for labeled training data.

5.8   Conclusion

We have presented a behavioral detection framework for viruses, worms and Trojans that increasingly target mobile handsets. Mobile environments must cope with various unique constraints and new features which do not exist in traditional desktop settings. Especially, a lightweight behavior classifier for malware detection is a must for resource-constrained mobile environments.We have generated a malicious behavior signature database based on a comprehensive review of mobile malware reported to date. Since behavior signatures are fewer and shorter than traditional payload signatures, the database is compact enough to be placed on a handset. A behavior signature also describes behavior for an entire family of malware including their variants. This eliminates the need for frequent updates of the behavior signature database as new variants appear. We have implemented

the monitoring layer on the Symbian OS for run-time construction of behavior signatures. In order to identify malicious behavior from partial signatures, we used SVM to train a classifier from normal and malicious data. Our evaluation of both emulated and real-world malware shows that behavioral detection not only results in very high detection rates (over 96%) but also detects new malware and if they share similar behavioral patterns with existing ones in the database.

Training Set Size	Support Vector	Accuracy	False Positive	False Negative
22	21	82.1%	0	16
47	22	97.9%	1	18
56	20	97.5%	0	22
74	34	98.4%	0	14
92	29	99.4%	0	5
122	30	99.5%	0	4
142	51	99.2%	0	7
153	38	99.6%	0	3
256	48	100%	0	0
356	82	99.7%	0	2
462	61	100%	0	0
547	95	99.8%	0	1
628	106	99.8%	0	1
720	68	100%	0	0
798	186	99.8%	0	1

Table 5.1: Classification accuracy.

Training Set	Testing Set				Overall
	Cabir	Mabir	CW	Lasco	
Cabir	100	17	35	72.5	56
Mabir	100	100	51	27	69.5
CW	100	30.5	100	69.5	75
Lasco	64.5	17.5	38.5	100	55.1
Cabir Mabir	100	100	42	54	74
Cabir CW	100	45	100	100	86.3
Cabir Lasco	100	27	50.5	100	69.4
Mabir CW	100	100	100	100	100
Mabir Lasco	100	100	100	100	100
CW Lasco	100	34.5	100	100	86.3
Cabir Mabir CW	100	100	100	76.5	94.1
Cabir Mabir Lasco	100	100	100	100	100
Cabir CW Lasco	100	99.5	100	100	99.9
Mabir CW Lasco	100	100	100	100	100

Table 5.2: Detection accuracy (%) for unknown worms

CHAPTER 6

Conclusions and Future Work

In this dissertation, we investigated propagation, detection and containment of emerging malware that spread using non-traditional vectors such as power-law topologies, mobile messaging systems, short-range RF communication channels, etc. Traditional epidemic models of infection propagation based on node homogeneity and average degree of connectivity among nodes are not suitable for capturing the propagation of these viruses and worms. It may not always be possible to develop differential equation-based models that can capture the underlying interactions at various time scales and heterogeneity of nodes. Therefore, in Chapter 2, we investigated agent-based modeling to study propagation dynamics of these malware. Using agent-based simulation, we incorporated different services (Bluetooth, IM, SMS/MMS, email, P2P, etc.) available on individual nodes (or,laptops, PDAs and handsets) that are targeted by the malware at a fine-grained level. The effect of mobility on the propagation was also studied by incorporating a number of commonly used mobility models. Our simulations affirm that combining multiple services increases the initial growth rate of the epidemic almost exponentially and therefore, human countermeasures will be useless. With the increasing number of hybrid malware reported in recent years, potential for wide-spread damage from such malware is high for both the Internet as well as the cellular networks.

In Chapter 3, we proposed a novel containment framework called *Proactive Group Behavior Containment* (PGBC) to contain malicious programs spreading in power-law topologies such as IM and SMS/MMS networks. The main ideas behind PGBC are service-

behavior graphs constructed at the server from client messaging patterns and partitioning of these graphs into behavior clusters that identify clients of similar behavior patterns. Then, PGBC uses a combination of message rate-limiting and quarantine with increasing reaction to alerts in the network. In our evaluation results for a SMS network based on real-life SMS traces, PGBC is found to be several orders-of-magnitude more effective than traditional defenses such as "detect-and-block" and traditional client rate-limiting. Our results show that group-based proactive defense is key to slowing down malicious codes during the early stages of their spreading. This is critical because there is only a small time window between the time an infection is detected and the time the cumulative number of infections reaches an epidemic threshold. PGBC makes most of this time window by proactively quarantining and rate-limiting vulnerable clients in the network.

In order to develop robust general-purpose detection and containment methodologies, one must analyze current-generation malware to extract a set of their common behavior vectors. In Chapter 4, we studied the vulnerabilities of Bluetooth and SMS/MMS messaging systems in depth, and identified the vulnerabilities that may be exploited by future mobile viruses. We have also developed the state diagram of a generic mobile virus that can spread via SMS/MMS and Bluetooth. We used data from a large real-world cellular carrier to generate a scaled-down topology of an SMS network and studied the propagation of this mobile virus. Our results indicate that due to heterogeneity of mobile handset platforms and scale-free nature of the SMS network, the growth rate of a mobile virus exploiting SMS messages is small. But the growth rate increases significantly when these handsets are highly vulnerable to Bluetooth exploits. Next, in Chapter 5, we proposed a novel behavioral detection framework for mobile malware based on extraction of common behavior vectors from a large number of reported mobile viruses, spyware and worms. Our detection framework applies the TLCK logic on a set of atomic behavioral steps that the malware must perform to create behavior signatures of broad category of malware. In order to identify malicious behavior, we train an SVM classifier with samples of both normal as well as malicious signatures. Our results indicate that behavioral detection not only results in very high detection rates (over 96%) but may also detect new worms and viruses if they display any behavioral pattern already in the database.

There are a number of areas where future work can be pursued.

- *S*ervice topologies: With millions of users joining P2P, IM and SMS networks, propagation and containment of malware in these networks will continue to be studied. The recent proliferation of social networks adds another dimension to the malware problem. Accurate characterization of power-law and social networks is an area where further research can be carried out. Reconstruction of these networks at periodic intervals will improve the accuracy and scalability of the PGBC algorithm. For example, one can track only incremental changes of the adjacency graph in time, instead of constructing the topology from scratch during each interval. In addition, fast indexing into this graph is also necessary to quickly determine the list of vulnerable hosts when an alert is generated. Therefore, more efficient service topology construction and search algorithms on graphs can be investigated.

- *L*arge network simulation: In order to study mobile malware propagation in real-life cellular networks, the AMM simulator should be optimized to handle millions of handset agents. This requires more efficient data structures and infection propagation algorithms. Further, parallel systems such as inexpensive Linux clusters can be used to perform the simulation in parallel and to accommodate large number of agents by decomposing the simulation domain into sub-domains.

- *M*obile malware detection and containment: The behavioral detection methodology presented in this dissertation should be integrated with a real-time containment framework that can selectively control different services available on the handset. This will ensure that voice and other services (e.g., navigation, local search etc.) on the handset are separately monitored by the containment layer, e.g., voice calls should not be impacted by malware that target only Bluetooth or SMS/MMS messaging. It will also be necessary to develop efficient over-the-air or Internet-based approaches for uploading new behavior signatures for the detection subsystem. As new generations of hybrid and crossover malware continue to appear at an increasing rate, further work will be necessary in all three aspects of malware research: propagation, detection and containment.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Appendix

A.1 Time-Series Modeling Techniques for Behavior Vectors

In this section, we apply the VARMA and exponential smoothing techniques to generate short-term forecasts for behavior vectors. Let us denote $Y_t = [y_{1t}, y_{2t}, \cdots, y_{mt}], 0 < t < \infty$, be a collection of m time-series corresponding to the m parameters of a behavior vector. Then, the VARMA(p, q) process for a stationary multivariate time-series with a zero mean vector can be represented as:

$$Y_t = \mu + \Sigma_{i=1}^{p} \Phi_i Y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t - \Sigma_{j=1}^{q} \Theta_j \varepsilon_{t-j} \tag{A.1}$$

where $\mu (= E(Y_t))$ is the mean vector, ε_t is the white noise with 0 mean and a positive definite covariance matrix σ^2. Y_t, μ and ε are $m \times 1$ vectors. The constants Φ_i and Θ_j are called *Auto-Regressive* (AR) and *Moving Average* (MA) coefficients, respectively. These are $m \times m$ matrices and can be estimated with the least-squares fit. The above equation can be written in a polynomial form by using operator L:

$$\Phi(L)Y_t = \mu + \Theta(L)\varepsilon_t \tag{A.2}$$

$$L^k Y_t = Y_{t-k}, \quad L^0 Y_t = Y_t. \tag{A.3}$$

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$\Phi(L)$ and $\Theta(L)$ are characteristic polynomials of order p and q, respectively:

$$\Phi(L) = I - \Sigma_{i=1}^{p}\Phi_i L^i; \quad \Theta(L) = I - \Sigma_{i=1}^{q}\Theta_i L^i. \tag{A.4}$$

In Eq. (A.2), each parameter y_{it} depends not only on its own histories, but also on time-series data of the other parameters in the behavior vector. Such cross-dependency cannot be observed by generating univariate ARMA models for individual elements of the behavior vector. The series Y_t is both stationary and invertible when the roots of $\Phi(L) = 0$ and $\Theta(L) = 0$ are on, or outside the unit circle, respectively. The orders p and q of the autoregressive and moving average terms are identified by calculating the extended sample autocorrelation function (ESCAF). We refer to [133] for a description of the estimation procedure.

Since VARMA is applied to stationary time-series data, we must test the stationarity assumption of the time-series data. We assume weak stationarity, i.e., both the mean and variance remain constant over time, and the auto-covariance depends only on the time lags in the data. Nonstationarity in time-series data may arise from several conditions such as drift, trend, outliers, random walk and changes in variance [150]. Of these, outliers can often be identified from a time-sequence plot of the original series since they tend to distort the mean, making it non-constant. A trend can be either stochastic (e.g., a random walk) or deterministic, making the series change in level over time. In general, a nonstationary series can be transformed into stationary by "differencing" (i.e., subtracting the lagged value of the series from its current value) for stochastic trends, and by regression for deterministic trends [53]. We use the Multivariate Augmented Dicky Fuller (MADF) test [128] for stationarity. This is possible because, as observed in [106], the MA(q) component of an ARMA(p,q) process can be represented by an AR(p) process under the condition of invertibility of MA(q) when a large enough value of p is chosen. Using this observation, it is possible to test for a unit root of a time-series by estimating the auxiliary regression equation (for components of Y_t):

$$y_{it} = \mu_i + \Sigma_{j=1}^{p}\rho_{ij}y_{it-j} + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{A.5}$$

and to test for all m equations:

$$H_0 : \Sigma_{j=1}^{p} \rho_{ij} - 1 = 0, \forall i \in 1, 2, \cdots, m. \qquad \text{(A.6)}$$

We refer to [128] for further details on MADF and the solution procedure.

Recent characterization studies [71, 153] have revealed self-similarity and long-range dependency of Internet traffic, and evidence of nonstationarity of end-to-end parameters. It has been suggested that the notion of stationarity depends on the time scale of observation. The above studies show that certain processes, such as loss and traffic rates, can be modeled well as i.i.d. within the periods of stationary behavior. Similar observations on Ethernet campus backbone traffic and studies of time-series modeling are not widely available. In order to accurately characterize the traffic in a large enterprise network, we have recently started a large-scale data-collection effort for a class B enterprise network. Note that the parameters of a behavior vector, being aggregated observations, are less noisy than packet-level observations and therefore, yield stationary processes. This is in agreement with our studies of the enterprise network. Once we detect instability of the variance with time, we perform variance-stabilizing transformations. There are several options such as natural log, power and Box-Cox transformations [150] that can render the variance more stable. To test if a particular transformation is appropriate, we used standard measures of goodness of fit such as Mean Square Error (MSE), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwartz Bayesian Criterion [44, 46].

When the data in a behavior vector are insufficient, highly irregular, or the correlations change rapidly over time (such situations may especially arise in mobile and wireless segments), we model the parameters with exponential-smoothing models since VARMA processes are not suitable for modeling such data. Instead, a window of w traces are collected periodically at an interval of ΔT, and the behavior vectors S are rebuilt at every ΔT. If each trace is of duration δt, ΔT should be chosen such that $\Delta T \geq w \delta t$. We apply exponential smoothing to the traces captured at times t and $t + \Delta T$, to create a smoothed series. The parameters of a behavior vector computed from the most recent traces ("observations") are weighted higher than those in the previous window to create a forecast for the next ΔT. An accurate calculation of service interactions and the associated weights is, therefore, dependent on several factors like window size w, sampling interval ΔT, duration

of each trace δt, and the smoothing parameter α $(0 \leq \alpha \leq 1)$. In general, the accuracy of service-behavior graph, G, increases with larger values of m, δt, and smaller values of ΔT.

We give an example of computing a specific element (n_m) of the behavior vector. let n and q denote the number of vertices in G and the number of observed services (or protocols) in the network, respectively. Also, let p_i and r_j denote any protocol i, and the number of captured frames in trace j during ΔT, respectively. The set of messages belonging to a protocol i and a trace j is written as $[MSG(p_i, j)]$, and therefore, $r_j = \sum_{i=1}^{q} [MSG(p_i, j)]$. A subset of these messages that belong to a given pair of vertices u and v are given by $[MSG(p_i, j)]_{(u,v)}$. Using these notations, we calculate the normalized number of messages, $n_m(t)$, for an edge e_{uv} in G at time t as follows:

$$n_m(t) = \frac{\sum_{j=i}^{w} \sum_{i=1}^{q} weight(p_i) \, [MSG(p_i, j)]_{(u,v)}}{\sum_{j=1}^{w} r_j}. \tag{A.7}$$

The parameter $weight(p_i)$ is a protocol-dependent weight in the network, and can be estimated from the fraction of all messages attributed to each of the protocols, as well as the number of hosts participating in each protocol. For example, if the traffic in a network consists mostly of HTTP, $w(HTTP)$ is close to 1. This is done in such a way that the most heavily-used protocols in the network have large weights. One can also build protocol-specific subsets of G by choosing appropriate subsets of $weight(p_i)$.[1]

Let $\overline{n_m}(t + \Delta T)$ and $\overline{n_m}(t)$ denote current and previous forecast values of the smoothed $n_m(t)$ at $t + \Delta T$ and t, respectively. Then, applying exponential smoothing to the observed data yields:

$$\overline{n_m}(t + \Delta T) = \alpha n_m(t) + (1 - \alpha)\overline{n_m}(t). \tag{A.8}$$

Eqs. (A.7) and (A.8) are used to calculate a weight for the edge e_{uv} in G, i.e., set $weight_e(uv) = n_m(t + \Delta T)$. Therefore, the weight reflects a communication cost associated with edge e_{uv}.

Similarly, we calculate the vertex weights by considering the total number of ingress and egress flows associated with each vertex. The vertex cost function can be used to group vertices that have similar communication costs. Let $[FLOW(p_i, j)]_{(k)}$ denote all flows in trace j of protocol type $p(i)$ that have vertex k as either source or destination.

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[1] $weight(p_i)=0$ eliminates protocol $p(i)$ from being included in the cost function.

The normalized number of flows associated with vertex k at t, $n_f(t)$, its forecast value $\overline{n_f}(t+\Delta T)$ and the vertex cost $weight_v(k)$ are given as:

$$n_f(t) = \frac{\sum_{j=i}^{w} \sum_{i=1}^{q} weight_v(p_i) \left[FLOW(p_i,j)\right]_{(k)}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{w} \sum_{i=1}^{q} \left[FLOW(p_i,j)\right]_{(k)}} \tag{A.9}$$

$$\overline{n_f}(t+\Delta T) = \alpha n_f(t) + (1-\alpha)\overline{n_f}(t) \tag{A.10}$$

$$weight_v(k) = \overline{n_f}(t+\Delta T). \tag{A.11}$$